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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis employs Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of law to argue that the doctrine of 
Canada’s duty to consult with indigenous communities is based on extra-legal communicative 
presumptions that fail to reflect the basic norm of communicative equality. It derives a set of 
communicative norms from discourse theory and demonstrates their dovetailing with discursive 
norms found within the intersocietal communicative practices associated with treaty-making in at 
least selected indigenous legal orders, such as in the establishment of the Great Peace of 
Montréal (1701). Finally, after providing a critical analysis of the duty to consult’s key 
discursive elements (historical narrative, justification, reconciliation, and the “honour of the 
Crown”), it argues for normative revisions of the duty to consult more appropriate to Canada's 
intersocietal legal order. 
 
KEYWORDS: Aboriginal rights, Indigenous legal orders, Canada’s duty to consult, Habermas, 
Pragmatic and performative discourse, Inter-societal legitimacy, Discourse norms 
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Introduction 
 
Sec.35(1) of the Canada Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes what it phrases as “aboriginal and 
treaty rights.” In the years following this constitutional recognition, however, Canada has so far 
failed to reconfigure its relations with First Nations and other indigenous communities.
1
 Instead, 
the courts have taken on the role of providing the fundamental determination of what sec. 35(1) 
might mean for the future of relations between settler state and indigenous parties in Canada. In 
an effort to cope with the gap between the 1982 recognition of these rights and existing state 
policies, the Supreme Court of Canada has gradually been developing the doctrine of the “duty to 
consult, and where indicated, accommodate”2 with holders of the rights recognized in sec. 35(1). 
As a result, the duty to consult has become the legal mainstay of indigenous participation in, and 
challenge to, state action affecting the future of indigenous interests of many sorts. Lower courts 
have engaged in an extensive process of refining this doctrine, through their consideration of 
literally hundreds of challenges to government actions. Over twenty of these cases have resulted 
in appeals reaching back to the Supreme Court of Canada, where various justices have added 
further clarification. The doctrine frequently appears to have wide-ranging implications, giving 
rise to questions of common law, administrative law, and constitutional law. Federal, provincial 
and First Nations governments, and individual departments and agencies, have developed 
protocols explaining the implications of the duty to consult on their operations. Corporations, 
                                                 
1
 For an in-depth look at this history from the first-hand perspective of the federal official who drafted 
much of the constitutional amendment language during that era, see Mary Dawson’s “From the Backroom 
to the Front Line: Making Constitutional History or Encounters with the Constitution: Patriation, Meech 
Lake, and Charlottetown” (2012) McGill Law Journal 57(4) 955. Also, political scientist Kirsten Matoy 
Carlson (Cherokee) examines the court’s emergence as a powerful shaper of national policy in the same 
time-frame. See her “Political Failure, Judicial Opportunity: The Supreme Court of Canada and 
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (2014) American Review of Canadian Studies 44(3) 334. 
 
2
 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 SCR 511, at 11. 
2 
 
industry umbrella groups, NGOs, academic institutions, all have published clarifications of law 
and policy for interested parties. Public discourse from the pages of peer-reviewed journals to the 
on-line comments attached to news stories, or in the work of bloggers, tweeters and other social 
media users, has been the site of heated and wide-ranging debates about the doctrine and its 
implications for the future of Canada’s relations with indigenous communities, and for the fate of 
the country. 
 
In what follows I address the duty to consult (never forgetting the “and where indicated, 
accommodate”) as it relates to the tasks of communication – which after all, comprises its most 
central features and purposes. I will argue that this communicative dimension of the duty to 
consult is crucial to making sense out of its basic meaning, and its implications for law in 
Canada. I argue that when considered as a set of communicative practices, the duty comes up 
short. To do this, I draw on the legal theory of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, while 
bearing in mind the words of Lamer C.J. that: “Aboriginal rights cannot, however, be defined on 
the basis of the philosophical precepts of the liberal enlightenment.”3 I imagine that what such 
“philosophical precepts” might aim to offer would be derivatives from various ideas about 
human nature or society. However, I make no effort to define Aboriginal rights here, nor do I 
argue for a particular reading of human nature or society. Instead, I draw on Habermas’s 
approach to what he calls the “pragmatic” aspects of communication, because I think it is helpful 
in addressing the depths of disagreement and confusion regarding the duty to consult.  
 
Scholars have discussed the duty to consult at great length. Much of their work addresses the 
scope of the duty to consult – the situations in which it applies, and the procedures necessary to 
                                                 
3
 R. v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507, at 19. 
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implement it consistently. Such scholarship targets the concerns of those who might need to 
conduct business, or policy formation and administrative oversight, and therefore need to 
understand the implications of the law for their endeavours.
4
 As well, scholars have assessed 
apparent gaps in the law, or the need for extending it to include circumstances not previously 
accounted for within the jurisprudence. Some have weighed its implications for administrative or 
constitutional law.
5
 Scholars of indigenous law have addressed its shortcomings as a means of 
achieving just resolutions to the longstanding conflicts between Canada and indigenous people. 
However, few scholars have sought to analyze it with an eye towards its functioning as 
communication; and none have addressed what I regard as the normative assumptions regarding 
communication that are entailed within the Supreme Court’s explication of the doctrine. 
 
My turn to Habermas for assistance in this task does echo the work of scholars studying other 
fields of contest in which public discourse confronts administrative power. Habermas’s views on 
public sphere discourse have had deep and far-ranging effect, sparking an industry of debate 
within the human sciences, philosophy, political and legal theory, and other fields. Scholars 
focused on resource management or environmental assessment questions have employed 
Habermas to analyze the roadblocks evident in formal and informal consultations, or in the work 
                                                 
4
 See, for instance, Chris W. Sanderson, Keith B. Bergner and Michelle Jones “The Crown's Duty to 
Consult Aboriginal Peoples: Towards an Understanding of the Source, Purpose, and Limits of the Duty” 
(2011-12) The Alberta Law Review 49(4) 821. Also, see Thomas Isaac and Anthony Knox “The Crown's 
Duty to Consult Aboriginal People” (2003-2004) The Alberta Law Review 49(1) 41. 
 
5
 For an argument that processes of judicial review should be made consistent when required by the duty 
to consult, see Robin M. Junger and Nika Robinson “Administrative Law Remedies in the Aboriginal 
Law Context” (2012) Canadian Journal of Administrative Law and Practice 25(1) 55. They note, for 
instance, that although judicial review of administrative decisions will typically result in either letting the 
decision stand, or “quashing” it, judicial review concerned with Aboriginal rights most often results in 
mere temporary suspension of the decision, ibid. at 69.  
 
4 
 
of tribunals, courts and legislatures.
6
 Most of this work, however, focuses on bureaucratic 
implementation of communication protocols, rather than on the more upstream legal 
development of the regulations guiding bureaucrats. Some scholars have drawn on either 
Habermas’s work, or the field of “deliberative democracy” largely sparked by that work, in 
examining the impact of public sphere discourse on Canadian resource extraction and 
management.
7
 A much smaller number have employed him in considering resource development 
or environmental management issues focused around the interests of indigenous communities in 
Canada and the US.
8
 In earlier work, I also drew on Habermas to examine the dynamics of 
public discourse involving Western Shoshone and other activists opposed to a Carter-era US 
nuclear weapons basing program slated for deployment on traditional Shoshone lands in 
Nevada.
9
 However, scholars have not yet employed Habermas in providing a normative reading 
                                                 
6
 For instance, David Dayton “Evaluating Environmental Impact Statements as Communicative Action” 
Journal of Business and Technical Communication (2002) 16(4) 355. 
 
7
 See John R. Parkins and Debra J. Davidson “Constructing the Public Sphere in Compromised Settings: 
Environmental Governance in the Alberta Forest Sector” (2008) The Canadian Review of Sociology 45(2) 
177; Cathy Driscoll “The Not So Clear-Cut Nature of Organizational Legitimating Mechanisms in the 
Canadian Forest Sector” (2006) Business and Society 45(3) 322; Patricia Fitzpatrick et al “Environmental 
Impact Assessment Under the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act: Deliberative Democracy in 
Canada’s North?” (2008) Environmental Management 42(1) 1; Genevieve Fuji Johnson “Deliberative 
Democratic Practices in Canada: an Analysis of Institutional Empowerment in Three Cases” (2009) 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 42(3) 679; and Rebecca Macias “Public Participation in Energy 
and Natural Resources Development: a Theory and Criteria for Evaluation” (2010) Canadian Institute of 
Resources Law, Occasional Paper 34.  
 
8
 See, for instance, Richard O. Clemmer “‘The Legal Effect of the Judgment’: Indian Land Claims, 
Ecological Anthropology, Social Impact Assessment, and the Public Domain” (2004) Human 
Organization 63(3) 334; and Paul Nadasdy “The Anti-Politics of TEK: the Institutionalization of Co-
Management Discourse and Practice” (2005) Anthropologica 47(2) 215. Along a different trajectory, the 
Canadian economist Kenneth L. Avio offered a brief argument for conceiving of sec. 35(1) rights in a 
Habermasian vein. See his “A Discourse-Theoretic Approach to Aboriginal Rights” The Canadian 
Journal of Economics 29(2) S619.  
 
9
 Matthew Glass Citizens against the MX: Public Language in the Nuclear Age (Champaign/Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1993); and “Air Force, Mormon and Western Shoshone Rhetoric of Place in 
the MX Conflict” in John Findlay and Bruce H. Hevly (eds.) The Atomic West (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1998) 255. 
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of Canada’s legal relations with indigenous peoples, nor in considering the duty to consult, as I 
do here.
10
  
 
In what follows, I develop my normative argument based on the assumption that the duty to 
consult’s purpose, as Habermas would put it, is to “promote conditions of mutual understanding 
and social solidarity.” The courts have spoken of the duty’s goal being to serve the purposes of 
“reconciliation” between settler and indigenous communities in Canada. My argument amounts 
to the normative claim that as constituted by the jurisprudence, the duty to consult should reflect 
a much stronger understanding of the communicative practices entailed in the court’s 
development of the duty.  
 
I proceed by first pulling out of the fundamental case law what I call the communicative 
practices grounding the duty. In Chapter 1, I address these practices within the Sparrow, 
Delgamuukw, and Haida Nation decisions, and turn briefly to consider communicative aspects of 
the duty that appear post-Haida Nation in the Supreme Court’s further consideration of the 
duty’s scope. In Chapter 2, I introduce relevant themes from Habermas’s work on the discourse 
theory of law, taking the time to exegete these themes in some detail for readers who might be 
unfamiliar with Habermas. Specifically, I outline his discursive view of law, and his view of 
discursive norms. I also contrast his discursive view of legal legitimacy with the more widely 
embraced views of legal validity inherited from Max Weber and H.L.A. Hart.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
10
 However, an exception to this is Fred Bennett’s dismissal of deliberative democratic approaches to the 
outstanding issues between Canada and indigenous communities. Bennett argues that since the Canadian 
public has little sustained interest in indigenous issues, a deliberative democratic approach would have 
little merit. Unfortunately, this leaves his argument reliant upon state organs for resolution of many 
problems. See, generally, his “Aboriginal Rights Deliberated” (2007) Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy 10(3) 339. 
6 
 
 
In Chapter 3, I consider some of the objections that might arise to my use of Habermas in even 
addressing the legal and political concerns of indigenous people, and offer some reworking of his 
assumptions that stand in the way of my use of discourse theory here. In Chapter 4, I attempt to 
show that a discourse theory approach to law can provide useful traction in considering the 
distinctive features of indigenous legal orders, at least as they relate to the formation of 
intersocietal legal legitimacy. As an example of this traction, I develop a discourse reading of a 
significant (though perhaps not widely known) colonial-era treaty, the 1701 “Great Peace of 
Montréal.” I regard the example of the Montréal process of treaty-making as providing a 
paradigmatic instance of the communicative conditions necessary for the formation of legal 
legitimacy in intersocietal contexts, such as those created across North America through the 
dynamics of interaction between settler and indigenous parties. 
 
Finally, in Chapters 5 and 6 I apply my construction of an intersocietal reading of discourse 
theory to analyze the communicative practices supporting the duty to consult. I argue that each of 
these practices entails “extra-legal” presumptions. In Rio Tinto, McLachlin C.J. acknowledged 
that consultation “itself is not a question of law; it is a distinct and often complex constitutional 
process and, in certain circumstances, a right involving facts, law, policy, and compromise.”11 
My aim is to demonstrate that we must also regard the duty to consult as not being in “itself a 
question of law.” Consequently, for the duty to consult to demonstrate what David Dyzenhaus 
terms, in a broadly Habermasian way, the “legitimacy of legality;” these extra-legal 
                                                 
11
 Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, at 60. 
 
7 
 
presumptions need to be significantly buttressed.
12
 Or, assuming that the court’s talk of 
“reconciliation” suggests at least an uncomfortable recognition of the continued force of colonial 
communicative practices that affect indigenous peoples’ legal standing in relation to the state, 
these presumptions need to be addressed, clarified, and critiqued, within an intersocietal legal 
context of communication. 
 
I argue that the only way this can be achieved is by employing a process of discursive 
assessment; that is, by recognizing that pragmatic communication oriented towards mutual 
understanding requires acknowledging the condition of what I will call “communicative 
equality” between Canada and indigenous communities. In my conclusions, I develop the 
suggestion that communicative equality might be conceived along the lines of what Brian 
Slattery has called a “generic” Aboriginal right, or as part of what James Sa'ke'j Henderson has 
spoken of as “dialogical governance.” There I explain why I think this is superior to the current 
position of communicative subordination still found within the courts’ assessments of the duty to 
consult. 
  
 
My usage of several terms in what follows may require clarification. I tend to use the term 
“state” when referring to the governing institutions of Canada, instead of the more common 
reference to “the Crown.” My reasons for choosing this will, I think, appear clearly in my 
discussion of the phrase “the honour of the Crown,” in Chapter 5. My usage is perhaps only 
idiosyncratic, and I note that indigenous legal scholars such as John Borrows and James Sa'ke'j 
                                                 
12
 See his “The Legitimacy of Legality” (1996) University of Toronto Law Journal 46(1) 129. There he 
melds the approach to legitimacy found in the work of American legal theorist Lon Fuller with that of 
Habermas, as I will take up in Chapter 2. Dan Priel provides a helpful effort to distinguish between the 
concepts of legitimacy and legal validity in his “The Place of Legitimacy in Legal Theory” (2011) McGill 
Law Journal 57(1) 1. 
8 
 
Henderson typically employ the “the Crown” when referring to what in other jurisdictions would 
readily be simply “the state.”   
 
I will most often use “indigenous” as a general term to indicate some point of similarity between 
a range of distinct peoples, much like “European” or “African” suggest ranges of similarity and 
difference in one context or another. It seems to me difficult to employ consistently a brief term 
that captures the political and legal stature of indigenous people’s collectivities. I do use the 
common term “First Nations” to indicate that stature, although at times I will use “indigenous 
communities.” Most awkwardly, when trying to indicate that the range of indigenous political 
and legal orders is not subsumed under the Canadian legal regime, or within Canadian 
federalism, I will refer to “First Nations and other indigenous communities.” 
 
I frequently use the terms “settler” or “settler state” in order to refer to populations, interests, 
legal and political traditions, and institutions of law and governance. I assume that these terms 
carry some of the weight of the colonial trajectory into the Americas, but also hope they are less 
ideologically charged than other terms that might be employed.
13
  
 
I will use “Aboriginal” to refer specifically to a general set of characteristics belonging to 
indigenous people as these characteristics are raised within the context of Canadian law, since 
this is the term employed within the juridical/administrative context of their relations with the 
                                                 
13
 They also reflect the practices of a growing body of interdisciplinary scholarship, some of which can 
strike the reader as also ideologically charged. See, for instance, Lorenzo Veracini Settler Colonialism: a 
Theoretical Overview (Hampshire UK: Palgrave McMillan, 2010), and Patrick Wolfe “Settler 
Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native” (2006) Journal of Genocide Research 8(4) 387. However, 
in Canada and the US, where “colonialist” seems understandably likely to raise the ire of courts, state 
officials, and the larger public, “settler” is more in keeping with the predominant self-image (even though 
it depends on a narrative, as these scholars point out, that requires the native’s “elimination”).  
9 
 
Canadian state. I capitalize “Aboriginal,” although state organs and courts frequently haven’t, 
because this usage seems preferable to indigenous people within Canada as they assert their legal 
and political distinctiveness in relation to Canada. That said, I think it would be better to treat 
“Aboriginal” as a level of political structure and identity, like “federal” or “provincial,” which 
don’t require capitalization in English. On the other hand, I don’t capitalize “indigenous,” as 
many do, simply on the ground that the term applies across a global range of communities and 
nations, and that a capital would suggest more of a geographically-specific application, as with 
“African” or “Asian.”  
 
I use “Indian” in relation to indigenous people when speaking about the legal construction of 
personal or communal identity within the context of the federal Indian Act or laws developed 
under its authority, in relation to cases where the courts also employ the term, in relation to 
American law – where the term remains common, or in reference to the broader cultural 
constructs of “Indianness” in both Canada and the US.  
 
Regarding plural forms of indigenous peoples’ collective names: unless the term in use already 
contains a plural, as in the final ending of “eg” in “Anishinaabeg,” I follow the suggestion of the 
Chicago Manual of Style, and indicate a people’s name, whether derived from their own 
language – for instance “Lakota,” or from another – for instance “Mohawk,” with a final “s” in 
order to make a workable English-language plural noun; that is, like “Germans” or “Russians,” 
and not like “French,” unless the name ends in an “s” or “x,” like “Sioux” or “Iroquois.” Also, 
my use of collective names lacks consistency. A reflection of my own ignorance more than 
anything else, I refer to some peoples by their own names. In referring to others, however, I use 
10 
 
names that although in common use, derive from earlier colonial encounters with people up river 
or back across a pass, and who gave Europeans their own name for the people down river, or on 
the far side of a pass -- but whose names for the people newly encountered by the Europeans was 
often only pejorative.  
  
11 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Communicative Practices and the Doctrine of the Duty to Consult 
 
 
In this chapter I examine those Supreme Court of Canada decisions that have shaped the duty to 
consult. I identify key communicative practices that the court has drawn upon in order to bring 
into focus how and why Canada has obligations to communicate with indigenous communities, 
and what sort of communication indigenous communities can expect this obligation to amount 
to. The court’s conception of each of these practices is weaker than it should be. In subsequent 
chapters I will lay out how the discourse theory of law, with its view of a communicative basis 
for legal legitimacy, suggests a more solid ground for understanding the practices identified here. 
In particular, in subsequent chapters I will show that a stronger understanding of communication 
is central to the intersocietal context of legal relations between Canada and indigenous nations. 
Finally, in Chapters 5 and 6 I will assess the communicative adequacy of the practices identified 
here, on the basis of norms of intersocietal legal discourse that I derive, in Chapter 4, from both 
Habermas and from discursive practices evident in the 1701 treaty at Montréal.     
 
A) The emergence of the duty to consult as communicative practice 
Over the course of the last two and a half decades, Canada’s Supreme Court has constructed the 
doctrine of the “duty to consult” in order to provide a means to determine the extent to which 
section 35(1) Aboriginal rights might constrain government decision-making on a variety of 
fronts. One consequence of this lengthy effort is that Aboriginal rights have in substance come to 
be identified primarily with the task of consultation. Such an approach to determining the 
meaning and scope of a right might at the outset seem peculiar. An individual’s right to vote as a 
12 
 
citizen of a given polity, for instance, is not something we would necessarily say receives its 
scope and content out of a process of communicative back-and-forth. Admittedly, the extension 
of that right to women and racial minorities could be regarded as coming about through such a 
process, but voting itself, as a right, we regard as having meaning derived from citizenship.  
 
Nor would we customarily think that a right to obtain medical treatment in a country with a 
public health care system first and foremost means that a legal resident or citizen in need of 
treatment would expect to engage in a process of debate, performed on a case by case basis, to 
establish with potential care providers whether and how they might be willing to obligate 
themselves to such provision of care (though this might be necessary for specific sorts of 
treatments, or in response to particular sets of circumstances). Unlike most of the positive and 
negative rights that we refer to in modern democratic, constitutional polities, Aboriginal rights 
may seem to lack the veneer of age that makes rights appear to be features of human nature itself 
– even when they are newly created through the decisions of courts or legislatures, such as the 
right to an abortion, same-sex marriage, or the extension of the franchise in the 20
th
 century. 
These newly created rights are themselves derivatives, or perhaps a sharpening, of already 
recognized rights. 
 
In contrast, Aboriginal rights as recognized by Canada’s courts seem more like what historian 
Eric Hobsbawm identified some time ago as “invented traditions,” which he elaborated as sets 
“of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic 
nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which 
automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to 
13 
 
establish continuity with a suitable historic past.”14 Hobsbawm highlighted three functions of 
invented traditions that bear on the Canadian effort to “recognize and affirm” Aboriginal rights 
in the Constitution Act, 1982, and on Canada’s resulting efforts to grapple with what recognition 
and affirmation means. For Hobsbawm, invented traditions are 
 a) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or 
 artificial communities, b) those establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations 
 of authority, and c) those whose main purpose was socialization, the inculcation of 
 beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour.
15
  
 
Canada’s courts have consistently framed the recognition of Aboriginal rights as part of a larger 
project of creating a certain kind of Canadian society, one capable of achieving reconciliation of 
former animosities, the overcoming of injustices, and the mutual accommodation of 
developmental paths, that is one grounded in Lamer C.J.’s admonition in Delgamuukw: “Let us 
face it[;] we are all here to stay.”16 Crucial to this imagination of Canada’s future is the image of 
a past in which communication took priority over violence and conflict. As many have noted, the 
articulation of this vision of the priority of communication over violence has itself often 
proceeded without the influence of indigenous voices.
17
  
 
Given that the duty to consult valorizes acts of communication over violence, making 
communication key to the legal substance of Aboriginal rights, and key to an imagined Canadian 
future, it seems worthwhile in this chapter to examine the presentation of communication, or 
                                                 
14
 Eric Hobsbawm “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The 
Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 1, at 1. 
 
15
 Ibid. at 9. 
 
16
 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, at para. 186. 
 
17
 D'Arcy Vermette “Colonialism and the Suppression of Aboriginal Voice” (2009) Ottawa Law Review 
40(2) 225. 
 
14 
 
what I will call communicative practices, enfolded within the doctrine of the duty to consult.
18
 I 
would define a communicative practice as an activity reflective of a set of implicit or explicit 
standards – though perhaps more the result of habit than of a rule-based approach to 
communicating. A practice of communication is not the same as Jürgen Habermas’s concept of 
“communicative action,” which I will explain in the following chapter. In his scheme, 
communicative action aims explicitly at producing social solidarity and common understanding. 
Communicative practices, on the other hand, may mask as much as they reveal, or pressure as 
much as they promote trust. That is, they can as readily be weapons as tools.
19
 Thus, a 
communicative practice can simply be undertaken for a range of communicative or strategic 
purposes. These purposes can be described or identified, as I attempt in what follows. In 
Chapters 5 and 6, I will scrutinize the practices supporting the duty to consult from the 
standpoint of Habermas’s theory of legal discourse.  
 
B) Communicative practices in R. v Sparrow 
In 1990 the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the B.C. Court of Appeal’s decision to set aside 
Ronald Sparrow’s 1984 conviction, in the process taking the first steps toward a clear 
articulation of the “duty to consult.” Sparrow had been convicted of using a drift net longer than 
25 fathoms, a length specified in his Musqueam Band’s food fishing license. The band’s 1984 
license had been issued under s. 12 of the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations, 
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SOR/84-248, a code authorized by the federal Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14. Although the 
Musqueam drift nets had been 75 fathoms throughout most of the 20
th
 century, earlier in 1984 
Canada’s Department of Fisheries had set out a new regulation on the length of Indian nets, 
while at the same time leaving unchanged the 200 fathom length used in non-Indian commercial 
fishing operations.
20
 Sparrow claimed in his defence that he had an Aboriginal right to use his 45 
fathom drift net under the recently repatriated Constitution. His case spent several years in 
British Columbia courts before the Supreme Court took it up in 1988. In writing the court’s 
unanimous opinion overturning his conviction, Dickson, C.J. and La Forest, J. noted that the case 
had required the justices to “explore for the first time the scope of s. 35(1) of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, and to indicate its strength as a promise to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.”21 
 
The justices clearly rejected the government’s own position that its regulatory regime over a 
common practice such as sustenance fishing had extinguished any question of it being an 
Aboriginal right. According to the justices, “[a]t bottom, the respondent's argument confuses 
regulation with extinguishment. That the right is controlled in great detail by the regulations does 
not mean that the right is thereby extinguished.”22 Instead, in accord with the 1973 Calder case, 
they said “The test of extinguishment to be adopted, in our opinion, is that the Sovereign's 
intention must be clear and plain if it is to extinguish an Aboriginal right.”23  
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At the same time, given the broad powers to regulate Aboriginal life derived from s. 91(24) of 
the British North America Act, 1867 and developed from 1876 on in the Indian Act (currently 
R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5), the justices were not envisioning Aboriginal rights as providing any 
impermeable limit to the government’s various regulatory aims concerning Aboriginals. Instead, 
they maintained that Aboriginal rights, whatever they might be, needed to be fleshed out in 
tandem with the legitimate regulatory power of government. Consequently, their argument 
identified three considerations necessary to construct a balance useful for any future conflicts 
over the meaning and scope of Aboriginal rights. 
 
The first consideration is embedded in the justices’ statement about the process through which 
Aboriginal rights became incorporated in the Constitution. They referred to s. 35(1) as “the 
culmination of a long and difficult struggle in both the political forum and the courts for the 
constitutional recognition of Aboriginal rights.” Aboriginal rights are thus historical products. 
This acknowledgment of Aboriginal rights as historical products should not be read as simply 
celebratory, however. Accompanying it closely was an assessment of the future of Aboriginal 
rights as well. “Section 35(1), at the least, provides a solid constitutional base upon which 
subsequent negotiations can take place.”24 We might readily think that rights that are recognized 
entail the realization that rights must be defended. Such defence, however, is most likely possible 
only on the basis of rights being first secured, at least conceptually. The justices in Sparrow, 
however, seemed to be highlighting something else about Aboriginal rights. Rather than rights 
emerging from a historical process of political struggle, achieving some degree of clarity, but 
then facing subsequent threats as social conditions change; Aboriginal rights here seem 
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enmeshed in an ongoing process of communication: political forums, courts, and negotiations are 
keys to the presentation and explication of these rights. This is to say that they might never 
escape the sphere of argument, even though entrenched within the Constitution. Thus the justices 
seemed to be maintaining that Aboriginal rights are inherently contested.  
 
The other two considerations advanced in Sparrow regarding Aboriginal rights also highlight 
how they are bound up with communicative acts. The second can be summarized as Aboriginal 
rights require the government to justify its policy and regulatory infringement of those rights, a 
requirement that they declared was "implicit" within the "constitutional scheme" created with s. 
35(1).
25
 This implicit requirement emerges out of the justices’ efforts to chart how Aboriginal 
rights intersect with governmental power. They referred to the sui generis nature of Aboriginal 
rights, which Dickson C.J. had first elaborated in Guerin.
26
 While Dickson’s opinions in both 
Guerin and Simon
27
 did not approach the question of s. 35(1) Aboriginal rights, he and La Forest 
J. concluded in Sparrow that the sui generis nature of Aboriginal law should serve as a “general 
guiding principle for s. 35(1).”28 
 
In Guerin, the term sui generis referred to unique obligations Canada owes to Aboriginals, 
obligations that fit poorly within a common understanding of either private or public legal duties. 
A key example of this awkward fit would be the federal obligation to hold Aboriginal lands in 
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trust. Although the courts have typically regarded a fiduciary relationship as a private 
relationship, the justices acknowledged there that Canada’s duties regarding Aboriginal land are 
unique, and that a fiduciary understanding of the relationships between the Canada and 
Aboriginal communities was the best way of clearly conceiving their interaction.  
 The Crown's obligation to the Indians with respect to that interest [Indian lands] is 
 therefore not a public law duty. While it is not a private law duty in the strict sense either, 
 it is nonetheless in the nature of a private law duty. Therefore, in this sui generis 
 relationship, it is not improper to regard the Crown as a fiduciary.
29
  
 
Similarly, in Simon Dickson C.J. had framed treaty-making between Aboriginal communities 
and Canada as distinctive, claiming that “An Indian treaty is unique; it is an agreement sui generis 
which is neither created nor terminated according to the rules of international law.”30 
 
 
In Sparrow, then, the uniqueness of the state-Aboriginal relationship requires a similarly unique 
format for addressing questions of right. “The relationship between the Government and 
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Aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation 
of Aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship.”31 
 
The format that Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. envisioned involved construction of a balancing 
mechanism, a step they acknowledged did not derive from any “explicit language in the 
provision that authorizes this Court or any court to assess the legitimacy of any government 
legislation that restricts Aboriginal rights.”32 The justices stressed in the same passage that: 
“Rights that are recognized and affirmed are not absolute.” They spoke of “reconciling” federal 
power and federal duty (though not really of reconciling Aboriginal rights and federal power, 
since federal duty, the fiduciary obligation, already seems to entail the recognition of Aboriginal 
interests). To accomplish this reconciliation, they derived a “demand” for the “justification of 
any government regulation that infringes upon or denies Aboriginal rights.” Numerous 
commentators in the years since Sparrow have pointed out the oddity of this task, which 
resembles the justification test developed out of s.1 – structurally, part of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, and not really tied to s. 35 of Constitution Act, 1982 at all.
33
 The same point is 
acknowledged in Sparrow, “It is true that s. 35(1) is not subject to s. 1 of the Charter.”34 
Confusion on this point also stems from the incorporation within Badger of a related point in the 
1988 Agawa decision. 
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This standard of scrutiny requires that the Crown demonstrate that the legislation in question 
advances important general public objectives in such a manner that it ought to prevail. Blair J.A. 
recognized the need for a balanced approach to limitations on treaty rights, stating: 
. . . Indian treaty rights are like all other rights recognized by our legal system. The 
exercise of rights by an individual or group is limited by the rights of others. Rights do 
not exist in a vacuum and the exercise of any right involves a balancing with the interests 
and values involved in the rights of others. This is recognized in s. 1 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms which provides that limitation of Charter rights must be 
justified as reasonable in a free and democratic society.
35
  
 
Thus, in their initial consideration of the task of justification, the justices in Sparrow gave 
evidence of a mixed set of goals: a potentially high bar – the Constitution’s call for government 
to accept limits on its policies; and a lower bar – the mere need of legislation or regulation to 
accord with a “valid objective.” Contributing to the potential high bar view of the decision, the 
justices also framed a “liberal interpretive standard” – from Nowegijick, and “honourable 
dealing” – from Guerin, as indicators of the sort of measure needed to successfully justify a 
regulation,
36
 which they referred to variously as a “justificatory process,” a “justificatory 
scheme,” or a “justificatory standard.”37 
 
At several points, the justices addressed the nature of the balance between contending forces they 
saw characterizing reference to Aboriginal rights. For instance, “Parliament and the provinces 
have sanctioned challenges to social and economic policy objectives embodied in legislation to 
the extent that Aboriginal rights are affected.”38 More pronounced, section 35 (1) “gives a 
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measure of control over government conduct and a strong check on legislative power.”39 At the 
same time, the justices did not say here that this measure of control or any particular strong 
check is something Aboriginal communities hold over against the government. For instance: 
 While it [section 35.1] does not promise immunity from government regulation in a 
 society that, in the twentieth century, is increasingly more complex, interdependent and 
 sophisticated, and where exhaustible resources need protection and management, it does 
 hold the Crown to a substantive promise.”40  
 
The essence of this substantive promise is simply that “government is required to bear the burden 
of justifying any legislation that has some negative effect” on Aboriginal rights, a point 
consistent with the view established in the BNA Act, and affirmed in St. Catherine’s Milling and 
Lumber, that Indian rights, such as “title,” were a mere burden on “the Crown.”41  
 
To assess this burden, they offered an explication of the justificatory test. The first step 
undertaken in such a test here would be to determine whether a legislative act interferes “with an 
existing Aboriginal right,” with an affirmative answer indicating a “prima facie infringement.”42 
If so, the legislation or impugned governmental regulation would require justification. Like the 
initial question considered in Sparrow, on the existence of an Aboriginal right (which I am 
bypassing in this discussion), this question of prima facie infringement is one that Aboriginal 
individuals and communities would need to broach in a legal challenge to legislation.
43
 The 
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justices maintained that determining infringement would depend on the answers to three further 
questions (which the justices framed in relation to the fishing right that gave rise to Sparrow): is 
a legislative limitation on an activity “unreasonable”? Does it “impose undue hardship”? Finally, 
does the legislation “deny to the holders of the right their preferred means of exercising that 
right?”44    
  
Establishing prima facie interference would then require turning to the question of justification 
proper, which would determine the "legitimate regulation of a constitutional Aboriginal right." 
This analysis would consider the matter of a "valid legislative objective," both in terms of 
Parliament's authorizing intention and an administrative department's consequent development of 
particular regulations.
45
 The justices rejected the appellate court's conclusion that the "public 
interest" was a sufficient objective to justify regulation, since a public interest claim would be 
both so vague and so broad "as to be unworkable as a test" for limiting rights. At the same time, 
they held that an end of conservation would be “surely uncontroversial.”46 One might wonder, 
given the justices' rejection of a public interest objective without any explication other than 
"vague" and "broad,” and their subsequent affirmation of a very open-ended conservation 
objective, whether this example of the threshold for justification is set very high at all.
47
   
 
                                                 
44
 Ibid. 
 
45
 Ibid. at 1113.  
 
46
 Ibid. 
 
47
 For an extended treatment of this question, see André Goldenberg, “‘Surely Uncontroversial’ – the 
Problems and Politics of Environmental Conservation as a Justification for the Infringement of Aboriginal 
Rights in Canada” (2002) Journal of Law and Equality 1(2) 278.  
 
23 
 
Admittedly, in Sparrow the justices held that a legitimate conservation objective of setting 
harvesting limits still entailed giving Aboriginal food fishing "priority over the interests of other 
user groups."
48
 At the same time, however, all that meant in the end, given the order for a new 
trial, was that British Columbia only needed to show that it had "no underlying unconstitutional 
objective such as shifting more of the resource to a user group that ranks below the 
Musqueam."
49
  
 
In addition to establishing a valid legislative objective, the justices found a second principle for 
determining justification: “the honour of the Crown.”50 The honour of the Crown in Sparrow and 
other related food fishing cases meant that, as Dickson J. (as he then was) wrote in Jack: "With 
respect to whatever salmon are to be caught, then priority ought to be given to the Indian 
fishermen."
51
 At the same time, the reasoning which makes this allocation a higher priority does 
not really say much about how it derives from the honour of the Crown, a problem I will discuss 
at some length in Chapter 6. After acknowledging the burden which British Columbia would 
face in justifying regulations affecting Aboriginal peoples, the justices indicated that the broad 
range of circumstances which might provoke Aboriginal challenges to regulations could also 
require that other considerations be included in a justificatory test. Among these, was "whether 
the Aboriginal group in question has been consulted with respect to the conservation measures 
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being implemented."
 52
  Although they did not elaborate on this process, they indicated that "at 
the least" it would entail an expectation that the community "be informed."
53
 Thus, the need for 
consultation mentioned only briefly towards the end of Sparrow stems from a characterization of 
Aboriginal rights that frames them as inhering in and becoming visible through what I regard as 
practices of communication.  
 
With that proviso, I would highlight two communication practices present in Sparrow bearing on 
the formation of the duty to consult. The first is its narration of the history of the emergence of 
Aboriginal rights. Rather than assume that the narrative of Aboriginal rights is simply 
preliminary to the justices’ real concerns in Sparrow, I think the narrative is a crucial indicator of 
how the decision works. Robert Cover argued some time back for the recognition of law as 
narrative: “The codes that relate our normative system to our social constructions of reality and 
to our visions of what the world might be are narrative. The very imposition of a normative force 
upon a state of affairs, real or imagined, is the act of creating narrative.”54 If this is germane to 
many facets of the law, it is central to the law when it adopts narrative explicitly. The story of the 
emergence of Aboriginal rights conditions any narrative of the Canadian state, and stands as an 
achievement in its national biography.
55
 Such a narrative fulfills a variety of communicative 
purposes, for instance engendering social solidarity between groups or forming an identity for 
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the nation within the international order. These tasks situate the narrative for readers in a domain 
of public knowledge about Canada and its aspirations to be a certain kind of society, even more 
basically than the narrative serves to recount a history of prior judicial approaches to a purely 
legal question. 
 
The second communicative practice evident in Sparrow is its conclusion that state infringement 
on Aboriginal rights must be justified. Like narrative, justification has a more-than-legal core. It 
also requires an audience, a group of some sort that can give testimony about whether 
justification has succeeded. For instance, readers of Paradise Lost, Milton’s epic effort to justify 
the ways of God to man, are by their act of reading put into the position of judging. The reader is 
the one who must assess the success of Milton’s effort, which is to say that justification results 
from a dialogical effort. The court in Sparrow undertook a more monological approach, 
grounded in background constitutional considerations of the role of the Supreme Court post-
repatriation, and consciously employing, as Brian Slattery noted in an article cited within the 
decision itself, standard British doctrine attributing paramountcy to Acts of Parliament.
56
 
Nevertheless, the issue of justification as a communicative practice at the least requires an 
audience to consider its success. I will consider the issue of justification more fully in Chapter 5, 
building upon Habermas’s discourse view of legal legitimacy. 
 
C) Communicative practices in Delgamuukw and Haida Nation  
How did the emerging requirement for consultation unfold within subsequent Supreme Court 
considerations of Aboriginal rights? Although Delgamuukw focused primarily on other issues, 
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there Lamer C.J. also took up the "nascent jurisprudence on justification" of infringements on 
Aboriginal rights, and set out his own effort there and in his earlier opinion in Gladstone as 
dependent upon the Sparrow discussion of justification.
57
 As had Dickson C.J., Lamer C.J. 
regarded the task of justification as necessary because of the fiduciary relationship between the 
Crown and Aboriginal communities. Lamer C.J., however, created a more elaborate role for 
consultation as an instrument in the process of reconciliation. In Gladstone, he had already noted 
that 
 Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of the reconciliation of Aboriginal societies with 
 the broader political community of which they are part; limits placed on those rights are, 
 where the objectives furthered by those limits are of sufficient importance to the broader 
 community as a whole, equally a necessary part of that reconciliation.
58
  
 
In contrast to Sparrow, however, where Dickson C.J. had spoken of reconciliation between 
federal power and federal duty,
59
 Lamer C.J. in Gladstone and in Delgamuukw framed 
reconciliation as a task to perform between Aboriginal communities and the larger society. In 
this scheme, legitimate government objectives also include “the pursuit of economic and regional 
fairness,” and “the recognition of the historical reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by 
non-Aboriginal groups.”60 
 
The consequence of this difference most important here is its framing of communication. In 
charting out an inter-societal scope for the task of reconciliation, Delgamuukw placed the duty to 
consult within a larger communicative framework. Consultation achieves a clearer role as a 
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means of harmonizing Canada's divergent forms of society. Even while expanding the horizon 
within which reconciliation must succeed, however, Lamer C.J. also appeared to tighten what 
might be achieved through a consultation process aimed at reconciliation and grounded in a 
fiduciary relationship. For instance, in regard to the question of harvesting limits animating the 
conservation concerns behind Ronald Sparrow's prosecution, Lamer C.J. concluded that 
fiduciary duty did not necessarily mean that Aboriginal fishing rights should receive a priority 
over non-Aboriginal fishing interests. He introduced a distinction, produced originally in 
Gladstone, between "internally-limited" rights (a harvesting limit determined by a community or 
individual need for food) and "externally-limited" (a harvesting limit only determined by the 
market for commercial fish) to show that priority did not always go to those with established 
Aboriginal rights.
61
  
 
Nevertheless, Lamer C.J. first referred to a "duty to consult" derived from the Crown's fiduciary 
relationship with Aboriginal communities. He offered the following breakdown of a range of 
procedures which might relate to the variety of rights challenging government regulation and 
policy: 
 There is always a duty of consultation. Whether the Aboriginal group has been consulted 
 is relevant to determining whether the infringement of Aboriginal title is justified, in the 
 same way that the Crown’s failure to consult an Aboriginal group with respect to the 
 terms by which reserve land is leased may breach its fiduciary duty at common law: 
 Guerin. The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary with the 
 circumstances. In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or relatively minor, it 
 will be no more than a duty to discuss important decisions that will be taken with respect 
 to lands held pursuant to Aboriginal title. Of course, even in these rare cases when the 
 minimum acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must be in good faith, and 
 with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns of the Aboriginal peoples 
 whose lands are at issue. In most cases, it will be significantly deeper than mere 
 consultation. Some cases may even require the full consent of an Aboriginal nation, 
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 particularly when provinces enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to 
 Aboriginal lands.
62
  
 
This breakdown of different levels of consultation undertakes more thoroughly than did Sparrow 
to provide the duty to consult with some procedural specificity. It also grounds the duty by the 
same acknowledgement of the “fiduciary” relationship animating Sparrow. However, the 
specificity it promotes through distinguishing different levels of consultation is still shrouded in 
ambiguity, some of which may well stem from the lack of substance given the “fiduciary” 
concept, glossed as involving “good faith” and the willingness to “substantially address” 
Aboriginal concerns. A reader is left with some confusion about the procedures being 
recommended as well as the weight of the norms the procedures might embody.  
 
Ambiguity obscures other aspects of Delgamuukw as well. For instance, consider the tension 
surrounding Lamer C.J.’s statement of the most serious form of consultation. “Some cases may 
even require the full consent of an Aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces enact hunting 
and fishing regulations in relation to Aboriginal lands.”63 How can “full consent” be especially 
important in relation to provincial regulations of the sort considered in Sparrow, when as 
mentioned above, the chief justice also indicated that giving Aboriginal harvesting a priority over 
other interests was not really what the fiduciary relationship required? Or, even more baldly, how 
does his apparently strong acknowledgment of the need for “full consent” square with his 
conclusions about justification? Justification, as in Sparrow, is a task undertaken out of a 
fiduciary duty, and specifically out of the goal of achieving “reconciliation of the prior 
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occupation of North America by aboriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty.”64 
As the chief justice elaborated on the range of justifiable projects that could infringe upon the 
right of Aboriginal title, it is so far-reaching as to include most conceivable development 
projects: 
 In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, 
 the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the 
 environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of 
 foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent 
 with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringement of aboriginal title.
65
 
 
Notably, the passage is cited approvingly in its entirety, or gently edited, in the concurring 
opinions of La Forest J. and L’Heureux-Dubé J.,66 and by McLachlin J.67 One way to 
characterize this conjoining of opposites: a utilitarian calculus of benefit to the larger society, 
and a deontological-sounding reference to Aboriginal rights, would be to say that in 
Delgamuukw ambiguity itself threatens to become a communicative practice. Although for law 
ambiguity requires weeding out, in other communicative forms it serves important functions that 
cannot necessarily be overcome. Decades ago the noted literary critic William Empson 
characterized the varieties of ambiguity relied upon in poetry. In the process, he demonstrated 
that in one form, the embrace of inherent contradictions, ambiguity serves to “show a 
fundamental division in the writer’s mind.”68 By “fundamental,” he meant personal and 
psychological divisions in aspiration, the sense of obligation, or ultimate commitments 
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(discussing theologically minded poetry of 17
th
 century England). Part of what makes this form 
of ambiguity unresolvable, for Empson, is the context in which it occurs.  
 An ambiguity . . . is not satisfying in itself, nor is it, considered as a device on its own, a 
 thing to be attempted; it must in each case arise from, and be justified by, the 
 peculiar requirements of the situation. On the other hand, it is a thing which the more 
 interesting and valuable situations are more likely to justify.
69
 
 
Although law is not poetry, law requires an equally imaginative effort, though a collective 
imaginary effort, in creating a shared, public order out of the potential chaos of historical 
experience. As scholars such as Benedict Anderson, Robert Cover and Charles Taylor all 
acknowledge in their different ways, law serves an inherently unwieldy task. It provides 
certainty, but only does so within a given historical and political context; and in which the range 
of individual and collective choices that appear as unquestionably rational are actually only the 
choices available within a certain “social imaginary.”70 The social imaginary runs so deep that its 
self-evidence is rarely questionable, or even identifiable. Accordingly, if this is fair, then my 
linking Lamer C.J.’s conflicting visions to what may be unresolvable from within a certain set of 
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convictions about Canada’s foundations as a legal order – grounded in and sustaining the future 
of a settler colonial project – may be less disrespectful than it sounds.71  
 
Subsequent to Delgamuukw, the most influential case concerning the duty to consult is Haida 
Nation, which, as of this writing, has been cited 278 times.
72
 In Haida Nation, the court 
considered questions arising out of Weyerhauser Company Limited’s efforts to obtain a Tree 
Farm License, transferred from MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. by the B.C. Minister of Natural 
Resources in 1999. The Haida Nation challenged this transfer affecting land to which they 
claimed unceded Aboriginal title, contending that they had not consented to its transfer.
73
 Given 
the unresolved question of their title, the government maintained it had no duty to consult with 
them about the transfer of the license, since Sparrow had tied the duty to consult to questions of 
recognized Aboriginal rights. As McLachlin C.J. framed the key question: “is the government 
required to consult with them [the Haida] about decisions to harvest the forests and to 
accommodate their concerns about what if any forest in Block 6 should be harvested before they 
have proven their title to land and their Aboriginal rights?”74 McLachlin C.J. rejected the 
government’s position that it had no such obligations to those without clearly established 
rights.
75
 In the process of holding that British Columbia did possess a duty to consult even 
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regarding unestablished claims to Aboriginal rights, she developed what some have maintained 
is a sturdier version of the duty than had emerged from Delgamuukw.
76
  
 
As McLachlin C.J. conceived it in Haida Nation, the duty to consult arises out of the “honour of 
the Crown.” Dickson C.J. and Lamer C.J. had both already established this; but in Lamer’s 
approach in particular, the honour of the Crown and the social goal of reconciling Aboriginal and 
non-aboriginal Canadians seems to take a back seat to the expansion of non-aboriginal interests 
in the land.
77
 A simple content analysis indicates that McLachlin C.J. used the term “honour” far 
more extensively than did either Dickson C.J. or Lamer C.J. An appropriate question then is in 
what ways does her opinion develop the communicative understanding of consultation beyond 
that in Sparrow and Delgamuukw? 
 
In both of those opinions, the court employed the honour of the Crown as a grounding principle 
for the need to consult, and both highlighted the Crown’s fiduciary relationship with Aboriginal 
communities to give specificity to the notion of honour. In Sparrow, for instance, the justices 
explicated every use of the term “honour” by following it with a statement of fiduciary duty. As 
the justices put it: “That is, the honour of the Crown is at stake in dealings with aboriginal 
peoples. The special trust relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-à-vis 
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aboriginals must be the first consideration in determining” the justification of legislation.78 In 
Haida Nation, however, McLachlin C.J. stressed that the issue before her concerned the Haida 
Nation’s claimed but still not established aboriginal right of title to the area of T.F.L. 39. This 
meant that the concept of fiduciary duty was of no help in determining the implications of the 
honour of the Crown here. In Weywakum, Binnie J. had already expressed frustration with the 
fact that “Canadian courts have experienced a flood of ‘fiduciary duty’ claims by Indian bands 
across a whole spectrum of possible complaints.”79 There he regarded the appellants as having 
crossed a rhetorical line.  
 But there are limits. The appellants seemed at times to invoke the “fiduciary duty” as a 
 source of plenary Crown liability covering all aspects of the Crown-Indian band 
 relationship. This overshoots the mark. The fiduciary duty imposed on the Crown does 
 not exist at large but in relation to specific Indian interests.
80
  
 
Consequently, in Haida Nation she framed the inappropriateness of a fiduciary obligation to the 
question before her. 
 Here, Aboriginal rights and title have been asserted but have not been defined or proven. 
 The Aboriginal interest in question is insufficiently specific for the honour of the Crown 
 to mandate that the Crown act in the Aboriginal group’s best interest, as a fiduciary, in 
 exercising discretionary control over the subject of the right or title.
81
  
 
 However, as discussed above, while the Crown’s fiduciary obligations and its duty to 
 consult and accommodate share roots in the principle that the Crown’s honour is engaged 
 in its relationship with Aboriginal peoples, the duty to consult is distinct from the 
 fiduciary duty that is owed in relation to particular cognizable Aboriginal interests.
82
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What does the separation of a duty to consult from the fiduciary obligation indicate about the 
nature of the duty to consult, or its framing as a process, and what does it say about the meaning 
of “the honour of the Crown”? Such a framing, she noted early on, was the goal of her writing in 
Haida Nation:  
 Our task is the modest one of establishing a general framework for the duty to consult 
 and accommodate, where indicated, before Aboriginal title or rights claims have been 
 decided. As this framework is applied, courts, in the age-old tradition of the common law, 
 will be called on to fill in the details of the duty to consult and accommodate.
83
  
 
The general framework possesses three features, each of which she explicitly grounded in the 
notion of the honour of the Crown. 1) The first feature, the spur to consult, the source of the 
duty, is the “honour of the Crown.”84 She did seem to aim here for a stronger reading of honour 
than Canada had argued for, in which obligations did not exist pre-treaty.  
 
2) The second feature of her framework is the caveat that consultation does not predetermine an 
outcome. It “must be meaningful.” Nevertheless, “There is no duty to reach agreement.”85 The 
“honour of the Crown” seems to underlie this in two ways, stemming from how the Chief Justice 
phrased the lack of a determinate end. One version appears in relation to the degree of 
accommodation that might emerge from a consultation process. “Good faith consultation may in 
turn lead to an obligation to accommodate Haida concerns in the harvesting of timber, although 
what accommodation if any may be required cannot at this time be ascertained.”86 This is to say 
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that an end of accommodation may emerge from consultation, and that such accommodation 
would be an obligation, even if what it involved was not known in advance.  
 
Another way of articulating the outcome of consultation appears further on in the opinion. 
 The accommodation that may result from pre-proof consultation is just this – seeking 
 compromise in an attempt to harmonize conflicting interests and move further down the 
 path of reconciliation. A commitment to the process does not require a duty to agree. But 
 it does require good faith efforts to understand each other’s concerns and move to address 
 them.
87
 
 
The difference between the two is that the second statement does not say, as the first did, that 
accommodation may involve an obligation to something unknown at the time of undertaking the 
obligation (which is rather like promising to do someone a favor before knowing what the favor 
involves). The first statement about obligation could easily accord with a strong sense, or even 
chivalrous sense, of honour. The second statement, instead, is more of a hedging of bets. An 
obligation to accommodate, but by accommodate mean “compromise,” would yield a softer 
obligation. This is because, for all the apparent synonymous functioning of “accommodate” and 
“compromise,” the focus of the terms shifts from an achievement to an abandonment. A quick 
look at the Oxford English Dictionary demonstrates that “accommodation” involves doing 
something for someone (providing, fitting, adjusting, satisfying, facilitating—all of which are 
meanings that the chief justice leaves out in her own reference to the pocket OED.)
88
 
Compromise, in contrast, concerns loss (risking, endangering, exposing, imperiling). The one 
would forge an obligation to provide, the other an obligation to abandon.  
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Consider how McLachlin C.J. answered the question stemming from Canada’s side of the Haida 
Nation issue: “Is the Crown, under the aegis of its asserted sovereignty, entitled to use the 
resources at issue as it chooses, pending proof and resolution of the Aboriginal claim? Or must it 
adjust its conduct to reflect the as yet unresolved rights claimed by the Aboriginal claimants?”89 
As she put it:  
 The answer, once again, lies in the honour of the Crown. The Crown, acting honourably, 
 cannot cavalierly run roughshod over Aboriginal interests where claims affecting these 
 interests are being seriously pursued in the process of treaty negotiation and proof. It 
 must respect these potential, but yet unproven, interests. The Crown is not rendered 
 impotent. It may continue to manage the resource in question pending claims resolution. 
 But, depending on the circumstances, discussed more fully below, the honour of the 
 Crown may require it to consult with and reasonably accommodate Aboriginal interests 
 pending resolution of the claim. To unilaterally exploit a claimed resource during the 
 process of proving and resolving the Aboriginal claim to that resource, may be to deprive 
 the Aboriginal claimants of some or all of the benefit of the resource. That is not 
 honourable.
90
 
 
From this, the end of consultation grounded in the “honour of the Crown” seems to indicate a 
vigorous notion of the Canada’s obligation. At the same time, the strength of such a potential 
obligation softens even as it appears in juxtaposition to the potency of “the Crown.” Hence the 
unilateral exploitation of a “claimed resource” is only potentially questionable. It “may” “deprive 
the Aboriginal claimants,” which yields a softened moral force in the judgment that such 
exploitation is “not honourable.” The chief justice did not say that exploitation of a claimed 
resource prior to resolution of a claim is not honourable. Instead, honour here would have to be 
determined by an empirical assessment of the infringement to any benefits from the resource that 
the claimants might be receiving. Generally, an empirical measurement of a moral obligation is 
bound to yield a soft version of the obligation. 
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McLachlin C.J.’s soft view of the “honour of the Crown” seems already indicated in Weywakum, 
where Binnie J. was concerned with the problem of the fiduciary relationship. There he referred 
to the Crown’s multiple hats.  
 When exercising ordinary government powers in matters involving disputes between 
 Indians and non-Indians, the Crown was (and is) obliged to have regard to the interest of 
 all affected parties, not just the Indian interest. The Crown can be no ordinary fiduciary; 
 it wears many hats and represents many interests, some of which cannot help but be 
 conflicting.
91
 
 
This same understanding of the Crown as representing many conflicting interests, and therefore 
wearing “many hats,” may also account for her concurrence with Lamer C.J. in Delgamuuk, 
mentioned above, on the extent of justifiable infringements. However, if the Crown wears many 
hats, some of them conflicting, and Aboriginal rights are only one of those interests, it is hard to 
see how the honour of the Crown entails any particular obligation to Aboriginal people. One 
could as easily say that the honour of the Crown undergirds all the hats it wears.  
 
3) The third aspect of her framework related to the honour of the Crown is the timing of a 
consultation process. In rejection of the government’s argument about the impracticality of 
consulting prior to gaining clarity on the issue of title, she concluded that legal authority does not 
support making consultation subsequent to the “final determination of the scope and 
content of the right.”92 More elaborately, she also framed this question of timing as a matter of 
honour: 
 The jurisprudence of this Court supports the view that the duty to consult and 
 accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and reconciliation that begins with the 
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 assertion of sovereignty and continues beyond formal claims resolution. Reconciliation is 
 not a final legal remedy in the usual sense. Rather, it is a process flowing from rights 
 guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This process of reconciliation flows 
 from the Crown’s duty of honourable dealing toward Aboriginal peoples, which arises in 
 turn from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over Aboriginal people, and de facto
 control of land and resources that were formerly in the control of that people.
93
 
 
Here the chief justice moved beyond her practical concern: that consultation might only occur 
after the damage to resources covered by potential Aboriginal rights had been done. She 
connected in an interesting way the temporal question of when the duty to consult arises, with a 
longer question, more tied to the narrative concern in Sparrow, which I discussed above. The 
duty to consult, and the task of reconciliation, are both situated in a “flow.” The flow she referred 
to seems to be more than the flow of logical entailment. Rather, she was speaking of a temporal 
flow. The duty and the process of reconciliation are tied to a historical process, one that “begins 
with the assertion of sovereignty and continues.” This process is evidently coterminous with that 
of Canadian history itself. With its intertwining of two forms of “process:” that of consultation, 
and that of reconciliation; its two sources of “flow:” rights and duty; and its two genetic 
assertions of Crown “sovereignty,” it makes a complicated picture – combining metaphor, moral-
sounding principles, Realpolitik and a condensed historical overview.  
 
Skeptical commentators have accused the court of  “conjuring” in giving shape to the honour of 
the Crown, language that may have been triggered by McLachlin C.J.’s own assurance that her 
effort in Haida Nation was “not a mere incantation, but rather a core precept that finds its 
application in concrete practices.”94 Mariana Valverde draws on Ernst Kantorowicz’s study of 
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medieval political theology to show that the ideas of Crown, honour and sovereignty operative in 
Canadian law still possess their metaphysical stature.
95
 Passages in Haida Nation affirming the 
honour of the Crown may seem to give credence to these suspicions. Nevertheless, I argue (more 
in hopes of sharpening these suspicions than in opposition to them), that the difficulties here 
stem from the workings of the honour of the Crown as a communicative practice. In Haida 
Nation the Crown’s honour is the supporting reason for nearly every declaration made, every 
suggestion developed, every distinction drawn between one case and another. And yet, its 
meaning is never clarified, except in circular references to itself, and a history of precedents that 
do no more to explain the concept. As a communication practice, I think it could be more 
charitably classified than as an “incantation,” which really requires the reader to know something 
about the worldview of the one offering the incantation. More simply, I think we can just 
conclude that the Chief Justice presumed that its meaning and functions were obvious.  
 
Thus, despite her efforts to give shape to the “honour of the Crown” by linking it to the task of 
communication, McLachlin C.J. provided no serious explanation of what honour might mean as 
a legally significant concept, nor how the “concrete practices” where it applies are made distinct 
by attributing them to honour. For instance, she declared that honourable negotiations, such as 
treaty negotiations, “serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown 
sovereignty.”96 As a communicative practice, one might think that an honour-based negotiation 
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serving to reconcile such separate notions as “pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty” and 
“assumed Crown sovereignty,” would have to make an open theme out of the object of 
negotiation: “sovereignty.” That this is not what the chief justice was actually advocating 
underscores the presumed rather than simply “assumed” form of sovereignty, and which is 
therefore in no need of demonstration. A few passages later, she referred to the “reality” of 
Crown sovereignty. That sovereignty can transform from being merely assumed to being real 
without some other intervention than the claims of honour may, as Borrows thinks, be 
alchemical.
97
 It also seems to simply involve the communicative practice of presumed 
obviousness, in which subjects apparently open for discussion are not open for discussion.  I will 
address this further in Chapter 6. 
 
D) Communicative practices in post-Haida Nation jurisprudence 
In the years since Haida Nation, lower courts have considered numerous further challenges 
arising out of McLachlin C.J.’s articulation of the duty to consult. CanLII lists, as of this writing, 
over 550 cases referring to the duty in one form or another. As well, provinces and a range of 
federal departments have elaborated protocols attempting to spell out consultation policies for 
government employees, and guidelines for business practices.
98
 Statutes, such as Ontario’s Far 
North Act, 2010, or the recent revision of its Mining Act, now require governments, and in some 
situations third parties, to engage in consultation with indigenous communities facing impacts 
from development policies. The Far North Act, for instance, invites First Nations to contribute to 
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the formation of “community based land use plans” in order to participate in decision-making 
processes.
99
 The Mining Amendment Act, 2009, at 140(1)(c), specifies that: 
 Aboriginal consultation has been conducted in accordance with the regulations, which 
 may provide that the Director, in considering whether he or she is satisfied that 
 appropriate consultation has been carried out, may take into account any arrangements 
 that have been made with Aboriginal communities potentially affected by the advanced 
 exploration.
100
 
 
The Supreme Court has also considered the duty to consult on several further occasions, refining 
the doctrine primarily by assessing the range of its application. The court has found that the duty 
applies to government actions infringing both historic and modern treaty rights. In the case of 
modern treaty conflicts of interpretation, the means of any required consultation might be more 
reflective of administrative reviews concerned with procedural justice. In Little 
Salmon/Carmacks, the first case dealing with consultation regarding modern treaty rights, 
recognized in the Yukon Final Agreement, however, Binnie J. rejected what he characterized as 
Yukon’s “tight-lipped approach” to consultation.101 The territory had maintained that no duty to 
consult existed outside the specific terms of the Yukon Final Agreement, which it claimed 
amounted to a “complete code.”102 Binnie J. found instead, that while the duty to consult 
grounded in the honour of the Crown (and not simply within the YFA itself) did apply to the 
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approval process, the standard of consultation was low.
103
 Additionally, in Rio Tinto the court 
found that the duty is forward looking; it does not apply to historic infringements, or speculative 
impacts on rights.
104
 McLachlin C.J. also found that the duty to consult did not easily govern the 
work of tribunals or commissions, such as the BC Utilities Commission – which the Carrier 
Sekani challenge had targeted for not undertaking consultation regarding the renewal of Rio 
Tinto/Alcan’s energy purchase agreement on the Nechako River. She noted that 
 Consultation itself is not a question of law; it is a distinct and often complex 
 constitutional process and, in certain circumstances, a right involving facts, law, policy, 
 and compromise. The tribunal seeking to engage in consultation itself must therefore 
 possess remedial powers necessary to do what it is asked to do in connection with the 
 consultation.
105
 
 
These remedial powers could only stem from the legislation creating a particular tribunal in the 
first place. She found no evidence of these remedial powers in the legislative history authorizing 
the utilities commission, and therefore held that it could not be expected to have undertaken the 
consultation process pleaded by the Carrier Sekani council. 
 
 In Moses, another modern treaty case – dealing with the James Bay and Northern Quebec 
Agreement (1975) – the court again held that the duty to consult applied to modern treaty 
interpretation, although the intense disagreement between Binnie J. and LeBel J. focused more 
on division of powers issues, as in St. Catharines Milling and Lumber (discussed in Chapters 5 
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and 6 – largely ignoring the Cree argument for participation in decision-making grounded in the 
duty to consult jurisprudence.
106
  
 
 
Though shaping the scope of the duty to consult, none of these more recent cases expand upon 
the communicative practices that McLachlin C.J. had previously employed in Haida Nation. 
However, in the court’s 2014 decision on the long-running Tsilhqot’in Nation title case, 
McLachlin C.J. did reconfigure her treatment of the communicative practices entailed by the 
duty to consult.
107
 There, in a landmark ruling declaring for the first time in Canadian history that 
a particular people does clearly possess title to at least a portion – five percent – of their 
traditional lands (for which the province had granted Carrier Lumber Ltd. a commercial timber 
license in 1983),
108
 the court seemed to be offering a strong affirmation of the existence of such a 
fundamental Aboriginal right. McLachlin C.J. also seemed to view her efforts there as providing 
indigenous communities with some teeth in future conflicts over lands development. As she put 
it in an aside:  
 I add this. Governments and individuals proposing to use or exploit land, whether  before 
 or after a declaration of Aboriginal title, can avoid a charge of infringement or failure to 
 adequately consult by obtaining the consent of the interested Aboriginal group.
109
 
 
However, what the Tsilhqot’in right of Aboriginal title amounts to is actually quite 
circumscribed by the communicative practices which the chief justice deployed in elaborating on 
the duty to consult. Throughout Tsilhqot’in Nation the theme of “consent” appears in relation to 
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Tsilhqot’in Aboriginal title. In each instance, however, the likelihood of justifying settler society 
development projects through a procedure of consultation and a consideration of justificatory 
reasons looms larger than the likelihood that failure to achieve consent might quash a project. 
For instance, in explaining the range of remedies that could be available to cope with breach of 
Aboriginal title, McLachlin C.J. concludes:   
 Finally, once title is established, the Crown cannot proceed with development of title land 
 not consented to by the title-holding group unless it has discharged its duty to consult and 
 the development is justified pursuant to s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
110
  
 
Thus the lack of consent is only a preliminary to a process of justification, which the decision 
focuses on developing upon the foundation of Sparrow. 
 
In Sparrow and Delgamuukw, the nascent duty to consult appeared as one component of the 
justification of government infringement on s. 35(1) rights. Dickson C.J. conceived the task of 
justification to be a necessary step in the process of reconciliation, as I noted above, between 
federal power and federal duty. As he put the task of justification:  
 In other words, federal power must be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to 
 achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification of any government regulation 
 that infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights.
111
  
 
He considered consultation itself almost as an afterthought.  
  
 Within the analysis of justification, there are further questions to be addressed, depending 
 on the circumstances of the inquiry. These include the questions of whether there has 
 been as little infringement as possible in order to effect the desired result; whether, in a 
 situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available; and, whether the aboriginal 
 group in question has been consulted with respect to the conservation measures being 
 implemented.
112
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As I noted above, in Delgamuukw Lamer C.J. expanded on the task of reconciliation – 
envisioning it as a task to be undertaken between indigenous and settler communities. He 
referred to his earlier framing of this reconciliation in Gladstone: 
 Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the 
 broader political community of which they are part; limits placed on those rights are, 
 where the objectives furthered by those limits are of sufficient importance to the broader 
 community as a whole, equally a necessary part of that reconciliation.
113
 
 
For Lamer, to reconcile indigenous and settler communities required finding a suitable way of 
defining what Aboriginal rights actually were. He quoted his earlier statement in Van der Peet: 
 The definition of an aboriginal right must, if it is to truly reconcile the prior occupation of 
 Canadian territory with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over that territory, take into 
 account the aboriginal perspective, yet do so in terms which are cognizable to the non-
 aboriginal legal system.
114
 
 
Including the “aboriginal perspective” was necessary, because the court has consistently 
regarded Aboriginal rights as communicative achievements, as I have tried to show. In her 
elaboration of the practice of consultation in Haida Nation, however, McLachlin C.J. did not 
mention “the aboriginal perspective” at all, though she continued to highlight the importance of 
communicative practices in order to establish the core of the duty to consult. Nor did she 
mention it in either of the two additional post-Haida Nation decisions she authored.
115
 She could 
have expanded on this in those arenas, since it would have explained how consultation and 
justification fit into the court’s enshrining of reconciliation into a national task. It would also 
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have made the language of reconciliation more understandable.
116
 In Tsilhqot’in Nation, 
nevertheless, she did acknowledge at one point (only) her agreement “with the Court of Appeal 
that the compelling and substantial objective of the government must be considered from the 
Aboriginal perspective as well as from the perspective of the broader public.”117  
 
In spite of this admission, or perhaps in keeping with the jurisprudence’s general care to ensure 
that “the perspective of the broader public” receive its due, Tsilhqot’in Nation presents the duty 
to consult and the task of justifying infringements on established Aboriginal title as less tied to 
the communicative practice of invoking the honour of the Crown, which is barely mentioned in 
McLachlin C.J.’s decision. Nor is there any statement of how the court ought to engage in 
considering “the Aboriginal perspective,” which might be thought of as a substantial enough 
question for the court to approach. Instead, the decision finds more significance in the Sparrow 
casting of reconciliation as a matter between government power and duty: 
 To justify overriding the Aboriginal title-holding group’s wishes on the basis of the 
 broader public good, the government must show: (1) that it discharged its procedural duty 
 to consult and accommodate, (2) that its actions were backed by a compelling and 
 substantial objective;  and (3) that the governmental action is consistent with the Crown’s 
 fiduciary obligation to the group: Sparrow.
118
  
 
                                                 
116
 The court’s reflections on reconciliation remain beyond my scope here, although for an argument that 
SCC statements on reconciliation are evidence of a “new paradigm” emerging, one reflecting an 
abandonment of the older understanding of sovereignty, see Felix Hoehn Reconciling Sovereignties: 
Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 2012). Also, for more equivocal views 
of reconciliation language from two indigenous legal theorists (from among many), see Dale Turner “On 
the Idea of Reconciliation in Contemporary Aboriginal Politics” in Jennifer Henderson and Pauline 
Wakeham (eds.) Reconciling Canada: Critical Perspectives on the Culture of Redress (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2013), at 100-114; and James Sákéj Henderson “Incomprehensible Canada,” 
ibid. at 115-26. 
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 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra p. 43 n. 107, at para. 81. 
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 Ibid. at para. 77. 
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What stands out strikingly in the decision is the language of proportionality, and of the public 
good. The duty to consult is made a procedural preliminary to the substantive goals of 
development desired by the larger public. The language of proportionality suggests that the task 
of justifying can be approached in a simple utilitarian manner. Although the chief justice took 
steps to indicate that the non-indigenous public’s developmental goals have to be considered in 
light of fiduciary duties (for rights proven, that is), she also noted with Delgamuukw that 
fiduciary duties “do not demand that aboriginal rights always be given priority.”119 She laid out 
the task of justification in terms that could have been cast in a communicative manner, and 
shaped to engage the “Aboriginal perspective,” but seemed instead to point back to the Sparrow 
court’s narrower casting of the issue of justification: 
 [T]he Crown’s fiduciary duty infuses an obligation of proportionality into the  
 justification process. Implicit in the Crown’s fiduciary duty to the Aboriginal group is the 
 requirement that the incursion is necessary to achieve the government’s goal (rational 
 connection); that the government go no further than necessary to achieve it (minimal 
 impairment); and that the benefits that may be expected to flow from that goal are not 
 outweighed by adverse effects on the Aboriginal interest (proportionality of impact).
120
   
 
A communicative cast to this obligation would have made it easier to see how proportionality 
and “Aboriginal perspective” could cohere together, and how to comprehend a process that can 
“protect Aboriginal and treaty rights while also allowing the reconciliation of Aboriginal 
interests with those of the broader society.”121   
 
To recap, my contention here is that the duty to consult entails a range of communicative 
practices, which I have illustrated through this discussion of the crucial cases in which the 
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 Delgamuukw, supra p. 13 n. 16, at para. 162. 
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 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra p. 43 n. 107, at para. 87. At the same time, she found this almost 
mathematical focus on proportion and weight to be at the heart of both Delgamuukw and Haida Nation.   
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 Ibid. at para. 139. 
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doctrine has developed. I have tried to show that these practices are slippery, perhaps counter-
intuitive, and in need of further reflection if the doctrine is really to serve as the foundation for 
ongoing relations between indigenous and settler communities in Canada. Notions such as the 
honour of the Crown, tasks such as justification, have an inherently communicative core, and yet 
as it stands, the court’s efforts to develop the doctrine do not sufficiently address how this 
communicative core applies to Canada’s legal relations with First Nations and other Aboriginal 
communities.
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
An Overview of Jürgen Habermas on Law, Discourse and Legitimacy 
 
A. Introduction  
In this chapter I provide an overview of the themes in Habermas’s work that I will apply 
in my analysis of the duty to consult. I attend to these themes in some detail chiefly 
because I think the level of contention regarding Habermas’s discourse theory means that 
readers can often have a distinct impression of the value, or the disvalue, of his work 
even without having much exposure to it. As well, given the depths of disagreement 
surrounding his positions on law, communication, and other features of his theory, a 
reader would need to know how I make sense out of his dense web of prose in order to 
evaluate my claims in what follows about the duty to consult.  
 
Further, given that it might easily seem presumptuous on my part to employ Habermas in 
discussing legal issues affecting indigenous peoples, I think it is necessary to attend to his 
own intellectual context. I don’t think a close reading of his work can sustain the 
conclusion that he is simply a ‘universal’ intellectual, assuming his ability to speak for all 
because of the solidity of his theoretical grasp of immutable truths. Instead, I think that 
the specific legal/political context that has shaped much of his work over several decades 
is crucial to interpreting his normative project, that of providing a critical understanding 
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of the legitimacy of legal order.
1
 That context is dramatically different from those of First 
Nations members, and member of other indigenous communities, as they struggle with 
the continued implications for their lives of the Canadian state, its legal regime, and a 
settler public consensus that views them as marginal to the past, present and future of 
Canada. 
 
However, Habermas’s attempt to forge a strong communicative basis for legal legitimacy 
in post-National Socialist Germany, also seems to me to be relevant to the legal 
challenges facing indigenous communities as they confront the Canadian state by means 
of the duty to consult. In both contexts, the relationship between legal legitimacy and 
communication has been profoundly influenced by legal traditions that have minimized 
the communicative roles of marginalized collectivities: cultural/ethnic groups in 
Germany, and small-scale nations with traditional capabilities of legal and political self-
determination in Canada. Turning to Habermas’s views on law, communication and 
                                                 
1
 For the centrality of law in his social theory, and particularly his interest in finding a way past 
the positivist-natural law debates that figured in post-war Germany, see Matthew G. Specter 
Habermas: an Intellectual Biography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 10. As 
well, see his autobiographical discussions in Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen 
Habermas (London: Verso, 1985, hereinafter AS) at 77-78, and in Between Naturalism and 
Religion: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge UK: Polity, 2008, hereinafter BNR). For a useful 
framing of the post-war German context, in which the “45er” generation grew up in a public 
world dominated by American educational programs, focused on instilling democratic values 
through learning the art of public discussion, a program with foundations in the work of John 
Dewey and other American pragmatists (and who would become so crucial to Habermas’s views 
on communication), see Nina Verheyen, Diskussionslust: Eine Kulturgeschichte des “besseren 
Arguments” in West Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2010). See also Dirk 
Moses German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
for Habermas’s active and controversial role in addressing public memory regarding the Nazi 
years. Charles Turner, in “Jürgen Habermas: European or German?” European Journal of 
Political Theory 3(3) 293, addresses the posture of universalism found in German intellectual 
traditions. My discussion of legal legitimacy later in this chapter will turn to this historical 
context, which also figures in the approach to legitimacy undertaken in the work of English 
theorist H.L.A. Hart. 
51 
 
legitimacy seems useful to me in analyzing the duty to consult because the duty is 
grounded in communicative practices that raise troublesome questions about legal 
legitimacy of the intersocietal context in which Canada and indigenous nations interact 
with each other. In Chapter 3 I will address some of the likely questions readers might 
have about my use of Habermas in what follows. Here, I will simply offer my reading of 
the themes relevant to this project.   
 
 B. Habermas’s key assumptions regarding communication and law 
A tangible picture of the concerns animating Habermas is most evident in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere.
2
 In that early work, Habermas shows how a 
democratic perspective emerged in the post-Reformation era, through such means as the 
critical discussion of norms in Europe’s salons and coffee houses, unfettered by the rules 
of Court or the prying eyes and ears of the Church. On his account, democratic 
institutions have gained both their effectiveness and their legitimacy out of this historical 
lineage of non-coercive, truth-seeking and solidarity-promoting communication. By the 
same token, they have become dysfunctional to the extent that forums, channels or 
opportunities for such critical, truth-seeking communication have shriveled under the 
influence of strategic forms of power. His subsequent publications have largely aimed to 
demonstrate or defend the utility of this sort of view, that is, one focused on what he has 
called “communicative action” or “discourse theory,” and to chart how it makes possible 
                                                 
2
 The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society (Cambridge MA: Massachussetts Institute of Technology Press, 1989 [1962]). 
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an alignment of other key empirical and normative intellectual projects, such as social 
theory’s charting of the emergence of modernity.3  
  
Charting the functioning, and the consequent implications of, the human ability to 
communicate is for Habermas both an empirical and a normative effort, and has required 
his immersion in such fields as linguistics, developmental psychology, anthropology, 
sociology and law--to mention a few of his conversation partners--as well as in 
philosophy. For Habermas, communication is the engine of social evolution, the source 
of valuation and the spur of critical reflection. However, where linguistics or analytic 
philosophy primarily invest themselves in the grammatical and semantic functioning of 
sentences as sufficient to understand the heart of language-based communication, 
Habermas has elaborated upon the speech-acts theories of J.L Austin and John Searle to 
give priority to the relation-forming function of communication, that is “action oriented 
to reaching understanding.”4 As he put it in the mid-1970s: “The goal of coming to an 
understanding is to bring about agreement that terminates in the intersubjective mutuality 
of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust and accord with one 
another.”5 Communicative action oriented towards factual truth and normative rightness 
accounts for all human phenomena worth preserving in a world now “post-metaphysical,” 
and severed from the authoritative hold of tradition stemming from Court and Church. 
                                                 
3
 See, generally, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon, 1975, hereinafter 
CES), Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon, 1975), The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1: 
Reason and the Rationalization of the Lifeworld (Boston: Beacon, 1984, hereinafter, TCA1), and 
TCA2. 
 
4
 CES, at 1. 
 
5
 CES, at 3. 
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The concept of communicative action is also key to charting and critiquing all that is not 
worth preserving. Without it, he holds, one cannot sustain a critique of anything.
6
  
 
Habermas distinguishes communicative action from “strategic action,” which might 
certainly employ language, but arises not concerned to establish un-coerced mutual 
understanding, rather to calculate and achieve the increasing hold or value of forces such 
as money or administrative power. This form of action he sees as the modern outcome of 
the sort of rationalization of society that Max Weber analyzed, his “iron cage.”7 In the 
1980s Habermas characterized the struggles between communicative and strategic action 
as occurring between the “lifeworld”—a phrase borrowed most directly from Austrian 
philosopher Alfred Schutz, and the “system.”8 The lifeworld refers to all that is 
interactive, representing the domains of family, tradition and culture, the varied processes 
of learning; thus the everyday background knowledge that holds both smaller and larger 
scale societies together. In short, the lifeworld is all that might be assembled internally 
and pre-theoretically by an individual, or expressed in terms of values and symbols by a 
community.  
 
                                                 
 
6
 See his lengthy discussion of skepticism in “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of 
Philosophical Justification” hereinafter DEN, in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action 
(Cambridge MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1990 [hereinafter MCCA]) 43, at 
76. 
 
7
 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribners, 1958), at 181. 
 
8
 See, generally, TCA2. 
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The system, by contrast, is only visible from an external point of view. In modern 
societies the two have come apart, or as he says, following American social theorist 
Talcott Parsons, been “differentiated.” Thus:  
modern societies attain a level of system differentiation at which increasingly 
autonomous organizations are connected with one another via delinguistified 
media of communication: these steering mechanisms—for example, money—
steer a social intercourse that has been largely disconnected from norms and 
values, above all in those subsystems of purposive-rational economic and 
administrative action that, on Weber’s diagnosis, have become independent of 
their moral-political foundations.
9
  
 
By disconnected, Habermas is referring to the separation of modern steering media from 
the kinds of control that various pre-modern forms of society held over economic 
activity, for instance as described in Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation.10 A ready 
example of this might be seen in the way that capitalism entails the interest power of 
money, which appears to be a natural force, and no longer the traditionally understood 
vice of usury. Or, in a North American context, it might be seen in the myriad conflicts 
between indigenous communities and the agents of Anglo civilization who sought to re-
orient traditional sustenance and trade patterns.
11
  
 
Habermas has also revised Weber’s diagnosis of the potential future looming over Europe 
and other areas of the globe, envisioning the spread of a destructive process that he 
termed “the colonization of the lifeworld.”  
                                                 
9
 TCA2, at 187. 
 
10
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon, 1957). 
 
11
 Anthony Wallace’s The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca (New York: Random House, 1969) 
and R. David Edmunds’ The Shawnee Prophet (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1983) might 
both be read as examples of these common 18
th
 and 19
th
 century conflicts between system and 
lifeworld.   
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The lifeworld is assimilated to juridified, formally organized domains of action 
and cut off from the influx of an intact cultural tradition. In the deformations of 
everyday practice, symptoms of rigidification combine with symptoms of 
desolation. The former, the one-sided rationalization of everyday communication, 
goes back to the growing autonomy of the media-steered subsystems, which not 
only get objectified into a norm-free reality beyond the horizon of the lifeworld, 
but whose imperatives also penetrate into the core domains of the lifeworld. The 
latter, the dying out of vital traditions, goes back to a differentiation of science, 
morality and art, which means not only an increasing autonomy of sectors dealt 
with by experts, but also a splitting off from traditions; having lost their 
credibility, these traditions continue along on the basis of everyday hermeneutics 
as a kind of second nature that has lost its force.
12
  
 
The cornerstone of Habermas’s analysis of communicative action is what he has referred 
to as  
 
the “ideal speech situation.”13 Critics have fastened on to this term, and Habermas has 
offered several revisions over the years to what he maintains the concept indicates about 
the pragmatic nature of communication.  Much of this back and forth has involved the 
implications of Habermas’s use of terms such as “ideal,” “transcendental” and “a priori” 
to characterize the ideal speech situation. He seems more recently to have let the term go, 
or at least to have softened its expression in response to its jarring impact on his critics, 
though he still refers to an effective but “weak” transcendence which remains necessary 
to its conception.
14
  
 
In recent work he has stressed that the sort of necessity inherent within these pragmatic 
assumptions is not really Kantian in its pedigree. Rather, he traces the lineage to the 
influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein. This necessity  
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 TCA2, at 327.  
 
13
 TCA1, at 25. 
 
14
 BNR, at 83. 
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 does not have the transcendental meaning of universal, necessary and noumenal 
 conditions of possible experience, but has the grammatical meaning of an 
 “unavoidability” stemming from the conceptual connections of a system of 
 learned—but  for us inescapable—rule-governed behavior. After the pragmatic 
 deflation of the Kantian approach, “transcendental analysis” means the search for 
 the presumptively universal, but only de facto inescapable conditions that must 
 be met if certain fundamental practices or achievements are to be possible. All 
 practices for which we cannot imagine functional equivalents in our sociocultural 
 forms of life are “fundamental” in this sense.15 
 
While such caveats might not satisfy his critics, I think they go a long way toward 
indicating that much of the hostility to his argument is misplaced, as I will address more 
fully below. An additional qualification that might reconcile at least some of his 
opponents is the fact that in his work on law, he also began to characterize the ideal 
speech situation more carefully, referring to it as an “anticipation,” a “thought 
experiment” or a “methodological fiction.”16 Nevertheless, in spite of these revisions to 
its status, the concept itself does remain the driving force behind his “discourse theory” 
of law and democracy.  
 
Sketched in brief, with the “ideal speech situation” Habermas has held that entailed in 
any act of communication oriented towards expressing a speaker’s perspective on some 
state of affairs, are certain necessary, though not necessarily explicit, pragmatic 
assumptions about the ability to communicate in the first place. Chief among these 
assumptions is simply our belief that in our own use of language (as competent natural 
languages speakers) to make claims about the world, we are capable of articulating the 
truth related to some state of affairs. When challenged about our ability to do so, or our 
                                                 
15
 Ibid. at 27. 
 
16
 BFN, at 323.  
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success in doing so, we see ourselves as also capable of providing reasons justifying our 
original claim. This challenge and response, leading to some form of argumentation 
centered on making a theme of discussion out of our challenged claim, is what Habermas 
means by “discourse.”17 That is, “discourse” is the communicative activity arising out of 
a challenge to one’s statements, in so far as they are grounded in what he refers to as 
basic “validity claims.” These validity claims can appeal to either empirical (or 
propositional) truth, normative rightness, or personal sincerity. The third form of validity 
claim is one that Habermas has been most flexible in articulating. It ranges in focus 
within his work from sincerity, “truthfulness,” or “personal authenticity,”18 such as might 
be associated with statements of emotional or subjective disposition, to statements about 
aesthetic perceptions, or the “well-formedness of symbolic expressions,” and therefore 
reflective of cultural practices as well as personal beliefs.
19
 It also seems as stated the 
least apt, since its domain encompasses a much greater range of speech acts than either 
the propositional truth or normative claims. Thus it may simply be a catch-all for various 
other categories of speech, one that others with greater interest in it than Habermas 
himself has shown could find more stable ways of characterizing. The distinctions 
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 TCA1, at 19. 
 
18
 TCA1, at 308. In his earliest efforts to address validity claims, for instance in his 1971 
Princeton lectures, he distinguishes four claims, including with the others mentioned above that 
of semantic “intelligibility.” He eventually let this one go, however, since its focus on the correct 
construction of sentences is different than the focus of the other claims on perceptions of states of 
affairs in the world. See his “From a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society” in On 
the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001) at 63. 
 
19
 TCA1, at 42. 
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between these claims might also be said to reflect Habermas’s debt to Kant’s revision of 
the traditional Platonic, characterization of the good, the beautiful, and the true.
20
  
 
As he expressed at one point the attendant assumptions necessary to hold in order to 
argue about the truth of some claim: 
Anyone who seriously engages in argumentation must presuppose that the context 
of discussion guarantees in principle freedom of access, equal rights to 
participate, truthfulness on the part of participants, absence of coercion in 
adopting positions, and so on. If the participants genuinely want to convince one 
another, they must make the pragmatic assumption that they allow their “yes” and 
“no” responses to be influenced solely by the force of the better argument.21  
Pragmatic, real-world illustrations of this expectation or anticipation of norms for truthful 
communication are not difficult to come by. For instance, when a teen-ager (or most of 
the rest of us, for that matter) is challenged regarding a poor moral choice, she is likely to 
invoke a context-transcending justification for the choice, even if it is only ‘anyone faced 
with the same choice would have made the same decision.’ This claim relies on the 
expectation that her challenger will recognize application of a principle of fairness. If she 
confronts her challenger with a set of facts that she hopes would make her choice seem 
more legitimate, she would be assuming that her challenger respects facts as such—and 
that she herself would respect facts as such, even if they were countervailing.  Such 
mundane examples illustrate the specific “anticipatory” role of the ideal of discourse as 
Habermas has laid it out. What is at work in a speech situation is the speaker’s 
anticipation that any group of impartial listeners would find themselves in agreement 
with the speaker’s characterization of the matter at hand. As a pragmatic anticipation, 
                                                 
20
 See his discussion of Kant in MCCA, at 2-3. 
 
21
 “Remarks on Discourse Ethics,” in Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1994) 19, at 31. Hereinafter RDE. 
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then, Habermas’s use of “transcendental” does not need to be seen as the problematic 
invocation of the “ideal” that his critics have argued it is.  
 
The attendant assumptions to discourse: free access to information, equal ability to speak, 
acceptance of the integrity of other speakers (in their own intention to speak truthfully), 
the “absence of coercion,” and the accompanying willingness to engage in “yes” or “no” 
dialogue, are all efforts to flesh out what Habermas has consistently called the “discourse 
principle.” The discourse principle, or “D”, summarizes the breadth of his analysis of 
communicative pragmatics. Its most common formulation is “Just those action norms are 
valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational 
discourses,”22 or with the substitution of “practical discourses” for “rational 
discourses.”23 In earlier work he regarded this principle as sufficient to account for moral 
obligation as well, but eventually developed from it a separate principle, “U,” to account 
for the universal perspective he believes morality requires. This states that: “All affected 
can accept the consequences and the side effects [a norm’s] general observance can be 
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests”.24 Although both 
principles share the focus on an ideal consensus derived through rational argumentation, 
they differ in their operation. U operates at “a specific form of argumentation which is 
internally constituted,” since it influences the thinking of all individuals. D operates at the 
level of “externally institutionalized” argumentation, which is to say that it “steers the 
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 BFN, at 107. 
 
23
 DEN, at 66. 
 
24
 Ibid. at 65, emphasis in original. 
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production of the legal medium itself.” D is therefore identical to the principle of 
democracy, grounded in specific action-contexts, and focused on the production of legal 
norms.
25
 
 
Given the amount of criticism Habermas has sustained for developing these assumptions, 
what is remarkable, for my purposes in addressing Canada’s duty to consult, is the 
provisional “and so on” with which his detailing of necessary discourse assumptions 
ends. It is clear from his elaboration of the discourse principle in various works that the 
specific content of these attendant assumptions is of lesser interest to him than the 
direction in which they point. For instance, he acknowledges Robert Alexy’s “suggested” 
articulation of what these necessary assumptions might be. He lays these out as: 1) 
everyone capable of speaking and acting can participate in discourse, 2) everyone can 
question any assertion, introduce any assertion, or express their needs and desires, 3) no 
one can be coerced into violating 1) or 2).
26
 Habermas does not attempt to hone Alexy’s 
account of these assumptions any further, though they differ somewhat from his own 
earliest efforts to specify them. Rather, he tries to show how they reflect a necessary 
posture for one who aims to communicate truthfully.
27
 In Chapter 4, I will argue that this 
provisional quality of the necessary assumptions of discourse makes clear how 
Habermas’s perspective might dovetail with norms of discourse embraced within 
indigenous approaches to intersocietal legal discourse. 
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 BFN, at 110-11. 
 
26
 DEN at 89.   
 
27
 Ibid. at 91.  
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Much of the criticism targeting Habermas’s account of the ideal speech situation, as 
Habermas has repeatedly noted, seems to mistake its basic purpose within his social 
theory. Many critics, for instance, have objected that it is simply too idealistic. 
Empirically-minded researchers have sought to show that as a model of communicative 
action, it does not describe much about the behavior of people actually engaged in 
communication, and seems to require people to function as communicative heroes.
28
 
Some have found its generality to be vacuous. Others have assailed it from post-modern, 
post-structuralist or anti-foundationalist perspectives, as I will note below. Some of those 
within the field of deliberative democracy who have been most influenced by Habermas’s 
larger project, have also argued that his account fails to capture how argument may 
actually function as a mechanism for democratic practice. Others have similarly argued 
that the ideal speech situation fails because of Habermas’s basic assumption of a social 
theoretical distinction between communicative and strategic action, as detailed above. For 
some, committed to Kantian or Platonic versions of transcendental philosophy, it seems a 
poor imitation of more classical approaches.  
 
And yet, given its status as an ideal, most of these dismissals of it seem little more than 
category mistakes, in effect holding it to standards alien to the purpose or properties of 
                                                 
28
 For a fairly egregious example of this approach, see Byron Rienstra and Derek Hook 
“Weakening Habermas: the Undoing of Communicative Rationality” (2006) Politikon 33(3) 313, 
which relies primarily upon formulations of Habermas’s views derived from the conclusions of 
his critics. For a more sophisticated expression of the mutually-beneficial dependencies of 
empirical and theoretical/normative approaches, see Dennis F. Thompson “Deliberative 
Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science” (2008) Annual Review of Political Science 
11, 497. 
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ideals as such. Habermas himself has emphasized that it is a regulative and not a 
constitutive ideal.
29
 Its purpose is to expose the “underside of communicative social 
relations—an underside that, even to the participants themselves, remains largely hidden 
in the shadows of the idealizing presuppositions of communicative action.”30 He 
acknowledges that the suspicions of his critics may stem from his terminology, which 
“tempts one to improperly hypostatize the system of validity claims on which speech is 
based.”31 Instead, he maintains that while the necessary assumptions of the ideal speech 
situation enable those communicating about something within the world to “go beyond 
local justifications and to transcend the provinciality of their spatiotemporal contexts,” 
this does not transform such would-be truthful communicative practitioners: “they are not 
themselves transported into the beyond of an ideal realm of noumenal beings.”32 They are 
                                                 
29
 At the same time, however, his usage is not always consistent. Here he seems to be saying that 
these assumptions are constitutive and not regulative:  
 Presuppositions of communication do not have regulative force even when they point 
 beyond  actually existing conditions in an idealizing fashion. Rather, as anticipatory 
 suppositions they are constitutive of a practice that without them could not function and 
 would degenerate at the very least into a surreptitious form of strategic action. 
 Presuppositions of rationality do not impose obligations to act rationally; they make  
 possible the practice that participants understand as argumentation (RDE, at 31).  
This apparent discrepancy in his usage is resolvable by distinguishing the different levels at 
which they operate within practical discourse (and by noting that his immediate sources for the 
terms, Rawls and Searle, also employ them somewhat fluidly). Habermas’s usage resembles 
Searle’s. The pragmatic rules of discourse “constitute” the possibility of engaging in rational 
discourse, by providing “weakly” (his term) “regulative” norms to assess the success of 
communicative action. Thus truthfulness is constitutive in general of our expectations of 
discourse aimed at establishing mutual understanding, yet also regulative when we are 
disappointed by an act that violates our expectations, for instance, by discovering that someone is 
lying to us. Rawls’s usage is similar: constitutive rules govern practices in general, regulative 
rules enable us to justify particular actions within a practice. For Rawls’s use, see his “Two 
Concepts of Rules” (1955) The Philosophical Review 64(1) 3. For Searle’s, see Speech Acts: an 
Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) at 51-52.  
 
30
 BFN, at 326.   
 
31
 Ibid. at 323. 
 
32
 Ibid. 
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thoroughly situated in particular historical, cultural, social contexts, though they “are not 
simply at the mercy of their lifeworld.”33 What they gain, even if only intuitively, is the 
ability to suspect those communicative efforts that appear to fall short of the standard 
made explicit in the discourse principle. They also gain the presumption that their 
partners in communication can be expected to share their assumptions that 
communication oriented towards reaching an understanding is also oriented towards the 
truth.  
 
Habermas elaborates on the real world use of D: 
Whenever we want to convince one another of something, we always already 
intuitively rely on a practice in which we presume that we sufficiently 
approximate the ideal conditions of a speech situation specially immunized 
against repression and inequality. In this speech situation, persons for and against 
a problematic validity claim thematize the claim and, relieved of the pressures of 
action and experience, adopt a hypothetical attitude in order to test with reasons, 
and reasons alone, whether the proponent’s claim stands up. The essential 
intuition we connect with this practice of argumentation is characterized by the 
intention of winning the assent of a universal audience to a problematic 
proposition in a noncoercive but regulated contest for the better arguments based 
on the best information and reasons. It is easy to see why the discourse principle 
requires this kind of practice for the justifications of norms and value decisions: 
whether norms and values could find the rationally motivated assent of all those 
affected can be judged only from the intersubjectively enlarged perspective of the 
first-person plural. This perspective integrates the perspectives of each 
participant’s worldview and self-understanding in a manner that is neither 
coercive nor distorting. The practice of argumentations recommends itself for 
such a universalized ideal role taking practiced in common.
34
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In Chapter 3, I will consider possible objections to this characterization of our 
communicative intuitions that stem, or could stem, from the perspectives of indigenous 
theorists concerned with the duty to consult. For now, it seems sufficient to note that 
Habermas’s characterization of our intuitions regarding argument rests upon our 
confidence that we can sufficiently access, and convey to others, a significant degree of 
truth regarding various states of affairs in the world. 
 
Although his theory of communicative action, or discourse, leads many to assume he is 
either naïve in his vision of consensus, or prone to restricting the sorts of communicative 
acts that might count as legitimate discourse, there is no reason to read him in such a 
way. Habermas’s view of public sphere discourse, legal and political, highlights its 
necessary contentiousness – 
 making it relevant to McLachlin C.J.’s Haida Nation admonition that the duty to consult 
does not need to yield agreement, as I will elaborate on in Chapters 5 and 6. This 
contentiousness 
is evident in his emphasis on law as a form of public sphere discourse. Discourse theory 
seeks the “institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions of 
communication,” as well as to maintain “the interplay of institutionalized deliberative 
processes with informally developed public opinions.”35 Habermas indicates the 
centrality of civic engagement in the concluding sections of BFN.  
In the proceduralist paradigm, the vacancies left by the private-market participant 
and the client of welfare bureaucracies are filled by enfranchised citizens who 
participate in political discourses in order to address violated interests and, by 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
35
 BFN, at 298. 
 
65 
 
articulating new needs, to collaborate in shaping standards for treating like cases 
alike and different cases differently. To the extent that legal programs are in need 
of further specification by the courts—because decisions in the gray area between 
legislation and adjudication tend to devolve on the judiciary, all provisos 
notwithstanding—juristic discourses of application must be visibly supplemented 
by elements take from discourses of justification.
36
  
 
In fact, Habermas makes quite clear that the roles played by this “energized citizenry” are 
not subsidiary to those of seemingly autonomous political and legal institutions. Rather, 
such a citizenry is the central force, embodying what he calls “communicative power,” 
which can shift the orientation of modern constitutional states toward “lifeworld” 
restoring developments. To that end, he has long pointed to the salutary democratic 
influence of civil rights groups, peace and anti-colonial activists, national liberation 
movements, feminist advocates, and grass-roots environmental movements; all of whom 
have employed within the public sphere a range of practices, including legislative 
advocacy, legal challenges to administrative decisions, and campaigns of civil 
disobedience.
37
 As he frames the centrality of public opinion formation to democratic 
political practice and the possibility of a legitimate legal order: 
In the proceduralist paradigm, the public sphere is not conceived simply as the 
back room of the parliamentary complex, but as the impulse-generating periphery 
that surrounds the political center; in cultivating normative reasons, it affects all 
parts of the political system without intending to conquer it. Passing through the 
channels of general elections and various forms of participation, public opinions 
are converted into a communicative power that authorizes the legislature and 
legitimates regulatory agencies, while a publicly mobilized critique of judicial 
decisions imposes more-intense justificatory obligations on a judiciary engaged in 
further developing the law [my emphasis].
38
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Habermas’s continuing view of the role of these public communicative practices on the 
development of law entails what he regards as a worthwhile “permanent risk of 
dissensus.”39 This risk of dissensus will be crucial to assess in my addressing the courts’ 
conceptualization of the duty to consult from the standpoint of discourse. 
 
C. A discourse view of the legitimacy of legality 
For Habermas, the truth-invoking argumentative function of the discourse principle 
serves as more than just an add-on to the philosophy of language, which he sees having 
overlooked the social-solidarity function of communication in its concentration on the 
semantics of assertions, as I noted above. The discourse principle also provides him with 
the core of an explanation for social interaction, and for his analysis of law and 
democracy in BFN. I will focus in chapter 4 and on the conditions for legal legitimacy 
that arise out of North American intersocietal communicative contexts, such as emerged 
in paradigmatic settings of treaty formation. Given the distance between these discourse-
based views and those more commonly held by courts and legal theory, I will distinguish 
Habermas’s approach here from those of Max Weber and H.L.A. Hart.  
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Habermas has long maintained that the accounts of law’s legitimacy descended from Max 
Weber and H.L.A. Hart are at best incomplete. Both of them, from Habermas’s 
perspective, succumb to a fatal temptation in their respective accounts of modern law. In 
these accounts, as he puts it: “the voluntarism of pure enactment stirs the imagination of 
legal positivism."
40
 This stirring, he contends, has thoroughly distorted our understanding 
of the role of law as a medium of social integration in modern society, in effect turning 
law into one of the "delinguistified steering media," which, as I noted above, means that 
it has become a force operating on a par with, and largely in service of, other forces 
(markets and bureaucracies), rather than restraining the corrosive impacts of those forces 
on democratic social orders.
41
  
 
Habermas certainly has much in common with both Weber and Hart. From Weber, 
Habermas has taken his long-term narrative focus on the rationalization of the Occident, 
which has provided the spur for Habermas to draw a different conclusion about the fate 
of that rationality from the one that Weber (and Habermas’s teachers Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno) drew in their portraits of iron cages and the triumph of instrumental 
reason. From Weber also, Habermas has inherited his commitment to keeping action 
theory at the heart of his social and legal theory—meaning that while he attempts to 
incorporate the systems perspectives of theorists such as Niklas Luhmann and Talcott 
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Parsons, he regards these approaches (or the somewhat related approaches of French 
post-structuralists such as Michel Foucault) as making impossible a full consideration of 
law as an intentional creation, or a product of what he often refers to as “political will 
formation.” Ultimately, it is this Weberian focus on social action (though now reframed 
as communicative action) that is such crucial fodder for the development of his view of 
legal validity.  However, Weber chose to address the legitimacy of law from within the 
limiting assumptions about rationality that steered his account of the modernization of 
Occidental social institutions. 
  
C(1). A discourse view of Weber’s account of legal validity  
Weber held that modern law rests on two sources of validity: its result from voluntary 
agreements between parties, which forms the basis of private, or contractual law;
42
 and 
from its “imposition by an authority which is believed to be legitimate and therefore 
meets with compliance.”43 Despite his overarching sociological interest in “belief,” and 
in the complex range of subjective motivations for social action in general, for instance as 
these shape his treatment of world religions; within his sociology of law, Weber 
dismissed the significance of the sources of “belief” in authority, or at least chose not to 
give them center-place in his depiction of the form of rational legal authority. Thus, while 
belief could have a “profound influence on action in the absence of any external 
guarantee,” at least within “primitive” social orders, he did not think it was central to the 
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sociologist of law’s focus in examining the institutions of formalized legal action. “[I]t is 
by no means necessary that all conventionally or legally guaranteed forms of order 
should claim the authority of ethical norms. Legal rules, more often than conventional 
ones, may have been established entirely on grounds of expediency.”44  
 
The evident tension here between Weber’s neo-Kantian interest in questions of 
motivation and value, and his interest in characterizing the objective features of formal 
legal institutions, especially bureaucratic administration, has much to do with his most 
basic assumptions about rationality. Fundamental to the Weberian project of tracing out 
the emergence of Occidental rationalism is the distinction between zweckrationalität and 
wertrationalität, that is between forms of rationality functioning in terms of means-end 
calculations, or procedural rationality; and those functioning in terms of commitments to 
absolute values. Whether he depicted this history dispassionately or with the melancholy 
of the Protestant Ethic, Weber consistently saw zweckrationalität as the only form 
available for measuring truth or success within the modern Occidental social order.   
 Value-rational action may thus have various different relations to the 
 instrumentally rational action. From the latter point of view, however, value-
 rationality is always irrational. Indeed, the more the value to which action is 
 oriented is elevated to the status of an absolute value, the more “irrational” in this 
 sense the corresponding action is.
45
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Thus legality can only be thematized as an expression of zweckrationalität. 
Consequently, the presence of “positive enactment which is believed to be legal” is the 
ground for measuring the legitimacy of the modernized “social order.”46  
 
Weber focused his study of legitimacy on the means by which law provided more stable 
expectations of social order than were possible under either regimes of expediency or 
custom.
47
 In the end, he held that law’s provision of order, legale Herrschaft, or legalized 
domination, stems from the “guarantee” of social order provided through the state’s 
“coercive apparatus”48 – that is, its monopoly on violence,49 and administered in a 
consistent way through bureaucratic organizations, in which “coercion [physical or 
psychological] will be applied by a staff of people in order to bring about compliance or 
avenge violation.”50 The “juridical formalism” of modern law “enables the legal system 
to operate like a technically rational machine.”51 Its principle characteristics: its 
systematic range of provisions, generalized form, and consistent application,
52
 appear 
seamlessly woven together with key characteristics of bureaucratic administration: 
uniform application of abstract regulations, technical basis of knowledge, and 
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“formalistic impersonality.”53 Legitimacy, “today,” he notes, derives from “the belief in 
legality, the compliance with enactments that are formally correct and which have been 
made in the accustomed manner.”54 As Weber characterized his historical account of 
legitimacy in one influential formulation: 
With the triumph of formalist legal rationalism, the legal type of domination 
appeared in the Occident at the side of the transmitted types of domination 
[meaning from traditional sources]. Bureaucratic rule was not and is not the only 
variety of legal authority, but it is the purest….[I]n legal authority, submission 
does not rest upon the belief and devotion to charismatically gifted persons, like 
prophets and heroes, or upon piety toward a personal lord or master who is 
defined by an ordered tradition, or upon piety toward the possible incumbents of 
office fiefs and office prebends who are legitimized in their own right through 
privilege and conferment. Rather, submission under legal authority is based on an 
impersonal nod to the generally defined and functional ‘duty of office.’ The 
official duty—like the corresponding right to exercise authority: the 
‘jurisdictional competency’—is fixed by rationally established norms, by 
enactments, decrees and regulations, in such a manner that the legitimacy of the 
authority becomes the legality of the general rule, which is purposely thought out, 
enacted and announced with formal correctness. 
55
 
For Habermas, Weber was only able to reach this depiction of modern, formal law by 
ignoring the communicative core of the rationality of law. One might note, for instance, 
his dismissal of the significance of “belief” about the law cited above. In addition, one 
might also note, that even on Weber’s grounds of limited “ethnological” (as he put it) 
exposure, he characterizes “primitive” law as established by voluntary agreement, hence, 
by what Habermas would call a communicative process of consent formation. However, 
Weber frames this form of law as lower on the rationality scale than that of modern, 
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formalized legal institutions—since voluntary agreement would inevitably produce a less 
secure social order.
56
 Significantly, although Habermas shares in Weber’s socio-
evolutionary view of the emergence of Occidental rationalism, he does not draw the same 
conclusion regarding the “primitive” nature of consensus formation. In addition, for 
Weber the consent possibility evident within “primitive” legal communities also stood in 
tension with the more basic form of legal legitimacy provided by “charismatic authority.”  
“Revelation of law” received from charismatic figures, he notes, while “opposing the 
stability of tradition,” is also “the parent of all legal ‘enactment.’”57  
 
What troubles Habermas most in Weber’s formulation of legitimacy, is that it represents 
Weber’s choice to make normative this constrained view of rationality. Over the years 
Habermas has frequently used the term “positivism” loosely to indicate this constrained 
view. Although his usage of the term may give some pause, what seems most significant 
here is that he is concerned to highlight the gap he sees between Weber’s achievement 
and his self-imposed theoretical limitations.
58
 On the one hand, Weber’s “approach still 
holds out the best prospect of explaining the social pathologies that appeared in the wake 
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of capitalist modernization.”59 On the other hand, his theoretical “bottleneck” was that he 
“equated the capitalist pattern of modernization with societal rationalization generally.”60 
Consequently, “he was unable consistently to bring the legitimation problems generated 
by a positivistically hollowed out legal domination under the pattern of rationalization of 
modern societies, because he remained himself tied to legal-positivistic views.”61 By 
viewing all credible expressions of rationality through the lens of “instrumental” or 
“purposive-rational” action, Weber consigns the rationality of moral judgment to the 
same subjective sphere in which he placed religion, art and other forms of cultural 
expression.  
 
Weber traces the origins of modern law to two analytically separate tendencies within 
Occidental cultures: 1) emerging “post-traditional structures of moral consciousness,” 
such as the Protestant Reformation, which he saw as grounded in wertrationalität, or 
substantive value-rationality, and 2) the accompanying economic and political 
institutionalization of market and state, grounded in zweckrationaliät, or purposive or 
instrumental rationality.
62
  As Habermas portrays it, Weber’s crucial error in his 
treatment of law was to dismiss the first tendency as only a holdover from a pre-modern 
world, thus limiting the rationality of law to the rationality of strategic, instrumental 
action. He notes that Weber succeeds in his historical account of law’s development 
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“only at the cost of an empiricist reinterpretation of the legitimation problematic and a 
conceptual separation of the political system from forms of moral-practical rationality – 
he trims back political will-formation to processes of acquiring and competing for 
power.”63 Thus, although Weber had the conceptual means and historical evidence 
available to have concluded differently, he concluded that law’s legitimacy was only a 
question of “legality” or “enactment.” 
  
C(2). A discourse view of Hart’s union of rules approach to law’s legitimacy 
Given the amount of effort Habermas has put into his absorption of, and interaction with, 
Anglo-Saxon currents in philosophy of language, socio-political theory, and other 
intellectual enterprises, it is surprising that he has not focused more on the work of 
Oxford legal theorists. This limited interaction may account for his loose usage of 
“positivism,” and his providing a reading of H.L.A. Hart that seems to place Hart more 
within the orbit of John Austin and Jeremy Bentham than Hart would have been glad to 
acknowledge, and to accept Ronald Dworkin’s reduction of Hart’s “positivism” to the 
issue of “pedigree.”64 Nevertheless, in his own approach to the legitimacy of law, he does 
make an effort to distinguish his approach from that of Hart.
65
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Weber’s view of law’s legitimacy seems to cohere easily with what Hart refers to as the 
“command theory,” that is, the “sovereign’s coercive orders,” advanced by earlier 
generations of positivists, a theory Hart sought to discredit and replace with his own.
66
 In 
its stead, Hart argues that for modern “municipal” legal regimes at least, the basis of 
legitimacy lies in the means of identifying law. The “union of primary and secondary 
rules” that Hart proposes as the “most illuminatingly” adequate account for the 
identification of law remains, fifty years after its promotion and accompanying level of 
scholarly debate, as thorny a concept as Habermas’s “ideal speech situation.”67   
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Hart maintains that the distinction between two forms of rule is a matter of historical 
development. Early social orders: “primitive” or “pre-legal,” undoubtedly had rules 
regulating conduct – although he is even less interested than Habermas seems to be in 
focusing his attention on what such societies may have been (or continue to be) like. 
These “primary rules,” at some unspecified historical moment, eventually became 
supplemented by a “secondary” sort of rule, “the rule of recognition,” which serves to 
legitimate authority. As he summarizes the distinction: 
Under rules of the one type, which may well be considered the basic or primary 
type, human beings are required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether 
they wish to or not. Rules of the other type are in a sense parasitic upon or 
secondary to the first; for they provide that human beings may by doing or saying 
certain things introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old 
ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or control their operations. 
Rules of the first type impose duties; rules of the second type confer powers.
68
 
Hart also distinguishes between “external” and “internal” views of law, the one available 
to the observer, the other to its practitioner or subject, and argues that his own approach 
to law is uniquely able to take account of this internal point of view.  
What the external point of view, which limits itself to the observable regularities 
of behaviours, cannot reproduce is the way in which the rules function as rules in 
the lives of those who normally are the majority of society . . . for them the 
violation of a rule is not merely a basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction 
will follow, but a reason for hostility.
69
 
 
He thinks that his theoretical forebears were overly-interested in the external aspects of 
law, and were committed to the erroneous idea “that somewhere in every legal system, 
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even though it lurks behind legal forms, there must be a sovereign legislative power 
which is legally unlimited.” As indicated above, he would seem to necessarily consign 
Weber to the camp of those committing this error, while maintaining that his 
identification of the internal aspect of law makes possible the absolute identification of 
the “concept” of law. However, in the end, his conceptualization of this “internal” aspect 
does little to get beyond Weber’s own identification, and then dismissal, of “belief” as a 
rational ground for legitimacy. That is, he never really addresses the nature of the 
“reason” that he highlights as the distinguishing mark between the internal point of view 
and the external. 
 
Thus, Hart maintains that in a municipal legal regime all would be able to accept the 
distinction between the two sorts of rules, and recognize the validity of primary rules 
enacted in accordance with the secondary rule. However, Hart exhibits little interest in 
what might readily, and Habermas would say ‘necessarily,’ stem from framing law as 
identifiable by its “internal” aspect. That is, law seems unanchored in political practice, 
or in what Habermas would call “communicative practice.” We might sharpen this by 
saying that for Hart the generative conditions of law—the formation of rules regarded as 
legitimate—are extraneous to what law actually is; as though the terms “formation” and 
“regarded” are not crucial to determining the meaning of “rules” and “legitimate.”  
 
For Hart, the conferral of power, made possible by a rule rather than a weapon, is the 
measure of legal validity. He identifies “as a matter of history,” that the rule of 
recognition became visible first in “the mere reduction to writing of hitherto unwritten 
78 
 
rules,” which provided a means of referring “to the writing inscription as authoritative, 
i.e. as the proper way of disposing of doubts as to the existence of the rule.”70 In this 
“simple operation of identifying a given rule as possessing the required feature of being 
an item on an authoritative list of rules we have the germ of the idea of legal validity.”71  
Hart considers the idea of “legal validity,” -- despite his identification of the “internal” 
aspect of law -- consistently from the standpoint of the external observer. As soon as he 
does this, however, he winds up reinstating the “command theory” that he has tried to 
displace, since he seems uninterested in exploring the complexities of any “internal” 
perspectives. Within Hart’s clarification of the essence of the category of law appear 
repeated demonstrations that it is either only adequately seen from an external 
perspective, or only embodied internally by those in command of a legal regime. The 
“ultimate rule of recognition may be regarded from two points of view: one is expressed 
in the external statement of fact that the rule exists in the actual practice of the system; 
the other is expressed in the internal statements of validity made by those who use it in 
identifying the law.”72 Thus, he sees legal validity as adequately addressed by the notion 
of parliamentary supremacy: 
 Finally, when the validity of the statute has been queried and assessed by 
 reference to the rule that what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law, we are 
 brought to a stop in inquiries  concerning validity: for we have reached a rule 
 which, like the intermediate statutory order and statute, provides criteria for the 
 assessment of the validity of other rules; but it is also unlike them in that there is 
 no rule providing criteria for the assessment of its own legal validity.” 73 
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Further, he blithely summarizes the scope of his fundamental concern by concluding that 
in the modern municipal system, “only officials might accept and use the system’s 
criteria of legal validity. The society in which this was so might be deplorably sheeplike; 
the sheep might end in the slaughter-house. But there is little reason for thinking that it 
could not exist or for denying it the title of a legal system.”74 In the end then, despite his 
insistence on having uncovered an internal aspect to the question of legal validity, he is 
still enamored, as was Weber before him, with what Habermas phrased above as “the 
voluntarism of pure enactment.” 
 
As he does with Weber, Habermas admittedly also shares important assumptions with 
Hart.
75
 Most crucially here, Habermas consistently takes pains to avoid collapsing law 
into morality. For instance, he holds that positive law represents a historic achievement, 
or at least functions as a coping mechanism for citizens of complex institutional orders, 
since “without revoking the principle of unhindered communication, [positive law] 
removes tasks of social integration from actors who are already overburdened in their 
efforts to reach understanding.”76 This means that positive law compensates for the 
“weaknesses” of “an autonomous morality,” by “relieving legal subjects of the effort that 
is demanded from moral persons when they have to resolve their conflicts on their 
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own.”77 Like Hart, though far more explicitly, Habermas has also drawn on resources 
within the philosophy of language, using them to shape his argument for communicative 
action. And, assuming Lacey is correct, they are both in debt to Weber’s narrative of the 
emergence of what Habermas called, and Hart would agree with, “post-metaphysical” 
legal formalism as a fundamental feature of modern Occidental rationalism.  
 
However, despite these similarities in orientation, Habermas does not think Hart is 
capable of handling the question of law’s legitimation. “Tying the validity of law to its 
genesis allows only an asymmetrical solution to the rationality problem.” Or, similarly: 
“the rationality problem is resolved in a way that gives priority to a narrowly conceived 
institutional history purged of any suprapositive validity basis.”78 This means that 
“legitimation through the legality of the lawmaking procedure privileges the pedigree—
namely, the correct process of enactment—over the rational justification of the norm’s 
content.”79 By the “rationality problem,” Habermas is referring in general to Weber’s 
depiction of the conflict between instrumental-purposive and absolute values. As 
concerns the legitimacy of law, this conflict deepens the fissure between Geltung and 
Gültigkeit, between what is valid as a matter of fact and valid as a matter of rational 
legitimacy.
80
 Habermas asks: “how can the application of a contingently emergent [that 
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80
 Habermas maintains that in some social-historical contexts (although without providing much 
in the way of historical or ethnological illustration) the normative force of law derives from its 
factual content, which would mean that those living in such contexts would have no way of 
articulating the two forms of validity distinguished in German as Geltung and Gültigkeit. In 
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is, via the process of enactment] law be carried out with both internal consistency and 
rational external justification, so as to guarantee simultaneously the certainty of law and 
its rightness?”81 Hart, like, Weber before him, has rationalized the legitimacy of law only 
by severing these two ends, consigning the second to extra-legal, and for Weber -- if not 
explicitly for Hart, to the irrational realm of moral-ethical reflection.    
 
For Habermas, by contrast, the questions of validity of enactment and procedure that 
occupy judges assessing a case cannot be isolated from the larger pragmatic questions of 
Gültigkeit. Thus, “the claim to legitimacy requires decisions that are not only consistent 
with the treatment of similar cases in the past and in accord with the legal system. They 
are also supposed to be rationally grounded in the matter at issue so that all participants 
                                                                                                                                                 
English, these terms could translate as “customary norm” (Geltung) and “reasonably considered 
norm” (Gültigkeit), and which I refer to as  
“pragmatic rational legitimacy” (in order to distinguish it from what appears as “rational 
legitimacy” in English translations of Weber). As Habermas accounts for the difference: 
 The validity (Gültigkeit) claimed for statements and norms (as well as for first-person 
 reports of experience) conceptually transcends space and time, whereas the actual claim 
 is, in each case,  raised here and now, in a specific context in which its acceptance or 
 rejection has immediate consequences. The validity we claim for our utterances and for 
 practices of justification differs  from the social validity or acceptance (soziale Geltung) 
 of actually established standards and expectations whose stability is based merely on 
 settled custom or the threat of sanctions (BFN, at 20). 
For an overview of the confusing usage of these terms in German, see Christoph Lumer "Geltung, 
Gültigkeit," in Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.) Enzyklopädie Philosophie v 1. (Hamburg DE: Meiner 
1999) at 450-55. Lumer notes that the distinction between factual and rational validity became 
prominent in German philosophical and legal discourse of the mid-19
th
 century. Weber, however, 
approaches the question of “legitimacy” in law simply as a matter of Geltung or gelten. See ES, at 
26. A point I have not yet encountered in the literature, but which a certain form of Habermas 
critic might be expected to highlight, is how such a historically-situated semantic distinction 
could give rise to the universal sorts of claims that critics find so objectionable in his work. The 
work of Nina Verheyen on the culture of public discussion emerging in post-war West Germany, 
supra p. 50 n. 1, also underscores the importance of historical context in the development of 
Habermas’s project.  
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can accept them as rational decisions.”82 Beyond those matters that indicate a case’s 
degree of “accord with the legal system,” meaning those questions of standing, 
jurisdiction, precedent that go to providing a judge’s ruling with legal certainty; is a more 
basic matter. Hart objected to this idea of law entailing a more basic matter, for instance, 
in his argument against the efforts of post-war German courts to wrestle with the 
continued relevance of National Socialist law, judicial practices and jurisprudence. In his 
criticism of German expressions of interest in natural law, primarily in the postwar work 
of Gustav Radbruch, he framed positivism as providing a braver, more intellectually 
consistent way of coping with the continued impact of evil laws:  
 For if we adopt Radbruch's view, and with him and the German courts make our 
 protest  against evil law in the form of an assertion that certain rules cannot be law 
 because of  their moral iniquity, we confuse one of the most powerful, because it 
 is the simplest, forms of moral criticism. If with the Utilitarians we speak plainly, 
 we say that laws may  be law but too evil to be obeyed. This is a moral 
 condemnation which everyone can understand and it makes an immediate and 
 obvious claim to moral attention. If, on the  other hand, we formulate our 
 objection as an assertion that these evil things are not law,  here is an assertion 
 which many people do not believe, and if they are disposed to consider it at all, it 
 would seem to raise a whole host of philosophical issues before it can be 
 accepted.
 83
   
 
In order to make his case for the superior ability of positivism to describe the nature of 
law within his own legal context, however, he seriously misread Radbruch – as well as 
the history of German legal positivism and the nature of the Third Reich’s legal system.84 
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 Hart argued that Radbruch’s post-war views were a rejection of positivism, and claimed that 
the post-war climate of legal opinion in Germany was devoted to rooting out positivism, as 
having contributed to the lethality of NS law. He contended that this rejection had unleashed a 
wave of natural law “hysteria” in the Federal Republic’s courts, his sole example being a 1949 
Bamberg appeals court’s upholding of a court’s judgment against a wife who had denounced her 
husband to the NS authorities, leading to his execution for comments critical of the regime 
83 
 
Indeed, Hart seems to construe Radbruch’s “conversion,” and subsequent display of 
“extraordinary naïveté” simply as a foil in order to extend the separation of law and 
morality thesis he derives from Austin and Bentham.
85
  
                                                                                                                                                 
(PSLM, at 619). In point of fact, however, the postwar courts were not inclined to overturn 
decisions from the NS courts, as Ingo Müller notes in Hitler’s Justice: the Courts of the Third 
Reich (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1991, at 292). Nor did “positivism” play a 
direct role in NS jurisprudence. According to both Carl Schmitt and Ernst Forsthoff, leading NS 
philosophers of law, the coming of the Reich marked the end of positivism in Germany (ibid. at 
219-20). Or, consider the opening statement for the NS defendants (among whom was the Reich 
Acting Minister of Justice, Franz Schlegelberger), in U.S.A. v Alstötter et al, the 1947 “Justice 
Case” or “Jurists’ Trial.” In his statement, defense counsel Egon Kubushok pointed out how 
“positivism” represented an older current within German law, as did discussion of its limitations 
– meaning that NS law, such as sec. 2 of the penal code, prohibiting Aryan—non-Aryan sexual 
relations, represented a modification of this positivist inheritance, leaning towards the “right of 
the Reich President to issue emergency decrees,” in Trials of War Criminals before the 
Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuernberg, October 1946-
April 1949, v 3, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1951, at 108-09). Even under the Weimar 
constitution, the provision of such basic rights as equality before the law was voided, “if 
necessary to restore public safety and order,” which the NS regime made permanent with the 
February, 1933 suspension of all rights (ibid. at 986). The “new world philosophy” of NS and its 
jurisprudence, as the defendant Curt Rothenberger (Gauführer of the National Socialist Lawyers 
League and State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Justice) put it, entailed an “antagonism 
toward law,” which was “justified because the present moment absolutely demands a rigid 
restriction of the power of law. He who is striding gigantically toward a new world order cannot 
move in the limitation of an orderly administration of justice" (ibid. at 1022, emphasis in 
original). The Nürnberg court quoted Reich Minister of Justice Otto Thierack’s 1943 explanation 
of the principle animating NS jurists: "The inner law of the guardian of justice is national 
socialism; the written law is only to be an aid to the interpretation of National Socialist ideas" 
(ibid. at 1023). Müller goes so far as to call the idea that NS justices were positivist a post-war 
myth, developed to assist in their defense and their extremely successful re-incorporation into the 
legal profession (Müller, ibid. at 222). 
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 PSLM, at 616-17. For a better account of the concerns animating   in 1946, and before, see 
Stanley L. Paulson“On the Background and Significance of Gustav Radbruch’s Post-War Papers” 
(2006) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26(1) 17. Paulson explains both the historical and 
theoretical confusions surrounding Weimar-era versions of legal positivism, and demonstrates 
how Radbruch was not the convert from positivism to natural law that Hart painted him to be. 
Although he certainly contributed to some of the confusion surrounding the separation of law and 
morality debate, his fundamental concerns reflected more what Orts (supra p. 75 n. 67, at 251) 
calls “critical legality,” than they do the natural law moral tradition. Orts also points out that even 
Fuller, in his 1958 exchange with Hart, is inclined to view the injustice of NS law as basically a 
moral issue (ibid. at 255). Still, Radbruch’s focus on the question of legality is something of a 
precursor of Habermas. For instance, in addition to the provision of legal certainty, he was also 
committed to the idea that law as an institution is made to serve justice, and continuously held 
that “positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes precedence even when its content is 
unjust and fails to benefit the people, unless the conflict between statute and justice reaches such 
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Even though Habermas shares with Hart the suspicion that natural law’s substantive 
values are inadequate for the legal orders of a “post-metaphysical” age, he, like Lon 
Fuller before him, thinks that Hart’s concept of legitimacy, that legitimate law is what is 
“valid given the system’s criteria of validity,” fatally misconstrues the relation of law and 
morality.
86
  
 
As an alternative to the approaches of Weber and Hart, Habermas employs the discourse 
principle, D, to show how this relation between law and morality might be more 
adequately, and practically, expressed when addressing questions of the law’s legitimacy. 
Both law and morality are forms of communicative action. Both are then oriented around 
D, meaning that their respective abilities to steer human action are subject to D. This does 
                                                                                                                                                 
an intolerable degree that the statute, as ‘flawed law,’ must yield to justice,” in “Statutory 
Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law (1946)” (2006) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26(1) 1, at 
7. By contrast, NS law was really a case of “statutory lawlessness,” designed, he holds, to: 
extricate itself from the essential requirement of justice, namely, the equal treatment of 
equals. It thereby lacks completely the very nature of law; it is not merely flawed law, but 
rather no law at all. This applies especially to those enactments by means of which the 
National Socialist Party claimed for itself the whole of the state, flouting the principle 
that every political party represents only a part of the state. Legal character is also lacking 
in all the statutes that treated human beings as subhuman and denied them human rights, 
and it is lacking, too, in all the caveats that, governed solely by the momentary necessities 
of intimidation, disregarded the varying gravity of offences and threatened the same 
punishment, often death, for the slightest as well as the most serious of crimes (ibid. at 8). 
In his own contribution to the 1958 Harvard exchange Fuller indicates his awareness of the 
thoroughly arbitrary nature of legality within the NS regime. As he notes: “the Nazi-dominated 
courts were always ready to disregard any statute, even those enacted by the Nazis themselves, if 
this suited their convenience or if they feared that a lawyer-like interpretation might incur 
displeasure ‘above’” (Fuller, ibid. at 652). Hart’s refusal to acknowledge the fundamental role of 
the Führerprinzip seems like a willed blindness on his part, especially given the wide publicity 
surrounding the post-war Allied trials, or even the ready availability of scholarly examinations of 
NS law during the 1930s and 40s -- such as the well-known work of the émigré Karl 
Loewenstein. See, for instance, his “Dictatorship and the German Constitution: 1933-1937” 
(1937) University of Chicago Law Review 4(4) 537, which demonstrates the departure of NS 
legality from anything credible from a positivist, or even Loewenstein’s own realist, perspective.  
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not mean that law is necessarily also subject to specific moral commitments. For 
Habermas, law’s provisions are specific to particular, historically-situated institutional 
orders, while morality’s provisions remain general to humans across not only institutional 
boundaries, but social boundaries as well.
87
 Both remain, however, subject to the 
justification required by D, which creates the only rationally adequate path to assessing 
the legitimacy of either a legal provision or a moral command. As he tries to indicate this 
more congruent relationship, in opposition to Hart: 
Moral argumentation penetrates into the core of positive law, which does not 
mean that morality completely merges with law. Morality that is not only 
complementary to but at the same time ingrained in law is of a procedural nature; 
it has rid itself of all specific normative contents and has been sublimated into a 
procedure for the justification of possible normative contents. Thus a procedural 
law and a proceduralized morality can mutually check one another.
88
  
 
Hart holds that it “cannot seriously be disputed that the development of law, at all times 
and places, has in fact been profoundly influenced” by conventional and reflective 
versions of morality. Nevertheless, this historical relationship has no bearing on the 
question of legal validity, as though “the criteria of legal validity of particular laws used 
in a legal system must include, tacitly if not explicitly, a reference to morality or 
justice.”89 Habermas, however, thinks Hart glosses over a key element in the question of 
validation as it involves the task of arguments of justification. Legal discourse “however 
bound to existing law, cannot operate within a closed universe of unambiguously fixed 
legal rules…The moral principles of natural law have become positive law in modern 
constitutional states. From the viewpoint of a logic of argumentation, the modes of 
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justification institutionalized in legal processes and proceedings remain open to moral 
discourses.”90  
 
For Weber and Hart, certainty is the achievement, and a Hobbesian fear of subjective 
conscience-based anarchy the attending threat, of the modern legal system. Habermas, 
however, points to the way in which legal certainty itself requires justification by D. 
“[L]egal certainty, which is based on the knowledge of unambiguously conditioned 
behavioral expectations, is itself a principle which must be weighed against other 
principles” in consideration of a case.91 But, as a principle advanced within rational 
discourse, it cannot be so weighed simply within the confines of “professionally and 
judicially institutionalized monopolies on interpretation and permit only internal revision 
according to their own standards.”92 Thus, on the basis of D, Habermas argues that the 
question of legitimacy cannot be addressed from within the closed catalog of procedures 
maintained by the culture of legal experts. Instead, grounded in acts of communication, it 
always opens to the wider social community of the “public sphere.” This means that 
law’s legitimacy is a function of democracy. Habermas’s discourse theory of law 
certainly also focuses on the creation of procedures. However, he consistently frames the 
construction of procedures as a process open under D to all users. “The proceduralist 
understanding of law [that is, his own rather than the positivist’s] thus privileges the 
communicative presuppositions and procedural conditions of democratic opinion- and 
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will-formation as the sole source of legitimation.”93 He envisions that the “additional 
burden of legitimation” which might realistically accompany any effort to make such a 
legitimizing task functional could be met by “the institutionalization of a legal public 
sphere that goes beyond the existing culture of experts and is sufficiently sensitive to 
make important court decisions the focus of public controversy.”94  
 
I have highlighted Habermas’s critique of legitimacy in the work of Weber and Hart 
because I believe it goes to the heart of difficulties Canada’s courts have had in 
addressing the communicative nature of intersocietal law, still inchoate within the court’s 
doctrine of the duty to consult. If legitimacy can be thought of as deriving from real-
world dialogical processes between legal actors in a public sphere, then how the courts 
have conceived of the communicative basis of state legal relations with indigenous 
parties has significant normative implications. I will address these implications in 
Chapters 5 and 6. In the meantime, having given some explication to Habermas’s 
perspectives, in the next chapter I will address potential tensions and shortcomings that 
might arise from attempting to reach a useful understanding of Canada’s duty to consult 
with Aboriginal communities on the basis of discourse theory. 
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Chapter 3 
Discourse, Law and Indigenous Legal Standing: a Response to Habermas’s Critics  
 
A disjuncture seems obvious between the concerns that animate Habermas’s critical theory of 
law and society, and those that might inform a normative investigation of Canada’s duty to 
consult with indigenous communities. From what I laid out above, his own historical context and 
his philosophical commitments both seem likely to contribute to a critical reader’s sense of this 
disjuncture. Such a reader might easily remain suspicious that Habermas’s approach is simply 
unhelpful – or perhaps even pernicious, in addressing the duty to consult. Indeed, Canadian 
political philosopher James Tully has offered a pointed caution to anyone considering the 
respective merits of Habermas or Michel Foucault, saying that “the stakes are extremely high, 
and anyone with a general interest in freedom and autonomy will choose Foucault’s approach 
over that of Habermas.”1 Tully’s assumption that Foucault is the better guide, however, seems to 
entail a dismissal of law as a constructive social form.
2
 Thus, it may not itself be all that useful in 
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 Public Philosophy in a New Key, vol. 1: Democracy and Civic Freedom (Cambridge UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) at 118. As he puts his objections to discourse theory: “It would constrain us to 
assess our moral and political norms in a deontological or juridical manner and to subordinate other ways 
of thinking and acting politically,” ibid. at 56. However, his own development of principles to guide 
relations between Canada and indigenous peoples seems to cohere with those that I think stem from 
discourse theory. He concludes, for instance, that: “The relationship will be proven to be valid if these 
principles come to be accepted in the course of further critical discussion by all Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people affected by them,” ibid. at 229. As well, he sketches the forms of dialogue and 
negotiation appropriate to his practices of recognition, envisioning: “an intercultural dialogue in which 
mutual understanding and un-coerced agreements by contextually appropriate forms of negotiation and 
reciprocal questioning on how they should cooperate and review their relations of cooperation over time,” 
ibid. at 239.  
 
2
 I do not want to enter into long-running theory wars between proponents of the one and proponents of 
the other. I will simply say that I think Foucault’s view of law’s power, in Discipline and Punish: the 
Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1975), approaches law from what Hart might have called an 
“external” perspective. Thus, Tully’s frequent use of the Foucauldian terms “juridical” and 
“governmentality” are calculated to focus a reader’s attention on the power-laden force of law, Weber’s 
Gewalt. Although all of this is necessary to making sense out of law, it does not easily leave open the 
89 
 
considering the normative basis of intersocietal legal legitimacy necessary for the duty to consult 
to serve the process of “reconciliation” called for by the courts. 
 
In order to sharpen the edge of what I nevertheless believe is a powerful analytic tool, in this 
chapter I will address the concerns of his critics most relevant to my subsequent discussion of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
possibility of conceiving of law in the more “internal” way that Hart, perhaps, but Habermas, surely, 
would say is necessary for us self-determining beings to will as a rational form of normative social order. 
When Tully turns to the normative questions at the heart of Canadian “Aboriginal” law, it seems to me 
that he is most comfortable drawing upon Foucault’s ethics, with its focus on “new forms of subjectivity.” 
 As did Foucault in the 1980s, Tully portrays Habermas as a “universal” intellectual viewing 
society from above, a “utopian,” someone convinced he is able to access critical principles beyond the 
influence of history, supra p. 85 n. 1, at 121. Following Foucault, he claims that Habermas is 
insufficiently critical in failing to examine his own presuppositions regarding his idea of a stable modern 
personality, or “subject,” ibid. at 95; that Habermas is unreasonable to simplify the pragmatics of 
communication into universal forms, ibid. at 109; that Habermas can’t examine historically the “juridical 
subject” ibid. at 113, and that Habermas is utopian in believing that power is inherently bad, and therefore 
missing from genuine acts of communication, ibid. at 120. Jean-Francois Lyotard also cast Habermas’s 
project in a similar light, concluding as early as 1979 that consensus was not the primary goal of 
communication, and that this awareness “destroys a belief that still underlies Habermas’s research, 
namely that humanity is a collective (universal) subject seek[ing] its common emancipation through the 
regularization of the ‘moves’ permitted in all language games and that the legitimacy of any statement 
resides in its contributing to that emancipation,” in his The Postmodern Condition: a Report on 
Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) at 66. Recently the Foucault/Habermas 
debate has been renewed among political and legal theorists. See, for instance, Jacopo Martire “Habermas 
Contra Foucault: Law, Power and the Forgotten Subject” (2012) Law Critique 23(2) 123. A useful effort 
to find some common concern and points of departure between Foucault and Habermas, is Amy Allen’s 
“Discourse, Power, And Subjectivation: the Foucault/Habermas Debate Reconsidered” (2009) 
Philosophical Forum 40(1) 1. 
 Scholars in several fields have usefully employed Foucault to detail the workings of both colonial 
administration and indigenous forms of resistance on North American reserves and reservations. See, for 
instance, Thomas Biolsi, Organizing the Lakota: the Political Economy of the New Deal on the Pine 
Ridge and Rosebud Reservations (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1992), Cole Harris, Making 
Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2002), and Keith D. Smith Liberalism, Surveillance, and Resistance: Indigenous 
Communities in Western Canada, 1877-1927 (Edmonton: Athabasca University Press, 2009). As well, 
both indigenous and non-indigenous scholars have applied Foucault to their interpretations of law as 
social power affecting indigenous people. See, for instance, Robert A. Williams, Jr. The American Indian 
in Western Legal Thought: the Discourses of Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and 
Seán Patrick Eudaily The Present Politics of the Past: Indigenous Legal Activism and Resistance to 
(Neo)Liberal Governmentality (New York: Routledge, 2004). For an example of Foucault’s thought 
applied to a recent case involving an inter-tribally significant sacred site in Arizona, see Jessica M. 
Erickson (2010) “Making Live and Letting Die: the Biopolitical Effect of Navajo Nation v U.S. Forest 
Service” Seattle University Law Review 33(2) 463.  
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duty to consult. In the first section, I take up an issue that does stand in the way of my immediate 
employment of Habermas: his own occasional references to indigenous communities and 
worldviews within the body of his social and legal theory, which I clarify by trying to bridge the 
gap apparent between what he refers to as “the system of rights” and the place of Aboriginal and 
treaty rights in Canadian law. In the second section, I will attempt to find common ground 
between the discourse approach to law and the approaches to dialogue and legal pluralism 
evident within the work of several indigenous scholars who have expressed their suspicion of 
projects such as Habermas’s.  
 
A. Limitations to Habermas’s conceptualization of the legal standing of indigenous communities 
To begin with what may simply be obvious, the range of interests, and the various literatures 
Habermas has absorbed in developing his discourse theory are daunting. Nevertheless, in his 
aiming to account for the rise of the modern social order, to save the democratic heritage of 
Enlightenment rationalism, and to provide a critical basis for a normative approach to democracy 
and legality, Habermas has paid scant attention to the histories of contact and conflict between 
European and North American modernizers and this continent’s indigenous societies. 
Consideration of these histories could certainly have an impact on the sorts of conclusions 
Habermas has voiced on occasion regarding the legal standing of indigenous communities, and 
might affect his conclusions regarding the position of subaltern and minority groups in other 
settings besides North America. In a 1985 interview, for instance, he framed a horizon of 
concern to his social and political vision: 
 I am no transcendental philosopher. I would not speak of ‘communicative 
 rationalization’ if, in the last two hundred years of European and American 
 history, in the last forty years of the national liberation movements, and despite all 
 the catastrophes, a piece of ‘existing reason,’ as Hegel would have put it, were not 
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 nevertheless also recognizable—in the bourgeois emancipation movements, no less 
 than in the workers’ movement, today in feminism, in cultural revolts, in ecological and 
 pacifist forms of resistance, and so forth.
3
  
His faith in the historical sprouting of “existing reason” in the form of North American liberal 
institutions and liberal political values, with no word at all offered regarding the coeval history of 
conflicts with North American indigenous nations,
4
 is sufficient to indicate this lack of interest, 
perhaps especially since in the same place he refers to the struggles against colonialism marking 
the post-war era on other continents. At the same time, his acknowledgment of those post-
colonial struggles of “national liberation” also suggests that he could conceivably still encompass 
the legal and political struggles of indigenous peoples in North America and elsewhere within 
the framework of his observations and reflections, since these movements were in part reflective 
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 AS, at 180-81. 
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 "Nation" is admittedly an awkward term to employ consistently, and my own usage here remains rather 
loose. Red Cliff Ojibwe historian Michael Witgen notes its unsubtle application to indigenous peoples' 
own political institutions. He maintains that its original use among New France's colonial administrators 
and intellectuals aided in their task of attempting to unify for their own purposes the varied structures and 
groupings of Great Lakes indigenous communities. See his An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New 
World Shaped Early North America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012) at 107. I do 
use it in what follows, however, thinking that its tilt towards an oversimplification of historic indigenous 
political collectives also balances out an equally strong tendency to minimize the legal standing of those 
collectives in relation to the Canadian state, and a tendency which US chief justice John Marshall 
countered in his own explanation for employing “nation,” as a group capable of making treaties, in 
relation to North American tribes. See Worcester v Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), at 650. As well, 
(and with an obligatory nod towards the work of Benedict Anderson) I acknowledge that its rhetorical 
suggestion of collective political identity, generally grounded in blood and language, connotes a 
uniformity that obscures the local as well as the broader – clan and league – based allegiances and 
decision-making forums that have often functioned within indigenous political orders confronting settler 
state challenges. For recent debate on the diminished usefulness of an indigenous "nationalist" 
perspective, see Joseph Bauerkemper and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark "The Trans/National Terrain of 
Anishinaabe Law and Diplomacy" (2012) The Journal of Transnational American Studies 4(1) 1. For an 
influential expression of a nationalist perspective, see the work of Crow Creek Sioux literary scholar 
Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, in particular, her "Who Stole Native American Studies?" (1997) Wicazo Sa Review 
12(1) 9. See also Anderson supra p. 24 n. 55. 
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of, or at least bound up with, indigenous peoples’ political aspirations in Asia, Africa, and the 
Americas.
5
  
 
The minor attention Habermas has actually given to indigenous societies in the course of his 
discussions of social evolution also demonstrates his lack of any developing interest in or 
awareness of indigenous perspectives on such questions as their legal standing in relation to 
settler states, or the substance of their own traditions of legal thought and practice. His limited 
discussions of indigenous peoples amount only to skewed, generalized and ahistorical 
reconstructions grounded in social theory classics, such as Emile Durkheim’s Elementary Forms 
of the Religious Life (1912).
 
In TCA2, for instance, he examines the social evolutionary link 
between the sacred and the moral order that Emile Durkheim developed out of his reading of 
early ethnological reports concerning Australian Aboriginal religious life, absorbed by his social 
theoretical aim, and lacking any curiosity about the integrity of Durkheim’s ethnographic or 
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 Granted, the category “indigenous” is also subject to considerable debate and stretch, which I won’t take 
the space to explicate here beyond noting anthropologist James Clifford’s effort to steer discussion away 
from earlier academic debates regarding insider/outsider, authentic/inauthentic. See his “Indigenous 
Articulations” (2001) The Contemporary Pacific 13(2) 467. For examinations of this issue in terms of the 
contests between states and indigenous groups attempting to gain greater standing within international 
law, see Jeff J. Corntassel “Who Is Indigenous? ‘Peoplehood’ and Ethnonationalist Approaches to 
Rearticulating Indigenous Identity” (2003) Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 9(1) 75, and Francesca 
Merlan “Indigeneity: Global and Local” (2009) Current Anthropology 50(3) 303. For an overview of 
international law related to colonialism and its impact on indigenous peoples, see Antony Anghie 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). The term “peoples” is also subject to considerable dispute within international bodies such as the 
UN and the International Labour Organization. For the development of indigenous peoples’ engagement 
with international law and its institutions, see S. James Anaya Indigenous Peoples in International Law 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For the challenges to state sovereignty associated with the 
term “peoples” see ibid. at 48-49. My point here is only that Habermas, never an orthodox Marxist, was 
able even in the early 1980s to see continuity between widely diverse political movements, some of which 
contained the seeds of the global-scale indigenous peoples’ movements expanding during the same time 
period as the postwar “national liberation” movements. My point is not to say that post-colonial regimes 
are themselves reflective, or supportive, of indigenous peoples’ aims at self- determination. 
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historical sources.
 6
 Similarly, in his evolutionary account of law’s communicative core in BFN, 
he objects to the common depiction of “kinship societies” as lacking any form of political/legal 
functioning, a claim crucial to state of nature arguments in the vein of Thomas Hobbes, though 
again without expressing any interest in the particulars undergirding his confident assertion of an 
“overabundance of anthropological material.”7  
 
Perhaps his most troubling statement related to indigenous peoples, however, arises in the course 
of his post-BFN efforts to address the legal basis of multiculturalism. In a 2005 essay on 
liberalism, and while drawing solely on the work of Canadian political theorist Will Kymlicka to 
provide himself with information and context, Habermas offers the following statement 
concerned with the rights of indigenous peoples in North America:  
 [T]here are tribal societies and forms of life and also cultic practices 
 that do not fit with the political framework of an egalitarian and individualist 
                                                 
6
 See TCA2 at 43ff. For a critique of Habermas’s reference to indigenous societies as a generalized 
touchstone within the confines of an evolutionary approach to social theory, and an argument for turning 
instead to Foucault to assist in the articulation of indigenous theories of resistance to continued colonial 
pressures, see Jan Lüdert “Habermas Revisited: Indigenous Lifeworld(s) Today” (2010) Indigenous 
Policy Journal 21(4). WilsonWeb, 27 April 2012. For a critique of the “neo-primitivist” assumptions 
contained in Habermas’s evolutionary approach to communication, see Victor Li The Neo-Primitivist 
Turn: Critical Reflections on Alterity, Culture, and Modernity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2006). Li attempts to show that Habermas’s entire view of communication rests upon a mythical 
construction of “pre-modern” primitive societies, thus committing in reverse the errors of those western 
figures who revered a golden age of noble savages. Unfortunately for the clarity of his position, Li winds 
up concluding that the mythical vision of primitivism contained within the theory of modernity is so 
pervasive in its influence that no work of theory, including his own, can escape it. My aim, not being 
theoretical, is only to extract enough of Habermas’s view of discourse to be able to employ it practically. I 
will have to leave open the question of how one might interpret Habermas severed from his own “post-
metaphysical” attempt to ground his normative theory of law and discourse by appealing to the social 
science construction of social evolution. I note, however, that many scholars have argued that a more 
pragmatist option exists for Habermas, whether or not he might accept it. If pushed, I would ally myself 
with this same attempt to resolve the question. See David 12, supra p. 7 n. 12, and Amy Allen, “The 
Unforced Force of the Better Argument: Reason and Power in Habermas’ Political Theory” 
Constellations 2012 19(3) 353.  
 
7
 BFN, at 138-39. 
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 legal order. That is apparent in the attempts by the United States, Canada and 
 Australia to correct the historical injustice to indigenous peoples who were 
 subjugated, compulsorily integrated and discriminated against for centuries. 
 These groups use the concession of far-reaching autonomy to maintain or to 
 restore particular forms of traditional authority and collective property, even 
 though in individual cases these conflict with the egalitarian principle and 
 individualistic reference of “equal rights for all.” According to the modern 
 understanding of law, there really cannot be a “state within the state.” If a so-called 
 “illiberal” group is nevertheless allowed to assume its own legal order within a liberal 
 state, that results in irresolvable contradictions. When tribal communities, whose 
 ancestors were forcibly integrated into the state of the conquerors, are, for moral reasons, 
 compensated with extensive rights to self-administration, the obligations of individual 
 members of the tribe can conflict with rights that they are entitled to as citizens of the 
 larger political community.
 8
  
 
                                                 
8
 “Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism” (2005) The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 13(1) 1, at 23-24, emphasis in original. His efforts here follow the tack he laid out in 
“Multiculturalism and the Liberal State” (1995) Stanford Law Review 47, 849. In both essays, and in The 
Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998), he tries to 
approach the legal and political claims of cultural identity movements as he did in BFN. There he sought 
to find a third way to discuss political rights and the creation of law, steering between classic divides of 
liberalism and communitarianism. Similarly, in his work on cultural identity, he seeks to provide more 
acknowledgment for collective sources of identity than he finds typical of liberals, but less than is typical 
of communitarians, who he thinks more inclined to award substantive group rights that conflict with the 
inherent self-legislating power of democratic citizens. They are right in acknowledging that personal 
identity is the result of an “intersubjective” process, but wrong to think this requires rights not serving 
primarily to shield individuals from group coercion, ibid. at 208. For a critique of the work of Kymlicka 
and Charles Taylor, who also influences Habermas’s thinking on the politics of culture, as that applies to 
“Aboriginal rights” in Canada, see Caroline Dick “Culture and the Courts’ Revisited: Group-Rights 
Scholarship and the Evolution of s.35.1” (2009) Canadian Journal of Political Science 42(4) 957. In an 
effort somewhat similar to the one I am advancing here, William Rabinder James argues that Habermas’s 
view of public discourse is an aid to the notion of tribal sovereignty. He distinguishes Kymlicka’s liberal 
sense of autonomy as a private exercise from Habermas’s, which he says is public. At the same time, 
however, in considering US cases such as Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez (98 US 1670 [1978]), he 
continues to frame indigenous standing as cultural. See his “Tribal Sovereignty and the Intercultural 
Public Sphere” (1999) Philosophy and Social Criticism 25(5) 57, at 65. Also, for an anthropologist’s 
critique of “culture” as it appears within Canada’s Aboriginal jurisprudence, see Michael Asch “The 
Judicial Conceptualization of Culture after Delgamuukw and Van der Peet (1999-2000) Review of 
Constitutional Studies 5, 119. See also Ronald Niezen "Culture and the Judiciary: The Meaning of the 
Culture Concept as a Source of Aboriginal Rights in Canada" (2003) Canadian Journal of Law and 
Society 18(2) 1. For critiques of the culture tests developed by the Supreme Court, see Russel Lawrence 
Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson "The Supreme Court's Van der Peet Trilogy: Naive Imperialism 
and Ropes of Sand" (1997) McGill Law Journal 42(4) 993; and John Borrows "The Trickster: Integral to 
a Distinctive Culture" (1997) Constitutional Forum 8(2) 27.  
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In this passage Habermas employs assumptions regarding the relation of subaltern or minority 
groups and dominant political/legal institutions that, if warranted, would make impossible many 
of the arguments that indigenous communities have advanced in Canada’s courts, and perhaps 
even some of the reflection on Aboriginal and treaty rights carried out by the courts themselves 
since 1982. Admittedly, as Gordon Christie demonstrates, the courts dealing with “Aboriginal 
rights” largely project, and seek to protect, the same web of liberal assumptions about law and 
political order that Habermas sees as threatened by “illiberal” groups.9 What makes Habermas’s 
analysis less than germane when stretched to apply to the situations of indigenous communities 
in Canada, however, is that it overlooks both what Christie speaks of as “Aboriginal 
difference,”10 and the key component of the historical forms of relationship constructed between 
indigenous and settler peoples. For instance, in characterising the basis of compensation for 
“forcible” integration “into the state of the conquerors” as being performed for “moral reasons,” 
he overlooks the historical development of treaty relations between settler states and indigenous 
communities. A significant consequence of this oversight is that it lets stand a line of thought 
evident in influential 20
th
 century U.S. cases, such as Tee Hit Ton (also cited in Calder and 
several other Canadian cases), where Supreme Court Justice Reed employed the idea that legal 
rights and moral sentiments in Indian cases are unrelated.
11
 An earlier expression of this strongly 
                                                 
9
 See his “Law, Theory and Aboriginal Peoples” (2003) Indigenous Law Journal 2, 67. 
 
10
 Ibid. at 91. 
 
11
 Tee-Hit-Ton v United States 348 U.S. 272 (1955), Calder et al. v Attorney-General of British 
Columbia, [1973] SCR 313. See also MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v Mullin (1985 CanLII 708 [BCSC] at 45, 
Lac La Ronge Indian Band v Canada (1999 SKQB 218 at 40) and the first appeal in Delgamuukw v 
British Columbia (1991 CanLII 2373 BCSC). Although not mentioning Tee Hit Ton, the same Hartian 
separation thesis appears more recently in Ross River Dena Council v Canada (AG), where the court 
accepted Canada’s argument that a moral promise dating from 1870 is not justiciable in the present (2012 
YKSC 4, at 20).  
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positivist view was the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion in Santa Fe Pacific that extinguishment 
of title raises “political, not justiciable, issues.”12 In Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians, 
another American title case, Justice Jackson was able to employ this same division to hold 
together the majority and the dissent, noting that: 
We agree with Mr. Justice Reed that no legal rights are today to be recognized in the 
Shoshones by reason of this treaty. We agree with Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice 
Murphy as to their moral deserts. We do not mean to leave the impression that the two 
have any relation to each other.
13
  
This basically Hartian tenet, as I discussed in the previous chapter, is a key element in the view 
of legal legitimacy that Habermas seeks to replace with his discourse theory. Confronted with 
such positivist reasoning in Indian and Aboriginal law cases, and informed of the longstanding 
nature of the treaty relationship, I believe Habermas would have to agree that the weight of his 
diagnosis of the Canadian situation should be questioned.
14
 
 
An entry point to this problem can be taken from his use of the word “illiberal” to characterize 
North American “tribal societies.” It may well be that by doing so Habermas has in mind the 
thick web of practices, values and institutions that historically distinguished indigenous societies 
                                                 
12
 United States v Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941), at 347. The lineage of this tendency 
extends back to Chief Justice John Marshall’s 1823 diffident expression in Johnson v M’Intosh:  
 We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturists, merchants, and manufacturers, 
 have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to  contract 
 their limits. Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the 
 private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim 
 which has been successfully asserted (21 U.S, 8 Wheat., 543 [1823], at 588). 
 
13
 Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v United States 324 U.S. 335 (1945), at 358.   
 
14
 Choosing to dismiss the need for such questioning would also leave him open to the critiques of 
philosophical liberalism coming from indigenous scholars such as Gordon Christie, supra p. 95 n. 9, and 
Dale Turner, who have both argued effectively that contemporary liberalism imposes the same constraints 
on indigenous survival as did its 19
th
 century forebear. See Turner’s This Is Not a Peace Pipe: towards a 
Critical Indigenous Philosophy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006). 
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in general from those brought to the Americas by European settlers. In such patterned areas of 
social life as kinship relations, property-holding, economic distribution, and gender-roles, as well 
as in domains of knowledge and understandings of the sacred, strong differences between 
indigenous and the emergent settler societies contributed to lasting tension and conflict. 
Certainly, if by “illiberal” one means a social order not inclined to regard the individual cash-
labour nexus of the emergent market economy as normative, nor bourgeois patterns of gender 
roles and family life, or privatized acknowledgment of the sacred, then the term “illiberal” might 
well apply.
15
  
 
However, Habermas says nothing that would indicate he has these or related features of North 
American society in mind. Thus, the term as he employs it can only mischaracterize other 
equally important aspects of indigenous societies in North America, most especially basic 
features of political decision-making and legal norm-creation and observance.
16
 The most likely 
source for this mischaracterization is that Habermas sees indigenous North Americans as 
fulfilling the same position within Canadian and US life as do minority and immigrant groups 
within European societies. “Illiberal” is a term he uses often in tandem with “fundamentalist” in 
speaking of immigration to Europe, or as an inhibitor of an emergent possibility of 
“constitutional patriotism” providing solidarity across Europe’s various borders. Or, he uses 
“illiberal” to characterize those he thinks may lack the stamina for democracy – meaning 
                                                 
15
 For an instructive analysis of the operation of liberal legal and administrative presumptions affecting 
one Western Shoshone family over the course of the 20
th
 century, and illustrating many larger conflicts, 
see Allison Dussias “Squaw Drudges, Farm Wives, and the Dann Sisters' Last Stand: American Indian 
Women's Resistance to Domestication and the Denial of their Property Rights” (1999) North Carolina 
Law Review 77(2) 637. 
 
16
 Christie, supra p. 95 n. 9. 
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especially his fellow citizens socialized in the GDR, prior to the burdensome process of 
reunification following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states. Without pursuing 
any further his discussions of multiculturalism within contemporary Europe, we can conclude 
that he is clearly mistaken in regarding immigrant Muslim communities in contemporary 
Germany or France, or former citizens of the GDR, as sharing any commonalities in relation to 
their legal or political standing with indigenous North Americans.  
 
Consequently, the position he advocates on multiculturalism in this passage from 2005 is of little 
value in thinking through the legal standing of indigenous North American communities. His 
repeated arguments against strong collective, cultural, rights are grounded in the idea that 
cultural practices and traditional chains of authority, in our liberal and “post-metaphysical” age, 
are forces that individuals are free to take up or reject on the basis of their yes/no responses to 
challenged validity-claims. While this may be applicable to some North American situations, it is 
indistinguishable in its effect, as regards Aboriginal legal and political standing, from such 
assimilation-minded policy directives as the Trudeau administration’s 1969 “White Paper.”17 
                                                 
17
 For an overview of the history of assimilation, see J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: a History 
of Indian-White Relations in Canada 3
rd
 ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). For the text of 
the White Paper, see “Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969” (Ottawa: Queen’s 
Printer, 1969), available at <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100010189/1100100010191>. The 
White Paper expressed a liberal view of assimilation as the preferable remedy to historical injustices, 
grounding this process in the choice of indigenous individuals to cast-off the legal and cultural weights 
which constrained their ability to live productive, self-determined lives. Thus it highlighted the value of 
culture and “identity,” while portraying these as essentially non-legal categories.  
  This Government believes in equality. It believes that all men and women have equal 
 rights. It is determined that all shall be treated fairly and that no one shall be shut  out of Canadian 
 life, and especially that no one shall be shut out because of his race. This belief is the basis for the 
 Government's determination to open the doors of opportunity to all Canadians, to remove the 
 barriers which impede the development of people, of regions and of the country. Only a policy 
 based on this belief can enable the Indian people to realize their needs and aspirations. 
  The Indian people are entitled to such a policy. They are entitled to an equality which 
 preserves and enriches Indian identity and distinction; an equality which stresses Indian 
 participation in its creation and which manifests itself in all aspects of Indian life (ibid. at 6).  
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Thus, on this issue, I think Habermas is clearly wrong, though I trace this to his being poorly 
informed rather than to possessing underlying theoretical commitments that would necessarily 
militate against my use of his discourse theory. He clearly holds the common misconception that 
North American indigenous "communities" are basically ethnic or cultural entities, and that their 
position within or in relation to the larger society is not fundamentally legal or political in nature. 
However, as a thinker who has exhibited frequent ability to reconsider and modify his own 
positions in response to interactions with his critics, I also believe Habermas is capable of setting 
aside his assimilationist understanding of North American indigenous communities.
18
 
 
The point at which his theory can be adjusted to include a more robust recognition of indigenous 
communities’ legal standing, and their government to government relationships with the larger 
North American political orders (points which, after all, are more matters of fact rather than 
theory), appears when we consider what he presents as the “system of rights,” his term for the 
essence of a democratic legal order. On Habermas’s account legally protected political rights are 
communicative achievements; they emerge within a political order through the mutual 
acknowledgment and consent of those affected -- that is the upshot of D. Constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and regulations embodying such rights, are all valid – as in rationally 
legitimate – because of this communicative core. On one reading of the emergence of Aboriginal 
                                                                                                                                                             
For a recent critique of the White Paper and its lingering effects, see Turner supra p. 96 n. 14.  
 
18
 Although this remains the subject of debate, consider how some feminist theorists have indicated that 
the features they found most troubling within Habermas’s theory of communicative action have been 
modified in his subsequent work. For an earlier response, see, for instance, Nancy Fraser “What's Critical 
about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender” (1985) New German Critique 35 
(Spring/Summer) 97. For a more recent appraisal, see Pauline Johnson “Distorted Communications: 
Feminism’s Dispute with Habermas” (2001) Philosophy and Social Criticism 27(1) 39. For a less positive 
view of his ability to change perspective, see Amy R. Allen “Systematically Distorted Subjectivity? 
Habermas and the Critique of Power” (2007) Philosophy and Social Criticism 33(5) 641. 
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rights within Canada’s constitutional order, those engaged in rights-acknowledging discourse are 
individuals. This would mean that Canada’s affirmation and recognition of Aboriginal and treaty 
rights in sec. 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 is at most an effort to secure for Aboriginal 
individuals some form of redress for the history of colonial oppression. This reading is in accord 
with those majority sentiments that dismiss the significance of Aboriginal rights as “special 
rights” in conflict with Canada’s democratic, liberal heritage.19 Accordingly, this reading would 
place members of Canada’s Aboriginal communities within the same constitutional framework 
that offers protection to all citizens. 
 
Habermas, however, given his commitment to the discourse principle, would have to admit that 
this reading ignores the particular communicative basis of the linkage between the Canadian 
state and Aboriginal communities. The primary form of this connection historically has been the 
creation of treaties between the state and self-determining indigenous nations. Assessed from the 
standpoint of D, Canada’s treaty-making has been, and arguably remains, a deeply flawed 
endeavour.
20
 If, as D holds, “Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected 
persons could agree as participants in rational discourses,” it would be hard to contend for the 
pragmatic rational legitimacy of the treaty-formation process.
21
 And yet, the treaty relation 
between indigenous nations and the Canadian state does contain a kernel of legitimacy, far more 
so than does the Indian Act or legislation such as the resource transfer agreements contained in 
                                                 
19
 This is the well-known position of Tom Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2000). 
 
20
 For a historical overview, see J.R. Miller Compact, Contract and Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making 
in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009). 
 
21
 BFN, at 107. 
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the Constitution Act 1930, all of which are lacking in any communicative dimension. That kernel 
of legitimacy, though stunted through a legacy of broken promises and the state’s unilateral and 
self-serving interpretation of the nature of these agreements, is observable within indigenous 
communities still; in their histories of treaty veneration, in their communicative practices of 
kinship and alliance formation, and in their high regard for upholding their own promises to 
share the land – despite the subsequent history of injustices. 
 
Habermas could easily find in the long tradition of treaty-making sufficient material to cause him 
to revise his view that the politics of culture and the legal securing of individual rights are 
sufficient to satisfy a discourse reading of the liberal state’s accommodation to the “historical 
injustices” affecting Canada’s indigenous communities. Although Canada’s courts have 
interpreted treaties as sui generis agreements, different in form and function from those made by 
Westphalian states, Habermas would have to acknowledge that – as elders have traditionally 
said, and as scholars have been documenting for some time now – treaties in Canada are 
primarily communicative, norm-creating events.
22
 Thus, the “system of rights” to which they 
have  given rise is akin to the system of rights that Habermas has argued for within the space of 
                                                 
22
 On the court’s view of sui generis treaties, see John Borrows and Leonard I. Rotman “The Sui Generis 
Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does It Make a Difference?” (1997) Alberta Law Review 36(l) 9. The 
literature documenting the conflicting interpretations of treaty-making between Canada’s representatives 
and First Nations parties is growing in depth and scope. See, for instance, Richard Price (ed.) The Spirit of 
the Alberta Indian Treaties (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980); Treaty 7 Elders and 
Tribal Council with Walter Hildebrandt, et al The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7 (Montreal: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 1996); and John S. Long Treaty No. 9: Making the Agreement to Share 
the Land in Northern Ontario in 1905 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2010). See also 
Jacqueline Hookimaw-Witt "Keenebonanoh Keemoshominook Kaeshe Peemishikhik Odaskiwakh - 
[We Stand on the Graves of our Ancestors]: Native Interpretations of Treaty #9 with Attawapiskat 
Elders," Trent University MA thesis, 1997. For a discussion of the conflict between traditional 
governance and band council approaches to Treaty 3 interpretations within one Anishinaabe First Nation 
community, see Sara J. Mainville “Treaty Councils and Mutual Reconciliation Under Section 35” (2007) 
Indigenous Law Journal 6, 141. 
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the European Union’s debate about a constitutional order. Within that order, even on what some 
observers regard as Habermas’s rather constrained vision of democratic constitution-building, 
the only system of rights bearing any potential legitimacy has to be one that all affected by are 
capable of consenting to, through whatever respective structures of representation and 
procedures of debate carry rational legitimacy within the various EU member communities. This 
vision of a politically federated Europe bears sufficient resemblance to the “treaty federalism” 
advocated some time ago by James Sákéj Henderson, to indicate that from a discourse 
perspective Canada’s web of Aboriginal rights and treaty relations with First Nations and other 
indigenous communities are poorly described and theorized post-1982 primarily through the 
resort to common law.
23
 
                                                 
23 Russel Barsh and Sákéj Henderson first applied the idea of treaty federalism to tribal/First Nations 
relations with the US and Canadian states in The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980). See also Henderson’s “Empowering Treaty Federalism” (1994) 
Saskatchewan Law Review 58(2) 241. For more recent efforts to advance his argument that Aboriginal 
treaties are actually documents affecting the nature of the constitutional order (rather than the more 
common assumption that they are only products of otherwise legitimated constitutional power), see John 
Borrows “Domesticating Doctrines: Aboriginal Peoples after the Royal Commission” (2001) McGill Law 
Journal 46(3) 615, at 627, and Gordon Christie “Justifying Principles of Treaty Interpretation” (2000) 
Queen's Law Journal 26(1) 143. For an effort to apply the concept of treaty federalism to contemporary 
issues of joint-governance, taking account of the difficult electoral issues that would arise from 
conceiving Canada as a three-tier federation (including deep suspicion of Canada’s electoral politics from 
within indigenous communities, see Michael A. Murphy’s “Representing Indigenous Self-Determination” 
(2008) University of Toronto Law Journal 58(2) 185. In “Treaty Federalism in Northern Canada: 
Aboriginal-Government Land Claims” (2002) Publius 32(3) 89, Graham White argues that while land 
claims in the north have created complex bureaucratic mechanisms for administration of lands and 
resources, it is unclear that these treaty-derived institutions are capable of incorporating Inuit values or 
traditional knowledge, although, as he says “it is hard to escape the judgment that traditional ways will, at 
best, only be able to modify (rather than transform) the enormously powerful institutional values 
embedded in the EuroCanadian administrative model,” ibid. at 113. Thomas Hueglin argues that Canada 
shares with the EU important characteristics of “treaty federalism,” despite some obvious differences in 
terms of Canada’s constitutional structure; although he nowhere mentions in his discussion the indigenous 
presence in Canada. See his “Treaty Federalism as a Model of Policy Making: Comparing Canada and the 
European Union” (2013) Canadian Public Administration 56(2) 185. For instance, the key parallel he 
finds between the federalisms of the EU and Canada entails a significant communicative dimension. As 
he puts it, in both settings “the institutional and procedural environment in which policy formation is 
likely to take place” depends upon “power sharing, intergovernmental contracting, council governance 
and equalization commitments” ibid. at 192. However, a recent study of US tribes coping with federalist 
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B. Indigenous dialogues, Habermasian discourses, and the legitimation of law  
I maintain that discourse theory can function in the present context much better than it would 
appear to on the basis of James Tully’s argument that anyone with “a general interest in freedom 
and autonomy” or respect for indigenous communities and their worldviews should reject a 
Habermasian approach out of hand. Nevertheless, I do think it is still necessary to question 
whether what can easily be seen as a lack of fit between discourse theory and the range of 
indigenous perspectives and concerns regarding communicative practices and legal standing 
would prohibit its utility here. Numerous indigenous scholars from North America and elsewhere 
have argued that western approaches to communicative practice inevitably weaken the 
possibility of indigenous peoples’ participation in any kind of intercultural communication event. 
Maori scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith and colleagues, for instance, adopt positions derived from 
Foucault and various post-colonial writers, arguing that the universal presumptions found in  
 Western Enlightenment notions of rationality, justice and humanity are not 
 necessarily transferrable to other contexts and times in their totality without an 
 engagement with issues of social justice that arise from the ideological, intellectual and 
 imperial domination of Western thought and theory.
24
  
 
As she frames it in an earlier work, the “modernist project” (which, as noted above, Habermas 
seeks to defend with his communicative view of law and society) is intimately tied in its 
                                                                                                                                                             
impulses active since the 1970s demonstrates the erosion of treaties and tribal self-determination through 
“compacts” or contracts made with state-level powers. See Jeff Corntassel and Richard C. Witmer, in 
Forced Federalism: Contemporary Challenges to Indigenous Nationhood (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2008). 
 
24
 See Debashish Munshi, Kristen J. Broadfoot and Linda Tuhiwai Smith “Decolonizing Communication 
Ethics: a Framework for Communicating Otherwise” in George Cheney, Steve May and Debashish 
Munshi (eds.) The Handbook of Communication Ethics (New York: Routledge, 2011) at 119. 
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conception of scientific rationality to the hierarchical classification schemes that incorporated, 
oppressively, indigenous peoples into western systems of knowledge and colonial 
administration.
25
 Dale Turner and Audra Simpson, in their discussion of indigenous leadership 
tasks within the context of modern First Nations governance, also speak to the difficulty of 
creating decent conditions for dialogue across linguistic and intellectual fences. They 
acknowledge that translation of traditional indigenous legal and political concepts into English is 
risky even when undertaken by members of indigenous communities (though they also regard it 
as necessary): 
  [T]o translate Indigenous ways of knowing the world into English may read as an 
 attempt to change Indigenous cultures, the interior spaces of our communities and our 
 knowledges where sacredness and tradition reside, into cultures that unproblematically 
 accept the discourses of rights, sovereignty, and nationhood as the only authoritative 
 sources of Indigenous political claims. We realize these languages may be read as a sort 
 of violence upon those interior spaces of our being, but we want to argue instead that they 
 are used to simply protect, through the language of the dominant culture – in a way that 
 they understand – what we regard as ours.26 
In their strongest formulations of the distance between such respective “epistemologies,” as 
grounded in the structures of different language families, some indigenous scholars have held 
that western and indigenous habits of thought are almost ‘incommensurable.’ Some of these 
statements may well be little more than rhetorical generalities functioning within the academic 
politics of post- or anti-colonial humanities and social science. For instance, referring to the work 
of the controversial linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf and his view of “linguistic indeterminacy,” 
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 See her Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, 2
nd
 ed. (London: Zed, 2012) at 
62-63. 
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 See their “Indigenous Leadership in a Flat World” (West Vancouver: National Centre for First Nations 
Governance, 2008) at 14. Margaret Kovachs, who speaks of indigenous as well as “tribal” epistemologies, 
also sees indigenous academic researchers being able to (though perhaps under challenging conditions) 
function both within these frameworks and within the parameters of modernist western approaches to 
knowledge. See her Indigenous Methodologies: Characteristics, Conversations and Contexts (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2009). 
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Marie Battiste and James Sákéj Henderson have drawn sharp distinctions between the “noun-
based” Indo-European languages employed by those who developed the “Eurocentric 
worldview” and the “verb-based” languages of North American indigenous peoples.27 As well, 
they have doubted the possibility of “benign” translation between such languages.28 While in 
some form these statements reflect notable positions within linguistics, philosophy of language, 
anthropology and other fields, the bald implications that Battiste and Henderson draw at points 
                                                 
27
 Protecting Indigenous Knowledge and Heritage: a Global Challenge (Saskatoon: Purich, 2000) at 73-
74. See also Anne Waters “Language Matters: Nondiscrete Nonbinary Dualism” in American Indian 
Thought: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) at 97. In addition, Grace Li Xiu Woo, drawing 
on the well-known work of Thomas Kuhn, and the post-Whorfian linguist George Lakoff’s studies of 
embodied metaphors (as in the idea of a “high” court), argues that conflicting views of s. 35(1) rights in 
Canada are a product of conflicting linguistic systems. See her Ghost Dancing with Colonialism: 
Decolonization and Indigenous Rights at the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2011) at 41-42. For Whorf’s influential formulation of the linguistic foundations of an 
indigenous North American worldview (derived from his analysis of the lack of any means within Hopi 
grammar to express ideas about the course of time), see his “An American Indian Model of the Universe” 
(1950) International Journal of American Linguistics 16(2) 67. The debates that Whorf sparked run too 
far afield to sketch here, other than to note the periodic changes in consensus on the part of linguists 
regarding the merits of his work. Ekkehart Malotki demonstrated that Whorf misrepresented Hopi 
grammar in Hopi Time: a Linguistic Analysis of the Temporal Concepts in the Hopi Language (Berlin: 
Mouton, 1983). More recently, Malotki’s universalist assumptions have also sparked considerable debate 
among linguists, anthropologists and cognitive scientists. Some of these more recent versions of 
indeterminacy focus as well on the political and legal implications that might be drawn from language 
structure. Anthropologist David Dinwoodie, for instance, employs Habermas’s concept of the public 
sphere to demonstrate the impact of the “voice” achieved by the use of the Tsilhqot'in language in a 1989 
public declaration from the Xeni Gwet'in, or Nemiah Valley Indian Band, regarding logging on their 
traditional lands. See “Authorizing Voices: Going Public in an Indigenous Language” (1998) Cultural 
Anthropology 13(2) 193. As well, Elizabeth Povinelli frames the hope for translatability as being bound 
up with what she speaks of as “late liberalism.” In “Radical Worlds: the Anthropology of 
Incommensurability and Inconceivability” (2001) Annual Review of Anthropology 30, 319, she provides 
an overview of the recurrent discussions among anthropologists and philosophers of Whorfian 
incommensurability or indeterminacy, focused particularly on the marginalized groups reflecting what she 
refers to as “radical alterity,” that is, ethnic, indigenous, religious and sexual minorities. Although also 
employing the language of incommensurability to chart the distance between fundamental Canadian and 
Anishinaabe legal concepts, Wapshkaa Ma'iingan (Aaron Mills) emphasizes that this gap “is contingent; 
that it need not be there and that at least in some ways, the respective jurisdictions could function 
together.” See his “Aki, Anishinaabek, kaye tahsh Crown” (2010) Indigenous Law Journal 9(1) 107, at 
148.  
 
28
 For Battiste and Henderson’s statements regarding language and the “illusion” of translatability, see 
supra p. 104 n. 27, at 80-81.  
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seem to me little more than polemical. As they put it: “A noun-based system that is not based on 
the sensory natural world but on artificially created ideas proceeds from mastery to 
enslavement.”29 In a similar vein, Mohawk legal scholar Patricia Monture-Argus urged 
indigenous scholars to pay  
 careful attention to the way that language (that is English) presupposes a framework of 
 meaning that is at the least hierarchical and gendered. I also experience it as colonial. No 
 definition can be taken for granted as inclusive. The re-examination of the way language 
 sanctions particular worldviews and  understandings is central [to the task of addressing 
 indigenous legal standing in Canada].
30
  
 
Although such statements may be polemical, these authors’ shared assumption that language  
 
affects worldview has also usefully encouraged a number of indigenous and other scholars to 
focus on the breadth of what Val Napoleon calls “indigenous legal orders” maintained across 
North America.
31
 These legal orders are often framed as reflecting their particular oral lineage.
32
 
                                                 
29
 Supra p. 104 n. 27, at 73. For Battiste and Henderson’s statements regarding language and what they 
refer to as “cognitive imperialism” see, ibid. at 74.  
 
30
 See her Journeying Forward: Dreaming First Nations’ Independence (Halifax: Fernwood, 1999) at 43. 
 
31
 Indigenous legal orders have been the focus of at least some scholars since E.A. Hoebel and Karl 
Llewellyn’s The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1941). This attention was quite limited however, despite the advocacy work of early 
20
th
 century pan-Indian groups, and the post-World War Two public prominence of crucial Indian law 
cases, such as Calder in Canada, or the US court battles over title and the rulings of the Indian Claims 
Commission – pursued by such tribes as the Oneidas, the Sioux and the Western Shoshones. The length 
of these battles, some dating back to the 1920s and earlier, testifies to the long-standing frustrations that 
members of indigenous communities have typically felt regarding the courts. For detail on the legal views 
and aims of lesser known pan-Indian organizations, see Steven J. Crum “Almost Invisible: The 
Brotherhood of North American Indians (1911) and the League of North American Indians (1935)” 
(2006) Wicazo Sa Review 21(1) 43; but see also Hazel Hertzberg The Search for an American Indian 
Identity: Modern Pan-Indian Movements (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971), and Wilcomb E. 
Washburn’s Red Man's Land/White Man's Law: a Study of the Past and Present Status of the American 
Indian (New York: Scribners, 1971), for general histories of the early development of Indian claims 
against the government. For the impact of Calder on the incorporation of sec. 35(1) within the Canada 
Constitution Act, 1982, see Hamar Foster, Heather Raven and Jeremy Webber Let Right Be Done: 
Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2007). A specifically indigenous literature concerned with both traditional legal 
understandings and with providing intellectual perspectives on contemporary legal questions really only 
emerged in the wake of the Red Power/civil rights era, which sparked the work of numerous indigenous 
authors, such as the acerbic Lakota scholar Vine Deloria, Jr., and in Canada, that of Cree political leader 
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Harold Cardinal, a founder of the National Indian Brotherhood. For Deloria’s Red Power-era views, see 
his We Talk, You Listen: New Tribes, New Turf, 2
nd
 ed. (Lincoln NB: University of Nebraska Press, 2007 
[1970]). For his analysis of the political and legal situation facing US tribes during this period, see his 
work with Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations within: the Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty 
(New York: Pantheon, 1984). With The Unjust Society (Edmonton: M.G. Hurting, 1969), Cardinal had an 
impact in Canada similar to that of Deloria in the US. See also Williams supra p. 89 n. 2, and Stephen 
Cornell The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), for comparable analyses of the constraints of western law and the indigenous political 
developments within that era. More recently, indigenous scholars have turned to the presentation and 
analysis of specifically indigenous approaches to law. Among a growing number of works, see Val 
Napoleon “Ayook: Gitksan Legal Order, Law, and Legal Theory” (University of Victoria Ph.D 
dissertation, 2009); John Borrows Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2010), and his Recovering Canada: the Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2002); Robert A. Williams, Jr. Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of 
Law and Peace, 1600-1800 (New York: Routledge, 1997); Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark “Respect, 
Responsibility and Renewal: the Foundations of Anishinaabe Treaty Making with the US and Canada” 
(2010) American Indian Culture and Research Journal 34(2) 145, and “Marked by Fire: Anishinaabe 
Articulations of Nationhood in Treaty Making with the United States and Canada” (2012) American 
Indian Quarterly 36(2) 119; James Sákéj Henderson “First Nations Legal Inheritances in Canada: the 
Mikmaq Model” (1995) Manitoba Law Journal 23(1), and Mills supra p. 102 n. 27. See also 
anthropologist Antonia Mills’ Eagle Down Is Our Law: Witsuwit’en Law, Feasts, and Land Claims 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1994). For an effort to assess the range of 
methodological approaches to this blooming area of scholarship, see Hadley Friedland “Methods for 
Accessing, Understanding and Applying Indigenous Laws” (2012) Indigenous Law Journal 11(1) 1. 
 
32
 The oral basis of indigenous legal orders raises a number of issues that theorists of legal pluralism, such 
as William Twining, have sought to address across an international spectrum. Twining notes that much of 
the academic discussion of legal pluralism rests with demonstration of the fact of legal diversity, and 
avoids, so far, the tasks of addressing the normative dimensions of plural legal discourses, such as one 
might explore from a Habermasian perspective. See his “Normative and Legal Pluralism: a Global 
Perspective” (2010) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 20(3) 473. Borrows (2010) 
supra p. 107 n. 31, has contemplated the implications of a pluralism recognizing indigenous legal orders 
in Canada. The courts, sparked by the Supreme Court’s 1997 ruling in Delgamuukw, have limited their 
consideration of oral legal orders largely to the specifics of admitting oral traditions as evidence at trial. 
For discussion of the limitations to what seems like the court’s acknowledgement of a crucial feature of 
indigenous traditions, see, among many, Val Napoleon “Delgamuukw: a Legal Straightjacket for Oral 
Histories?” (2005) Canadian Journal of Law and Society 20(2) 123; John Borrows “Listening for a 
Change: the Courts and Oral Tradition” (2001) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 39(1) 1; and Bruce Granville 
Miller Oral History on Trial: Recognizing Aboriginal Narratives in the Courts (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2011). For a leading, though controversial, government witness’s statement of 
what he regards as the inferior ability of oral tradition to function as evidence within the strictures of court 
procedures, see Alexander von Gernet “What My Elders Taught Me: Oral Traditions as Evidence in 
Aboriginal Trials” in Owen Lippert (ed.) Beyond the Nass Valley (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2000) 174. 
For a critique of the positivist view of knowledge animating von Gernet’s dismissal of oral history in the 
courts, see Robin Jarvis Brownlie “Disciplining Orality: Alexander von Gernet and the Crown’s 
Invalidation of Aboriginal Oral History in Canadian Litigation” (forthcoming in Native Studies Review, 
but online at http://gsdl.ubcic.bc.ca/collect/firstna1/index/assoc/HASHc8d1.dir/doc.pdf, accessed 24 
January 2014). See also historian Arthur Ray’s account of his experience serving as an expert witness for 
the Delgamuukw plaintiffs, and others, in Telling It to the Judge: Taking Native History to Court 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011). Ray notes the influence of von Gernet’s view of the 
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Their distinctiveness from the European common and civil law traditions, however, is even 
broader than the term “oral” expresses. Like the legal orders of medieval Europe, of ancient 
societies such as Greece, Rome and Israel, or of a range of tribally based societies located across 
Africa and Asia; North American indigenous legal orders have relied upon a wide-range of 
media to express their specific understandings of obligation. As Bernard Hibbitts argued some 
time ago, apart from the world of post-Protestant Reformation Europe, much of what people 
have done to communicate and to effect their understandings of legal obligation has employed 
the full range of senses other than the visual, and its derivative product – the written word.33 
Hibbitts argues that law is best regarded not in its “black letter” form, but as primarily a matter 
of “performance,” that is, as depending on spoken words, gestures, touches, sounds, and even 
                                                                                                                                                             
scientific basis of historical knowledge in Justice Teitelbaum’s consideration of the Samson Cree treaty 
claim, Victor Buffalo v the Queen, ibid. at 231-32, n. 52. Although courts have frequently accepted von 
Gernet’s dismissal of oral tradition and history, in 2007 the British Columbia Supreme Court was quite 
critical of his positivist assumptions about knowledge, and held that the “goal of reconciliation can only 
be achieved if oral tradition evidence is placed on an equal footing with historical documents.” See 
Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia (2007) BCSC 1700, at 137.  
 
33
 See his “Making Sense Of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal 
Discourse” (1994) Cardozo Law Review 16(4) 229, which argues that what he calls “modal metaphors,” 
such as found in the idea of law’s visual nature: 
 can have an especially strong impact on how we think and what we do. If, for example, I call 
 "thought" itself "reflection," I am figuratively characterizing thought as a visual enterprise. 
 Insofar as reflection literally presumes a visual subject, the metaphor may subtly encourage 
 thinkers to believe that they should look for intellectual stimulation, rather than listen for it; in 
 other words, the metaphor may affect their epistemological orientation. The same visual metaphor 
 may alternatively imply that only individuals from visually biased backgrounds can properly 
 engage in thought, prompting individuals from other traditions that prize other senses to be 
 dismissed (or not to regard themselves) as legitimate or competent participants in intellectual 
 inquiry (ibid. at 237). 
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smells.
34
 To give only one example out of what Hibbitts indicates might easily be thousands 
across time and space, in ancient Greece nomos meant both “law” and “tune;” and Aristotle, or 
one of his peripatetic followers at least, suspected that this was because the laws were originally 
sung.
35
 Or, for an illustrative North American performance from the southwest, consider the 
report of American fur trapper James O. Pattie, who made a treaty in 1825 with several unnamed 
Apache caciques,
36
 while working for a Spanish mine owner northeast of Santa Fe. The caciques 
agreed not to harm the Spaniards, apparently fooled by Pattie into thinking that Americans 
actually owned the mine. Nevertheless, the caciques concluded the treaty, which had been first 
elaborated with speeches of peace and smoking of the pipe, with a practice unfamiliar to Pattie. 
He notes: 
 They then dug a hole in the ground in the centre of the circle, and each one spat in 
 it. They then filled it up with earth, danced round it, and stuck their arrows in the little 
 mound. They then gathered a large pile of stones over it, and painted themselves red. 
 Such are their ceremonies of making peace. All the forms of the ceremony were familiar 
 to us, except the pile of stones, and spitting in the hole they had dug, which are not 
 practised by the Indians on the American frontiers. We asked them the meaning of the 
 spitting. They said that they did it in token of spitting out all their spite and revenge, and 
 burying their anger under the ground.
37
 
                                                 
34
 See his “‘Coming To Our Senses’: Communication and Legal Expression in Performance Cultures” 
(1992) Emory Law Journal 41(2) 873, which sketches a typology of law as performance based on senses 
of touch, taste, smell, and hearing.  
 
35
 For the example of Aristotle, see Hibbits ibid. at 247. See also Aristotle’s Problemata, E.S. Forster, ed. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1927) at XIX.920.28.  
 
36
 A Taino term for leader employed by the Spanish across the Southwest. 
 
37
 James O. Pattie, Pattie's Personal Narrative of a Voyage to the Pacific and in Mexico June, 20, 1824 -- 
August 30, 1830 (Cincinnati: John H. Wood, 1831) https://user.xmission.com/~drudy/mtman/html/ 
pattie/pattie.html, accessed 24 February, 2014. Vine Deloria, Jr. and Raymond DeMallie also record this 
event in their Documents of American Indian Diplomacy: Treaties, Agreements and Conventions, 1775-
1979, vol. 1 (Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999) at 7-8. Historian Nancy McGown Minor 
cites a 1784 account of a similar ceremonial means of establishing peaceful relations between Lipan 
Apaches and the Spanish in San Antonio, which included the burial of a live horse and numerous 
weapons in the town plaza. See her study of written sources on the Lipans, The Light Gray People: an 
Ethno-History of the Lipan Apaches of Texas and Northern Mexico (Lanham MD: University Press of 
America, 2009) at 134. 
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In North America, indigenous parties to legal disputes, or conversely, to solemn agreements, 
have long relied on performances employing a wide range of ceremonial acts, formal recitations 
and narratives, and revered physical objects; as well as invoking norms derived from their 
relationships with plants, animals and natural features of the landscape.
38
 While such 
performances have generally been difficult for post-Guttenberg westerners to respect,
39
 on 
Hibbitts’ account of law as performance, indigenous North American legal traditions would also 
appear to have much in common with legal practice across a wide range of historical and social 
contexts. Nevertheless, examples run throughout Canadian and US history of settler impatience 
with the physicality of indigenous diplomatic protocols, of the courts’ skeptical reactions to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
38
 Even a far from complete set of examples would include the performance aspects of wampum and 
treaty-making practiced in the northeast part of the continent, as I discuss below. See Williams (1997) 
supra p. 107 n. 31, for a discussion of wampum and other performative vehicles within 17
th
 and 18
th
 
century indigenous diplomacy. For a useful cultural history of wampum from the 17
th
 century to the 
present, emphasizing the key role of autonomy in Haudenosaunee political thought, see Kathryn V. 
Muller “Holding Hands with Wampum: Haudenosaunee Council Fires from the Great Law of Peace to 
Contemporary Relationships with the Canadian State” (Queen’s University Ph.D. dissertation, 2008). For 
an argument that Canada’s constitutional bedrock is best located within First Nations’ wampum practices, 
see John Borrows “Wampum at Niagara: the Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and Self-
Government” in Michael Asch (ed.) Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equity, and 
Respect (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997) 169. For an articulation of her elders’ 
understandings of treaty obligations, including those with other species, see Leanne Simpson “Looking 
after Gdoo-naaganinaa: Precolonial Nishnaabeg Diplomatic and Treaty Relationships” (2008) Wicazo Sa 
Review 23(2) 29. See also James Merrell Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania 
Frontier (New York: Norton, 1999), at 186-202. For an argument that the 13 colonial-era treaties with the 
Haudenosaunee and other nations collected by Benjamin Franklin are all structured on the basis of the 
Haudenosaunee Condolence ceremony, see Michael M. Pomedli “Eighteenth-Century Treaties: Amended 
Iroquois Condolence Rituals” (1995) American Indian Quarterly 19(3) 319. Franklin’s collection is 
available in Susan Kalter (ed). Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania, and the First Nations: the Treaties of 
1736-62 (Urbana IL: University of Illinois Press, 2006).  
 
39
 Justice McEachern, for instance, whose efforts to take account of the Gitxsan and Witsuwit’en oral 
traditions for the British Columbia Supreme Court proved inadequate for the Supreme Court, expressed at 
several points his conviction that in considering the testimony of Gitxsan witness Mary Johnson, he found 
it impossible to reconcile irrational and rational beliefs. “The Medeek [the storied figure of the grizzly 
bear] or supernatural portion of these adaawk is a matter of belief, or faith, rather than rational inference” 
see Delgamuukw (1991), supra p. 95 n. 11, at 173.   
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relevance of indigenous narrative performances, and the discounting of ceremonial assurance of 
the truth of agreements.
40
 These dismissals of indigenous performances may stem from a variety 
of motivational and intellectual sources, but they also seem likely to reflect differing 
fundamental assumptions about law as produced, encountered and conveyed through written 
texts, and law as encountered, produced or conveyed through other media.
41
  
 
Proponents of indigenous legal standing grounded in the wide-ranging particulars of traditional 
languages, practices or worldviews could thus understandably greet with suspicion my rendition 
of the Habermasian discourse theory. Making the evaluation of Habermasian norms for discourse 
even more complex, other indigenous scholars have focused on how colonial power in Canada 
has produced a “private sphere” equally as destructive of indigenous “lifeworlds” (Habermas’s 
term) as the more prominent “public” sphere of diplomacy and federal regulation of lands, 
resources and self-governance. Athabascan scholar Dian Million, for instance, has demonstrated 
the significant gendered impacts of this domestic colonial power on discourse before the courts, 
such as in consigning to the legal margins the role of “affective” testimony in relation to the 
sordid abuse practiced at Canada’s residential schools, or in dealing with violence against 
indigenous women. As she notes: “The intimacy of the ‘domestic’ location that is Canadian 
                                                 
40
 William Denny, English governor of Pennsylvania, and active in the 1758 treaty councils at Easton, 
illustrates this tendency as well as anyone. While relying upon Condolence-derived treaty protocols in his 
remarks at Easton to Six Nations, Delaware and other participants, he framed, in more private 
correspondence, these same protocols as merely “trifling Ceremony.” See Merrell supra p. 110 n. 38, at 
264-65. For Denny’s more public form of discourse during the treaty negotiations, see Kalter supra p. 110 
n. 38, at 298-301.   
 
41
 This is not to say that settler legality has not had its own significant basis in performance. See, for 
instance, Michael Witgen’s study of French colonial performance, in "The Rituals of Possession: Native 
Identity and the Invention of Empire in Seventeenth-Century Western North America" (2007) 
Ethnohistory 54(4) 639. For an examination of the performative legal practices employed by all European 
colonial powers in the northern and southern hemispheres, see Patricia Seed Ceremonies of Possession in 
Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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colonization in Indian lives renders any conversation about ‘it’ subjective and emotionally 
engaged.” 42 The affective depths of those traumas may well prevent the rationalistic model of a 
public sphere at the heart of discourse theory from being of assistance in any conceivable 
overcoming.
 
 
 
Thus, any communicative process – or even the practices animating a given communicative 
process – held under the strictures of D might seem bound to erase the significance of many 
forms of indigenous participation. Although speaking of the Indian subcontinent, the Bengali 
historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has framed the questionable advantage of subaltern dialogue with 
proponents of “the hyper-rationalism characteristic of colonial modernity” in ways that coincide 
with the concerns of indigenous North American suspicions.
43
 Such a dialogue, he notes, “by its 
very structure, is not democratic.”   
 For a dialogue can be genuinely open only on one condition: that no party puts  
 itself in a position where it can unilaterally decide the final outcomes of the 
 conversation. This never happens between the ‘modern’ and the ‘non-modern.’ 
 Because, however non-coercive the conversation between the Kantian subject (i.e. 
 the transcendent academic observer, the knowing, judging and willing subject of 
 modernity) and the subaltern who enters into a historical dialogue with the former 
 from a non-Enlightenment position, this dialogue takes place within a field of 
                                                 
42
 See her “Felt Theory: An Indigenous Feminist Approach to Affect and History” (2009) Wicazo Sa 
Review 24(2) 53, at 71. See also, her Therapeutic Nations: Healing in an Age of Indigenous Human 
Rights (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2013). There she supplements a Foucauldian reading of the 
Indian Act, 1876 as a colonial form of “biopower,” ibid. at 41, with an argument for the centrality of the 
affective in indigenous discourses addressing the state. In addition, see Audra Simpson “Captivating 
Eunice: Membership, Colonialism, and Gendered Citizenships of Grief” (2009) Wicazo Sa Review 24(2) 
105. 
43
 Dipesh Chakrabarty “Radical Histories and the Question of Enlightenment Rationalism: some Recent 
Critiques of Subaltern Studies” in Vinayak Chaturvedi (ed.) Mapping Subaltern Studies and the 
Postcolonial (London: Verso, 2012) 256, at 259. 
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 possibilities that is already structured from the very beginning in favour of certain 
 outcomes.
44
 
In the same vein, Métis legal scholar D’Arcy Vermette, referring to the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in R. v Van der Peet, notes how the Canadian courts employ a variety of practices to transform 
indigenous contributions to court proceedings, or the very bringing of claims, in order to 
maintain what he argues is colonial control over indigenous parties: 
 Claims also need to be drafted in a way that the court will understand. Again, it is 
 Aboriginal people making the accommodation and not the courts. To illustrate how this 
 works we can look at how the Court characterized Dorothy Van Peet’s claim. The Court 
 stated: “She is claiming, in other words, that the practices, custom and traditions of the 
 Sto:lo include as an integral part the exchange of fish for money or other goods.” The key 
 to this statement is found in the expression “in other words,” which indicates that the 
 claimant’s Aboriginal voice has been confiscated and turned into a legal voice – the voice 
 of the colonizer. However, the Court goes too far in its characterization of her claim 
 according to and in support of the “integral” test laid out by the Court. It is inappropriate 
 for the Court to put words in her mouth. It is a reflection of the inflexible nature of the 
 colonial courts.
45
 
The concern that Vermette and other indigenous scholars express quite frequently is that under 
colonial conditions, any discourse situation involving indigenous parties and the state will likely 
be freighted with incapacitating difficulties in achieving a resolution to conflicts or providing a 
hearing of grievances that an indigenous party could accept as what Habermas refers to as 
“rationally legitimate.”46 However, although pursuing these concerns is crucial to the continued 
                                                 
44
Ibid. at 273. 
 
45
 Supra p. 13 n.17.  
46
 Among efforts to address this conflict, which we could sum as being between state-sanctioned legal 
procedure and indigenous expectations of legitimacy under the conditions of colonialism, and which 
reflect the tension that Habermas portrays between the end of law as certainty and the end of law as 
justice, as I noted above, see Gordon Christie’s “Indigenous Authority, Canadian Law, and Pipeline 
Proposals” (2013) Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 25, 189. As well, see his “A Colonial 
Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuukw and Haida Nation” (2005) Windsor Yearbook of 
Access to Justice 23, 17. For an assessment of Canadian law as still operating on colonial assumptions 
and employing colonial methods, see Mary Eberts “Still Colonizing after all these Years” (2013) 
University of New Brunswick Law Journal 64, 123. Other analyses of the continued impact of colonial 
constraints on indigenous self-determination in Canada include Darlene Johnston “Aboriginal Traditions 
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development of indigenous legal theory, and to addressing questions of Canadian law’s ability to 
respond fairly to indigenous parties’ legal concerns, I think they do not actually indicate that 
Habermas’s discourse theory is necessarily tarred with the burdens of conveying an underhanded 
legitimation of colonialism.  
 
To provide some context for this conclusion, consider an example of troubled communication 
that Canadian historian Sheldon Krasowski derives from eyewitness accounts to the making of 
Treaty Six. Krasowski points out that one of the few true failures in mutual understanding 
connected with the 1876 negotiations at Forts Carlton and Pitt concerned “the significance of the 
Treaty Six pipe ceremonies.” As he frames it,  
 Alexander Morris held that ‘the pipe ceremony meant that [the commissioners] had 
 accepted the friendship of the Cree nation.’ However, the Indigenous understanding of 
 the pipe ceremony evoked the presence of the Creator and ensured that the truth was 
 spoken during the negotiations. Though the commissioners did not appear to fully 
 understand the significance of the pipe ceremony, they knew it was important and vital to 
 the success of the treaty.”47   
                                                                                                                                                             
of Tolerance and Reparation: Introducing Canadian Colonialism” in Micheline Labelle, Rachad Antonius, 
Georges Leroux (eds.) Le Devoir de Memoire et les Politiques du Pardon (Quebec City: Presses de 
l’Universite de Quebec, 2005) 141. Johnston stresses the need to establish jointly created norms to assess 
the impact of colonial rule, ibid. at 154, a point on which I think Habermas would readily agree. Much of 
the literature on colonialism and indigenous law, outside of the field of history, rests within the 
contentious academic politics of post-modernism. For examples within the Canadian context, see Adam J. 
Barker “The Contemporary Reality of Canadian Imperialism: Settler Colonialism and the Hybrid Colonial 
State” (2009) American Indian Quarterly 33(3) 325, as well as Woo supra p. 105 n. 27. 
47
 See his “Mediating the Numbered Treaties: Eyewitness Accounts of Treaties between the Crown and 
Indigenous Peoples, 1871-1876” (University of Regina Ph.D. dissertation, 2011), at 272, and 238. For 
Morris’s own view of the significance of the pipestem ceremony at Fort Carlton, see his The Treaties of 
Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the Northwest Territories (Toronto: Coles, 1971 [1880]) at 183. 
For Plains Cree elder Jim Kâ-Nîpitêhtêw’s view of the pipestem ceremony as assuring the truth of 
Canada’s Treaty Six promises, see Freda Ahenakew (ed.) ana kâ-pimwêwêhahk okakêskihkêmowina: the 
Counselling Speeches of Jim Kâ-Nîpitêhtêw (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2007) at 107-11. 
According to Kâ-Nîpitêhtêw, the ceremony, which involved Morris grasping the pipestem and repeating 
his promises, was fundamentally a means of assuring the truthfulness of the promise-maker. As Kâ-
Nîpitêhtêw recounted its purpose in 1987 to a group at the Saskatchewan Indian Cultural College: 
 He, my late father, used to say this: ‘Well, a certain old man had foretold it, rising from his seat; 
 then he had foretold it: ‘The people must have something to rely upon as  testimony, and we who 
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Consider in addition another form of misunderstanding occurring during the Treaty Six 
negotiations. Krasowski also recounts how Morris’s official recording of a speech delivered by 
pro-treaty Métis commissioner James McKay omitted an exchange between McKay and The 
Badger, a Cree chief unenthusiastic about the proposed treaty. On the basis of the eyewitness 
report of interpreter Peter Erasmus, hired by the Cree chiefs to assist them, however, McKay 
evidently responded with some hostility regarding comments from The Badger about treaty 
terms. According to Krasowksi:  
 McKay admonished the chiefs for their demands and stated ‘In my experience you 
 always want more than you were promised in the first place and you are never satisfied 
 with what is given to you.’ McKay’s speech was followed by a distinct murmur of 
 disapproval and The Badger immediately rose to his feet and stated, ‘I did not say that I 
 wanted to be fed every day. You, I know, understand our language and yet you twist my 
 words to suit your own meaning. What I did  say was that when we settle on the ground to 
 work the land, that is when we will need help and that is the only way that a poor Indian 
 can get along.’48  
Krasowski’s accounts of these incidents highlight two forms of failure to reach an understanding. 
The failure to understand the significance of the Treaty Six pipe ceremony may well go to the 
conflict in worldviews that Battiste and Henderson emphasize. Even in such a conflict, however, 
someone less committed to the strong conflict of world views position might argue that Morris’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
 are Crees do have something to rely upon as testimony; that which is called the pipestem, that is 
 all upon which we can rely as testimony. When he, our brother the White-Man, made these 
 promises to us, he did promise that no human walking upon two legs on the surface of the earth 
 would ever be able to break the  promises he made to us, ibid. at 109. 
Morris’s own words, as Kâ-Nîpitêhtêw recounted them, don’t seem to allow for the possibility that he 
misunderstood the significance of his action:  
 [Cree treaty chief:]‘Indeed, do you speak the truth in that you will forever look after me to this 
 extent?’ he had said to that one, ‘If you speak the truth, hold then this pipestem, do you speak the 
 truth, yes or no?’ 
 ‘Yes!’ [Morris] said, and when they had made him hold the pipestem, then he had  
 taken this pipestem, ‘Indeed, no human walking on two legs will ever be able to  
 break what I am hereby promising you,’ ibid. at 111. 
 
48
 Ibid. at 257-58. 
116 
 
apparently simplistic conclusion that the ceremony was important regardless of its meaning to 
the Crees who employed it was sufficient to produce Canada’s good faith participation in the 
treaty. In either case, what I draw from this example is that it demonstrates what Habermas 
would call the semantic level at which the participants likely assessed the ceremony as a 
communicative performance. The second example, McKay’s alleged twisting of The Badger’s 
words, although it also clearly employed what Habermas considers a “strategic” use of 
communication – since “twisting” is not animated by a desire to reach mutual understanding – 
shares with the ceremony the level at which the participants likely assessed it as well. 
 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, Habermas’s concern with the discourse theory of law 
derives from the distinction between a semantic and a pragmatic approach to communication. 
These approaches to language use remain distinct analytically, although, as with McKay’s use of 
The Bear’s words, they can overlap in practice. The direct concern of a semantic focus is the 
weighing of the truth and meaning of linguistic expressions. Struggles over the validity or 
meaning of worldviews, often found in failures to communicate across cultural divides, are 
largely focused around semantic questions of language and communication. Struggles over the 
meaning or translatability of words like “property” or “resources,” or Justice McEachern’s 
difficulty with Mary Johnson’s testimony regarding the Medeek in Delgamuukw, for instance, 
entail efforts to find equivalences – or at least resemblances, and to form distinctions between 
varying concepts across the language gaps that Battiste and Henderson highlight, and to chart the 
philosophical, legal and political implications of these equivalences and distinctions. Even if we 
reversed the direction of the effort to find equivalences, accepting that indigenous legal 
categories and practices should be considered part of the normative whole of Canada’s legal 
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framework – which would make the problem as much one of finding indigenous language 
equivalents for English concepts as it is about finding English equivalents for ‘exotic’ indigenous 
concepts; the struggle to find the appropriate equivalences would still be a semantic struggle.
49
  
 
On the other hand, a pragmatic concern with communicative acts focuses on conditions 
necessary for producing a mutual understanding, or establishing and maintaining social 
relationships. Thus law, morality and ethics, for Habermas, are all ultimately pragmatic 
enterprises. Though they have important differences, as I noted in the previous chapter, 
Habermas regards them each as bearing a degree of legitimacy derived from the extent to which 
all parties involved in discourse seeking mutual understanding would ideally consent to the 
norms necessary to evaluate contributions to the discourse.
50
 Thus, in addition to, or even 
preceding, the possible resolution of pressing semantic questions across colonial divides, 
between parties of conflicting interests or worldviews, or in courtrooms and other legal/political 
venues; is a separate, and on Habermas’s account, ultimately pragmatic concern. This means that 
                                                 
49
 See Borrows (2010) supra p. 107 n. 31, for a pluralist argument that the range of indigenous legal 
orders functioning in Canada should be regarded as part of the country’s constitutional fabric. My 
understanding of legal pluralism also stems from William Twining supra p. 107 n. 32.  
 
50
 Although consent remains a troublesome concept within political theory, I think understanding it within 
a Habermasian framework, as well as perhaps within a broad range of indigenous legal frameworks, is not 
as tied to the liberal pitfalls of original or tacit consent that Jeremy Webber identifies in his “The 
Meanings of Consent,” his introductory essay to his and Colin M. MacLeod’s Between Consenting 
Peoples: Political Community and the Meaning of Consent (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 2010) at 13-15. In that same volume, for instance, Val Napoleon speaks of the importance to 
Gitksan legal order of a “dialogic construction of consent,” that is a “process of discussion, disagreement, 
affirmation and reconciliation, performed at intervals whenever important actions or decisions were 
required.” See her “Living Together: Gitksan Legal Reasoning as a Foundation for Consent” ibid. at 46. 
Also in that volume, Janna Promislow finds in her study of Hudson Bay Company and Hayes River Cree 
interactions at York Factory that consent was the product of a “working intersocietal space in which 
normative expectations that were shared at the level of practice were not always shared at the level of 
meaning,” a distinction I think is still congruent with the one Habermas makes between semantic and 
pragmatic aims of discourse. See her “‘Thou Wilt Not Die of Hunger . . . for I Bring Thee Merchandise’: 
Intersocietal Normativity and the Exchange of Food at York Factory, 1682-1763” ibid. at 104. 
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in certain settings the criteria for evaluating discursive statements are themselves the product of 
the mutual effort of the parties to make themselves understood. I think Habermas’s critics are 
wrong to hold that Habermas’s view of the conditions of discourse are somehow predetermined 
by the specifics of a particular point of view (in this case the western, colonial point of view). 
Therefore, I maintain that it makes more sense to concur with Habermas when he says that 
substantive convictions regarding rationality need not be encased within or found lurking behind 
the discourse principle. His own statement that “[c]oncepts such as truth, rationality, and 
justification play the same role in every language community, even if they are interpreted 
differently and applied in accordance with different criteria,” indicates a confidence – perhaps 
misplaced, but one I will rely upon – that attempts to find common pragmatic ground across 
conflicts of worldview are not inherently fated to let the colonial rationalist’s faith in the 
superiority of western traditions of thought in by the back door.
51
 Instead, discourse theory 
entails the requirement of securing a “symmetrical relation” for any “intercultural” 
communication, and holds that “assimilation” or “conversion” of the parties must remain 
inappropriate outcomes. As a discursive ideal, this “symmetrical relation” does not, as I think it 
seems to for his critics, valorize the contemporary approach to dialogue with indigenous parties 
regarding Aboriginal and treaty rights often practiced in Canada, in which the state limits the 
range of discussion to future-oriented issues,
52
 as I will demonstrate in the next chapter.
                                                 
51
 RDE at 105. 
 
52
 See, for instance, Brian Egan “Sharing the Colonial Burden: Treaty-making and Reconciliation in 
Hul’qumi’num Territory” (2012) Canadian Geographer 56(4) 398, at 410. 
 
  
 
 
   
Chapter 4 
 
Intersocietal Legal Norms of Discourse 
 
A. Performative legality in the region of the middle ground  
Considered simply at the pragmatic level, I think a strong correlation is evident between 
Habermas’s rendition of the norms of discourse and those embodied within at least certain forms 
of indigenous discursive practices. It remains well beyond my capability to trace these in any 
detail across the wide historic and cultural range of discursive practices operating within North 
American indigenous legal orders, but also, I think, unnecessary in this context. Instead, here I 
merely want to highlight a congruence of norms operating within one form of “intersocietal” 
discursive practice (to use Promislow’s term) germane to the discourse required by Canada’s 
duty to consult:
1
 protocols for treaty formation commonly employed within the region Richard 
White referred to with his historical trope of the “middle ground.”2  
                                                 
1
 Supra p. 117 n. 50. 
 
2
 Richard White The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-
1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). It may well be that a large range of 
communicative practices particular to various indigenous communities, or even shared more broadly 
between communities, do not fit easily (which is not to say should not be employed) within the sort of 
public “middle ground” arena between indigenous and settler societies, where the duty to consult holds 
sway. For instance, Patricia Covarrubias, in “(Un)Biased in Western Theory: Generative Silence in 
American Indian Communication” (2007) Communication Monographs 74(2) 265, notes the importance 
of what she calls “generative silence,” that is silence as a productive rather than destructive personal and 
communal practice, among her students’ largely Coast Salish families. The generative capacities of 
silence employed within courts, tribunals, hearings and other gatherings focused on processes of 
consultation might stretch the imaginative sympathies of a non-indigenous review panel or judge. 
Nevertheless, as I employ discourse theory, I don’t think Habermas has indicated that traditional 
communicative practices that might fit less well into a “middle ground” scenario need to be regarded as 
inappropriate to a public sphere discourse setting. The strongest strictures on what sorts of practices or 
claims might be admissible in public sphere discourse, that is, as needing to rest on “public reason,” have 
come more from John Rawls. On Rawls’s account, participants in political conversation or negotiation, or 
at court, would themselves need to carry an intellectual sieve, sifting out their tradition- or metaphysical-
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Having already turned to the context of treaty-making to illustrate both performative dimensions 
of indigenous legal orders, and the problem of failures in understanding indigenous legal 
performance across cultural divides, here I want to draw more explicitly on historical accounts of 
“middle ground” treaty formation, in order to demonstrate how common norms of discourse 
operated within settings where law as indigenous performance intersected with law as settler 
written decree. From a discourse perspective, these intersocietal norms, employed in the 
practices of treaty-making between French and English colonial authorities and representatives 
of a wide range of indigenous nations in the Great Lakes region, are paradigmatic. Far more so 
than does the post-Confederation web of Canadian legislation and case law dealing with 
Aboriginal issues, the norms employed across the middle ground demonstrate real-world 
approximations of Habermas’s discourse principle. However, tensions remain between leading 
characterizations of those norms. 
 
For White, and for James Tully following him, social, political and environmental conditions 
within the Great Lakes region (at least up until the end of the War of 1812) provided the 
possibility of fragile, almost accidentally achieved agreements negotiated between First Nations 
and settler forces. In White’s well-known formulation, the middle ground is the site of fortuitous 
misunderstandings. 
                                                                                                                                                             
bound convictions before broaching them in public. For a comparison of Rawls and Habermas on this 
point, see Todd Hendricks Rawls and Habermas: Reason, Pluralism and the Claims of Political 
Philosophy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010) at 40. Matthew Tomm argues that Rawls’s notion 
of public reason has at best an ambivalent impact on indigenous parties engaged with Canada’s legal 
institutions, as his discussion of the Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation’s challenges to Platinex 
Inc.’s exploratory drilling at Big Trout Lake illustrates. See his “Public Reason and the Disempowerment 
of Aboriginal People in Canada” (2013) Canadian Journal of Law and Society 28(3) 293, as well as 
Justice Smith’s reasons for judgment in Platinex Inc. v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation, 
2006 CanLII 26171 (ON SC).  
 
121 
 
On the middle ground diverse peoples adjust their differences through what amounts to a 
process of creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings. People try to persuade others 
who are different from themselves by appealing to what they perceive to be the values 
and practices of those others. They often misinterpret and distort both the values and the 
practices of those they deal with, but from these misunderstandings arise new meanings 
and through them new practices – the shared meanings and practices of the middle 
ground.
3
 
As noted above, historic treaty-making in the northeast, and likely in other areas of the continent 
as well, involved various performative, largely ceremonial, means of establishing obligations. 
For White, these performances were bits of bricolage, assembled on the fly between Algonquians 
and the French (then later the English), out of the “shattered pieces” of indigenous social life left 
over from the “Iroquois hammer striking Algonquian glass,” that is, in the aftermath of the long-
running war between the Haudenosaunee confederacy and a number of other Algonquian and 
Iroquoian nations in the seventeenth century.
4
 As White puts it: “Particularly in diplomatic 
councils, the middle ground was a realm of constant invention, which was just as constantly 
presented as convention. Under the new conventions, new purposes arose, and so the cycle 
continued.”5  
 
White’s focus on invention out of failed understandings, as a historian of the accidental and the 
discontinuous, readily harmonizes with that of Tully’s own view of political and legal practice as 
strategic embodiments of power. However, it also tends to obscure points of continuity that have 
operated within the same diplomatic, intersocietal sphere. Historian Heidi Bohaker and 
Anishinaabe legal scholar and historian Darlene Johnston (Chippewas of Nawash) have each 
                                                 
3
 White supra p. 119 n. 2, at x. 
 
4
 Ibid. at 2.  
 
5
 Ibid. at 52. 
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faulted White’s characterization of indigenous participation within this zone of treaty and 
alliance formation. In particular, Bohaker rejects White’s reduction of indigenous treaty parties 
to mere “shards” of their former communal and individual selves, and the strongly constructivist 
view of their communicative practices.
6
 According to Johnston and Bohaker, Great Lakes 
Anishinaabe communities were never reduced to the status of refugees, at least not to the 
collective and permanent extent that White takes for granted: alienated from homelands, lacking 
the connection of relations, divorced from spiritual and intellectual resources. Thus, their 
participation in a range of diplomatic efforts continued to draw on well-defined performances of 
their personal, social and legal/political identity as members of functioning clans, or odoodemag 
in Anishinaabemowin.
7
 Consequently, in this chapter, although I continue to employ White’s 
term as a spatial metaphor significant for analyzing intersocietal legal discourse, I mean to 
sidestep his own construal of it. Instead, I take more direct inspiration from Johnston and 
                                                 
6
 Heidi Bohaker “Nindoodemag: The Significance of Algonquian Kinship Networks in the Eastern Great 
Lakes Region, 1600-1701” (2006) The William and Mary Quarterly 63(1) 23. See also Darlene Johnston 
“Litigating Identity: the Challenge of Aboriginality” (University of Toronto L.L.M. thesis, 2003) at 33-
38. Johnston also faults White for what she refers to as "pan-Algonquianism," in effect lumping all 
opponents of the Haudenosaunee confederacy into the one French category of "Algonquian," ibid. at 41. 
A consequence of this, though not the one she emphasizes, is the erasure of culturally embedded 
discursive norms, such as I want to highlight here. 
 
7
 Third person plural, based on the stem, ode, and cognate of de, “heart.” In Anishinaabemowin (not that I 
am a speaker), “dependent” nouns, indicating necessary relationships, are used with affixes denoting 
person, number and animacy. See the Ojibwe People's Dictionary, ojibwe.lib.umn.edu/main-
entry/odoodeman-nad, accessed 4 April, 2014. Bohaker uses the first person singular in her writing, 
which, as she notes, creates the odd English usage of “their ‘my clan,’” but is consistent with “linguistic 
conventions.” See her “Nindoodemag: Anishinaabeg Identities in the Eastern Great Lakes Region, 1600 
to 1900” (University of Toronto Ph.D. dissertation, 2006) at 6, n. 5. The Ojibway scholar Basil Johnston 
recounts the etymology of the term, noting that the “evidence is strong that the term ‘dodeam’ comes 
from the same root as do ‘dodum’ and ‘dodosh.’ ‘Dodum’ means to do or fulfill, while ‘Dodosh’ literally 
means breast, that from which milk, or food, or sustenance is drawn. ‘Dodaem’ may mean ‘that from 
which I draw my purpose, meaning, and being,’” in Ojibway Heritage (Lincoln NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1990) at 61.  
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Bohaker, and contend that the long functioning of odoodemag demonstrates important discursive 
norms widely observed within the treaty-making protocols of Great Lakes indigenous nations.
8
 
 
Writing in the early 1850s, the historian William Whipple Warren (son of an American father 
and a White Crane clan mother), quoted his Anishinaabe informants and relatives stating that 
they regarded the clan system as dating “back to when the Earth was new.”9 French trapper and 
explorer Nicholas Perrot had emphasized this same view of the temporal continuity of 
odoodemag, as well as their embodiment of what we might think of as sacred power, in 
recounting what he heard from Great Lakes Anishinaabeg in 1665: 
 After the creation of the earth, all the other animals withdrew into the places which each 
 kind found most suitable for obtaining therein their pasture or their prey. When the first 
 ones died, the Great Hare caused the birth of men from their corpses, as also from those 
 of the fishes which were found along the shores of the rivers which he had formed in 
 creating the land. …You will hear them say that their villages each bear the name of the 
 animal which has given its people their being – as that of the crane, or the bear, or of 
 other animals. They imagine that they were created by other divinities than those which 
 we recognize.
10
  
Johnston, in making her argument for the continued legal relevance of doodem identity, provides 
a translation of the comments of French cleric Abbé Thavenet, in his unpublished Algonquian 
grammar: 
 It is to be supposed that uniting as a nation, each family preserved its Manitou, the 
 animal which lives in the country from which it came, being the most beautiful or  the 
                                                 
8
 Susan Sleeper-Smith, in her overview of a series of considerations of White’s concept, notes that the 
term “has become so appealing that many scholars are guilty of turning every time and place of cultural 
encounter into a middle ground, transforming the phrase into an elusive metaphor for various forms of 
compromise,” in “Introduction” (2006) The William and Mary Quarterly 63(1) 3, at 4. 
 
9
 In his History of the Ojibway Nation (St. Paul MN: Minnesota Historical Society, 1885) at 41. Available 
online at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nnc1.0038846144.   
 
10
 In his The Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi Valley and Region of the Great Lakes, vol. I, Emma 
Helen Blair, ed. (Cleveland: A.H. Clark, 1911) at 37. Accessed online at http://solomon.eena. 
alexanderstreet.com/cgi-bin/asp/philo/getobject.pl?c.324:2:3.eena, accessed 5 April 2014. 
 
124 
 
 best friend of man, or the most feared, or the most common; the animal which it 
 ordinarily hunted and from which it got its usual nourishment &c.; that this animal 
 became the distinctive mark of each family, and that each family transmitted it to its 
 posterity for being the perpetual symbol of each tribe. One  must therefore – when 
 speaking of a tribe – designate it by the animal which is the symbol. 11 
The American anthropologist A. Irving Hallowell employed the term “other-than-human 
persons” to stand for the range of powerful beings influencing the Anishinaabe world, such as 
those Abbé Thavenet described.
12
 The term remains in wide scholarly use today. As Bohaker, 
and the Anishinaabe historians Stark, Johnston and Witgen, have all detailed, the fundamental 
form of political identity among Anishinaabeg up into the late 19
th
 century was that derived from 
odoodemag relations with other-than-human persons. These relations structured life at the village 
level, though they also extended across Anishinaabe territories, creating kinship ties among 
villages sharing the same other-than-human ancestors, and extending these ties to others, whether 
strangers or former enemies. Drawing on Max Weber’s discussion of charisma in her study of 
Anishinaabe leadership in 19
th
 century western Great Lakes communities, Anishinaabe historian 
Cary Miller demonstrates the interrelationship of religious, legal and familial authority at the 
village level. She notes that ogimaag, leaders, while often possessing an inherited source of 
legitimacy, typically augmented this by also manifesting charismatic connections with 
odoodemag progenitors: other-than-human manidoog. Thus gift exchange, the extension of real 
                                                 
11
 Abbe Jean-Baptiste Thavenet "Grammaire Algonquin" (1819) unpublished manuscript, quoted in 
Johnston supra p. 122 n. 6, at 54-55. 
 
12
 See his “Ojibwa Behavior, Ontology and Worldview,” first published in 1960, in Contributions to 
Ojibwe Studies: Essays, 1934-1972 (eds.) Jennifer S.H. Brown and Susan Elaine Gray (Lincoln NB: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2010) at 538. 
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and fictive kinship ties, and the sharing of resources, were all seen as obligatory requirements for 
social relations grounded in odoodemag.
13
 
 
To invoke the continuity across generations provided by odoodemag relations, Anishinaabeg 
deployed pictographs of their clan progenitors in a variety of settings across the Great Lakes 
region, doing so for a variety of purposes. Of often great antiquity, the doodem symbols remain 
visible on the landscape today, deployed across the Laurentian Plateau. As well, these pictures 
were often deployed on their bodies, on material possessions, and at burial sites.
14
 Here, 
however, I only want to highlight what several scholars imply about the discursive function of 
these pictures as embodied specifically on treaty texts. Bohaker’s study of over one hundred 
treaty texts from the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, treaties convened with French, English, US and 
                                                 
13
 Ogimaag: Anishinaabeg Leadership, 1760-1845 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010). As she 
puts it:  
 The gifts exchanged between human beings and manidoog were mirrored in the social lives of 
 Anishinaabeg people. Gifting was the cornerstone of kinship, and kinship organized society. 
 Gifting even served as a means to incorporate newcomers into the community. If an individual, 
 family, or community could not  establish some form of real or fictive kinship, then social 
 interaction could not take place, much less trade, and the outsider would be treated as potentially 
 hostile to the individual or community (ibid. at 32). 
Miller traces the combinations of charismatic and inherited authority, undergirding what she describes as 
the three overlapping forms of religious, military and civil (my term) leadership effective within the 
various doodemag. Whatever their leadership role, she notes, all ogimaag relied on performative means of 
establishing connections to manidoog, through tobacco, feasts, songs, dances and Midewiwin 
ceremonials, see ibid. at 114-15. 
 
14
 Ontario archaeologist Jon Nelson relates his conversations with Lac La Croix First Nation elders 
regarding the need to protect sacred doodem pictographs in Quetico: Near to Nature’s Heart (Toronto: 
Dundurn, 2009) at 82. Anthropologist John L. Creese elaborates the complex set of relations with other-
than-human beings inscribed across the landscape of the Canadian shield, in “Algonquian Rock Art and 
the Landscape of Power” (2011) Journal of Social Archaeology 11(1) 3. The Online Cree dictionary notes 
that these totemic figures, known as pawakanak in Northern Cree, are encountered in dreams, and bestow 
spiritual power on individuals and communities. See <http://www.creedictionary.com/search/index.php? 
q=pawakan&scope=1&cwr=7225> accessed 16 April 2014. See Bohaker supra p. 122 n. 7, at 137, for 
Champlain's observations of the care Anishinaabe individuals took in personal adornment evoking 
doodem identities. See Johnston supra p. 122 n. 6, at 94-101 for the prevalence of doodem symbols at 
burial sites. 
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Canadian authorities – as well as on a variety of petitions to the US and Canadian governments – 
demonstrates the widespread practice of ogimaag employing pictographs of odoodemag identity 
in order to establish legally binding representations of community consent.  
 
Johnston and Bohaker both focus primarily on establishing that doodem identities were 
historically central to the treaty relationships forged between Anishinaabe and colonial/settler 
state parties. Both of these authors, as well as Miller, hint at, though they don't really explore, 
what strikes me as a performative dimension operative in the doodem pictographs. Bohaker 
refers to them as "iconic," though without really explaining her use of the term. However, she is 
most interested in demonstrating that they functioned historically as a form of identity-conferring 
writing: symbols bearing information, exchanged with others, "a rich, highly developed and 
complex Great Lakes public communication system."
15
 Johnston demonstrates this identity-
conferral in referring to the practice of Credit River chief, Methodist minister, and her great-great 
grandfather, Peter Kegedonce Jones, who signed treaties with a pictograph of his Otter doodem, 
rather than his Christian name.
16
 For Johnston, the employment of such a pictograph also links a 
visual symbol with a community's history, embodying a narrative history that is more significant 
than the individuals who made such pictures. As she notes: "Aboriginal people understand their 
stories have a power independent of the teller, as do the marks, independent of their maker."
17
 
This would seem to underscore Bohaker's use of "iconic," though it also remains undeveloped. 
                                                 
15
 For "iconic," see supra p. 122 n. 6, at 7. For "public communication," see ibid. at 146. See also, her 
“Reading Anishinaabe Identities: Meaning and Metaphor in Nindoodem Pictographs” (2010) 
Ethnohistory 57(1) 11.  
 
16
 Johnston supra p. 122 n. 6, at 62. 
 
17
 Ibid. at 108. 
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From a discourse perspective, I think the employment of doodem pictures on middle ground 
treaty texts suggests an even-stronger framing of their function within legally significant acts of 
treaty-making than Johnston, Bohaker, or Miller, provide. The Anishinaabe literary scholar 
Niigonwedom James Sinclair comes much closer, in his discussion of doodem markings as 
bagijiganan: offerings, or gifts.
18
 As he indicates (and as I quote at some length), doodem 
markings established the treaties as broad, Anishinaabe-defined relationships:  
 Signing using Nindoodemag meant that Anishinaabeg were not just “agreeing” to  a set of 
 legal arrangements over territory (and sometimes even that is questionable, considering 
 certain barriers of language and political interests), but were also introducing Europeans 
 to Anishinaabeg ways and introducing newcomers to the world they were entering – one 
 full of relationships and agreements in the interests of sharing and reciprocity. Markings 
 of Nindoodemag were not only statements of power and collectivity but narratives given 
 to Europeans from dynamic, innovative, and political communities intended to teach 
 them about the relationships they were joining. The issue, as it stands in many 
  scholarly characterizations of treaty exchanges, is that it is often thought that it  
 was Europeans who were “modernizing” Indians when it is equally possible that it 
 was the other way around. Considering these exchanges as two-way venues where 
 communication, discourse, and ideas were traded illustrates more what these 
 arrangements actually were: the joining together of peoples and their languages. This 
 does not mean power and subjectivities were not at work, for they  undoubtedly were. It 
 is that often the Indian side of these arrangements are thought to be without voice – or in 
 a whisper – when this approach ignores the obvious evidence at hand.19  
 
In terms of the tasks of discourse, I think we can follow Sinclair in concluding that Anishinaabeg  
placing doodem symbols within treaty texts did more than simply mark their consent or 
submission to terms asserted in French or English. The symbols functioned performatively for 
those who placed them. As he notes, "In essence, an Anishinaabeg carrying a doodem is 
                                                 
18
 "Nindoodemag Bagijiganan: a History of Anishinaabeg Narrative" (University of British Columbia, 
Ph.D. thesis, 2013). 
 
20
 Ibid. at 81, emphasis in original. 
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effectively that doodem.”20 They created promissory obligations, established possibilities of 
relationships, and gave access to a world containing opportunities for what Habermas would call 
processes of “mutual learning,” and that Sinclair speaks of as invitations to share in Anishinaabe 
"offering."
21
 As such, it may well be that their deepest functions would only have been most-
easily deciphered from within the framework of an Anishinaabe worldview, or, as Sinclair shows 
with respect to Nicholas Perrot – and who was present at the 1671 treaty ceremony at Sault Ste. 
Marie – someone long-familiar with that worldview.22 The literature is also stocked with 
examples of settler state officials deciding not to bother with the learning necessary to gain such 
familiarity. Bohaker, for instance, quotes Indian Department official, J.W. Keating, complaining 
to his superiors in 1843: “I had commenced by causing each Indian to make his totem but the 
amazing time each took would have taken two or three days from their numbers & so they 
merely touched the pen as white people unable to write,” and thus finding a legal equivalence in 
                                                 
20
 Ibid. at 81, emphasis in original. 
21
 This opportunity for mutual learning was also often rejected in the name of settler party “civilizing” 
aims. As Bohaker documents, the British and Americans in particular were most eager to replace 
collective doodem symbols with the use of individual Christian names or X-marks, supra p. 122 n. 6, at 
206-07. The French also were inclined to challenge the Anishinaabe symbolizations of animal-human 
bonds as defining of New World nexus of social-legal-environmental relationship possibilities. For a 
consideration of intersocietal, contested views of doodem-significant animals, see Benjamin Breen "The 
Elks Are Our Horses: Animals and Domestication in the New France Borderlands" ( 2013) Journal of 
Early American History 3(2) 181, at 189, where he notes that:  
The goal of la francisiation was thus to transform both American landscapes and  the humans and 
animals who inhabited them into not only societal, but also ecological and environmental analogs 
of France. Indians were to find fixed habitations, to cease to 'keep things in common', and to 
adopt Old World patterns of resource management, animal husbandry and agriculture. One of the 
first steps toward achieving these goals was the abandonment of long-held [Anishinaabe] 
attitudes towards animals and the embrace of European models of animal possession. 
Mississauga Anishinaabe scholar Leeane Simpson discusses her elders’ understanding of clan-based 
treaty-relationships as conducted not only with human communities, but with animal “nations” as well. 
See her “Looking after Gdoo-naaganinaa” supra p. 110 n. 38. 
 
22
 Sinclair supra p. 127 n. 18, at 71. 
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such different forms of inscription sufficient to erase the specific performance basis of the 
doodem symbols.
23
  
 
I draw from this too-brief historical survey several conclusions. Like many other aspects of 
indigenous legal orders, Anishinaabe participation in treaty-making was performance-based, in 
continuity with long-standing doodem practices of legal significance: the framing of communal 
identities, the extension of kinship-networks, the making of alliances, and the forging of 
promissory agreements. These performative, worldview-centered practices, as Johnston, 
Bohaker, Stark and Witggen demonstrate, were initially regarded favourably enough by settler 
parties (that is, enough for them to undertake treaty negotiations), even when their full 
significance was not understood.  However, over the course of the 19
th
 century (a point I have 
not elaborated on) they came under increasing pressure from settler-state forces, who viewed 
them as legally inadequate to their own aims of “governmentality,”24 of incorporating indigenous 
peoples within the range of settler-state administrative bodies and domestic law.  
 
This accounting of the history dovetails readily enough with the critical assumptions that figures 
such as Tully share with Henderson and Battiste, and with other indigenous authors who 
demonstrate the legally-significant gulf between indigenous and Euro-centered worldviews, and 
question Canada’s ability to engage fairly with indigenous nations in healing lingering impacts 
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 Bohaker supra p. 122 n. 6, at 205.  
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 Michael Asch offers a brief reading of Foucault’s concept in relation to indigenous/settler state relations 
within Canada, in “Governmentality, State Culture and Indigenous Rights” (2007) Anthropologica 49(2) 
281. Michael Coyle’s work has long offered an insightful analysis of the working of power within the 
common law, although without relying on the Foucauldian language favoured by Tully and others. See, 
for instance, his “Negotiating Indigenous Peoples' Exit from Colonialism: the Case for an Integrative 
Approach” (2014) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 27(1) 283. 
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of its colonial legacy. As these authors point out, Canada’s frequent dismissal of the legal 
significance of indigenous performance-based practices has continued into the present era.  
 
B. Norms of Discourse in the Great Peace of Montréal 
What I believe is distinctive about Habermas’s discourse theory, is that it offers a way to get 
beyond these power-charged gaps between worldviews, by highlighting the different levels of 
discursive functioning operating within practical environments, such as within the intersocietal 
domain of treaty-making found in North America. One treaty text that seems to be especially 
instructive from a discourse theory perspective is that recording the 1701 agreement sometimes 
known as “La Grande Paix de Montréal.”25 The treaty largely ended the century-long warfare 
between the French, their many allies, and the Haudenosaunee league, and also ensured 
Haudenosaunee neutrality with respect to conflicts between the French and the English. 
Historian Gilles Havard notes how the text represents a "syncretic product of French-Native 
diplomacy" blending both French and indigenous traditions of alliance formation. It contains a 
written French text, recording a speech delivered by Louis-Hector de Callière, Quebec’s 
governor general, as well as his signature and that of French witnesses. The text also includes 36 
pictographs, primarily doodem-based, of those indigenous nations concurring with the peace; 
and in a separate, concluding section, spoken responses to Callière’s speech from 18 of the 
indigenous representatives.
26
 Thus, in spite of the document’s construction in French, as well as 
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 As included in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, v 9, (ed.) John R. 
Broadhead (Albany: Weed, Parsons: 1855) at 722, the treaty is simply referred to as “Ratification of the 
Peace between the French and the Indians.” Accessed online, 5 May 2014, from Library of Congress, 
archive.org. 
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 The actual number of distinct groups joining the treaty through these inscriptions remains disputed. The 
text in the Broadhead collection, ibid. at 725, refers to 38 “nations.” Bohaker reads the inscriptions as 
clearly indicating 20 separate doodemag  political entities, supra. p. 122 n. 6, at 84; while Havard claims 
131 
 
its clear recording of Callière’s effort to constrain the agreement in ways that would achieve 
French dominance, the text remains deeply reflective of indigenous protocols.
27
 Considering the 
text at a performative level, and bearing in mind Sinclair’s fuller rendition of how doodem 
symbols have functioned in general within Anishinaabe communities, it seems fair to say that 
what makes the 1701 treaty binding for the indigenous parties is the crucial role of the doodem 
inscriptions. They extend bonds of fictive kinship to the French, and one might even think from 
Anishinaabeg to the Haudenosaunee as well. They invite former enemies to share in a common 
world. 
 
This performative establishment of legitimacy, however, raises a crucial question about the 
relation between the doodem inscriptions and the subsequent speeches from the various 
indigenous leaders. If the French-language transcriptions of the speeches record sufficiently the 
gist of the leaders’ statements, what discursive purposes did they serve? Perhaps the French 
understood the speeches to comprise the substantive core of the agreement, and the inscriptions 
to serve as marks of authority. Bohaker maintains that the doodem inscriptions are similar to the 
European use of wax or lead seals, which also conveyed authoritative identity, and, she notes, 
may have been familiar to indigenous leaders who had observed French practices, or likewise 
been viewed as such by the French.
28
 If so, then it is likely that the various parties each pointed 
                                                                                                                                                             
“almost 40.” See his The Great Peace of Montreal of 1701: French-Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth 
Century (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001) at 4.   
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 In terms of colonists’ frequent rhetorical efforts to establish their dominance over indigenous 
communities, scholars often note that the language of extended kinship employed in these intersocietal 
alliances entailed significant gaps between French and indigenous views of the father figure and his 
inherent authority. See, for instance Havard, ibid. at 30, and White supra p. 119 n. 2, at 142-43.  
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 Bohaker supra p. 122 n. 7, at 202.  
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to the wrong indicator of what the other parties had aimed to convey with their agreement, a 
point that would underscore White’s ironic characterization of the middle ground as a zone of 
misunderstanding.  
 
Or, perhaps they were seen by either the French or their indigenous treaty partners as translations 
of the “offerings” conveyed in the doodem inscriptions. While this could perhaps be inferred on 
the part of the French, I doubt it is fair to the indigenous participants. Given what Bohaker and 
Sinclair, and the other Anishinaabe historians I mention above, have indicated about the 
culturally deep-seated assumptions regarding doodem inscriptions prevalent among 
Anishinaabeg generally, it seems unlikely that the indigenous Montreal treaty participants would 
have agreed with the claim that the significance of the inscriptions were adequately conveyed in 
the various translated remarks. These remarks are notably thinner in content than that conveyed 
by the inscriptions, especially on Sinclair's reading of them. The remarks are largely confined to 
expressions of gratitude or loyalty to Callière, expressions of consent to the peace, mention of 
prisoners brought in exchange, and offerings of wampum “colliers” and calumets.  
 
If the remarks were not simply redundant to the formation of the peace, then I think they need to 
be viewed as functioning not at the performative, but rather at the pragmatic level of discourse.
29
 
Assuming the actual establishment of the peace through the performance nature of the 
inscriptions (not to mention the entire process – typical of indigenous treaty-making protocols – 
of feasting, gifting, speech-making and private conferences held over the two weeks proceeding), 
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 James Sákéj Henderson has characterized indigenous legal orders in a similar way, as grounded in 
traditions of both performance and dialogue. See his “Dialogical Governance: a Mechanism of 
Constitutional Governance” (2009) Saskatchewan Law Review 72(1) 29, at 71.  
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the remarks themselves must have served additional pragmatic purposes. They establish degrees 
of loyalty. They clarify terms of promise fulfillment. They enumerate the specifics of promise 
fulfillment. They critique the integrity of others, and identify their failures to fulfill obligations. 
In doing so, they also appear to reflect at least three pragmatic discursive expectations held on 
the parts of the various ogimaag who spoke, and – given their representative roles as orators – 
likely by their communities as well.
30
 
 
First, the remarks presumably rest on an implied expectation that agreements of this sort might 
be formed across linguistic or cultural fault lines – that the contents of pragmatic agreements 
could be translated sufficiently for the various parties gathered at Montréal to rely upon them. 
Thus, although contemporary indigenist and cultural theorists, such as those I referred to above, 
might want to highlight as incommensurable the gap limiting translation across cultures and 
worldviews, this particular episode of North American treaty history suggests that settler and 
indigenous parties shared a significant discursive expectation regarding the potential for 
achieving intersocietal pragmatic agreements. I am not able here to provide a broader range of 
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 Miller, in her study of Anishinaabe leadership within the Great Lakes region, notes that "[s]trong 
oratory was an important leadership skill in a consensus-based society that relied on verbal persuasion 
and interpreted eloquence as credibility," supra p. 125 n. 13, at 87. At the same time, she demonstrates 
how affective eloquence and charismatic influence were qualities bound by active forms of community 
consent. Thus leaders could only aim to persuade when they were regarded as credible to begin with. This 
dialogic structure of persuasion and consensus, she notes, accounts for both the large number of 
participants attending treaty conferences (at Montréal upwards of 1,000 Anishinaabeg were present) and 
the lengthy processes of consideration undertaken in search of consensus, ibid. at 103. She also refers to 
Basil Johnston’s characterization of this dialogical structure. As he puts it: “One of the prerogatives of a 
leader was to speak, but when speaking he did not purport or even presume to speak on behalf of his 
people without first seeking their guidance and their opinions upon the matters to be discussed. By 
deferring to custom and the will of the people the spokesman was seeking permission.” See Johnston 
supra p. 122 n. 7, at 79.  
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examples of this expectation, but believe it to have been widely-spread across North America.
31
 
This expectation has functioned despite the many obvious failures in practice, and despite the 
gaps in worldviews that have hindered colonial and settler state parties from typically 
recognizing, as Sinclair put it above, the obligations they have incurred from accepting the 
“offerings” extended, often performatively, from indigenous communities.  
 
Second, is the pragmatic expectation that giving consent and making promises of loyalty are 
verbally confirmable (that is, can be considered separately from, or in addition, to the 
performative acts of the doodem inscriptions). Thus, the majority of the remarks contain 
statements of consent such as that of the ogimaa of the Kiskakons, who said to Calliére: “I 
willingly subscribe to everything you have done.”32 Others offer pledges of loyalty, such as that 
of the Potawatomi Onanguisset: “I am always ready to obey even to the death,”33 or who, in also 
speaking for the Sauks, said “I am of one body with you, my father.”34   
 
Third, although featured less prominently within the treaty text than the statements of consensus 
and pledges of loyalty, the remarks also contain statements critical of the Haudenosaunee failure 
to bring their captives with them to exchange in Montréal. By the end of the seventeenth century, 
taking large numbers of captives had become a crucial feature of warfare in the Great Lakes 
                                                 
31
 The expanding investigations of specific legal orders, and of the histories of treaty-making, that 
indigenous scholars have been conducting in recent years will serve to confirm or refute my 
characterization of these discursive expectations as a general feature of intersocietal jurisgenesis in North 
America.  
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 Havard, supra p. 130 n. 26, at 211. 
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 Ibid. at 213. 
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region, conducted under the additional pressures of epidemics and fur trade competition. Havard 
refers to the estimate of Pierre François Xavier de Charlevoix, the Jesuit historian of New 
France, who concluded that by the 1660s two thirds of the Haudenosaunee population had 
originally been taken as captives.
35
 Accordingly, Calliére’s aim of achieving peace through the 
return of captives posed additional problems, especially for Haudenosaunee communities worn 
down by the region’s long-running conflicts. Although those French-allied parties with captives 
largely brought them to Montréal, the Haudenosaunee demurred. 
 
The remarks thus include statements from ogimaag criticizing the Haudenosaunee, as well as 
their responses justifying the failure to comply. Recorded in the text as the first of the indigenous 
leaders to speak, the unspecified Haudenosaunee representative (this would have been one of the 
three pro-French Seneca spokesmen: Tekanoet, Aouenano or Tonatakout) acknowledged the 
discrepancy between the agreement to return prisoners, and their failure to comply. “[W]e assure 
you, by these four collars [wampum belts], that we will comply with everything you have 
arranged; we are presenting you with two prisoners here with us, and we shall return the others 
that we have.”36 However, their failure to bring indigenous captives in any number nearly 
thwarted the agreement, and many of the French allies expressed their outrage. Kondiaronk, the 
influential Wendat leader, spoke early in the conference:  
 We obeyed you [referring to Calliére’s call for a prisoner exchange]. . . . Let us see at the 
 same time see if the Iroquois obey you, and how many they have brought back of our 
 nephews who were taken since the beginning of the war . . . If they have done so, it is a 
                                                 
35
 Ibid. at 49. 
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 Ibid. at 119 and 212. Havard notes that tensions between three principal factions within the league: the 
pro-French, the pro-English, and those favouring neutrality towards the colonial powers, were only 
partially resolved at the time of the treaty conference in Montréal, ibid. at 91-93. 
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 mark of their sincerity; if they have not done so, they are dishonest. I know, however, that 
 they have not brought any . . . they have deceived us.”37  
While the remarks within the treaty text do not go nearly as far in condemning the 
Haudenosaunee as did those of Kondiaronk, the suspicion of Haudenosaunee intentions and 
disappointment at their failure remains. Most directly spoken are the remarks of the “Salteur” 
Crane doodem ogimaa, Ouabangué:  
 You sent us a collar three years ago to invite us to make peace with you. We sent you one 
 in return. We also give you this one to tell you that we have laboured for that goal. We 
 ask no more than that it be lasting. Do also for your part what needs to be done for the 
 peace.
38
 
 
The other comments are more indirect, such as the words of Outoutagan, ogimaa of the 
Michilimakinac Odawas: “I ask you my father with this collar that the Iroquois release to me my 
flesh that is in their country.”39 This request, and others that simply mention the various 
speakers’ offerings of wampum and calumets to the Haudenosaunee delegation, may all employ 
the discursive practice of indirect shaming in order to highlight the Haudenosaunee failure and to 
urge their compliance. Even in such a form, however, they would still proceed from a necessary 
discursive expectation that actions can be subjected to scrutiny, and indicate a confidence that 
pragmatic discourse can serve the critical function of distinguishing across language and cultural 
gaps between promissory obligations upheld and obligations neglected. 
 
If this is a fair depiction of the discursive expectations held on the parts of indigenous treaty-
makers at Montréal, that is, expectations of pragmatically worthwhile translatability, of the 
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possibility of giving consent and making promises, and of providing critical responses to failures 
to uphold obligations, how do they compare with those expectations elaborated in Habermas’s 
discourse theory? As I noted above, Tully thinks Habermas’s version of discourse norms is likely 
to weigh more in favour of settler state parties. As Habermas himself casts these norms:      
Anyone who seriously engages in argumentation must presuppose that the context of 
discussion guarantees in principle freedom of access, equal rights to participate, 
truthfulness on the part of participants, absence of coercion in adopting positions, and so 
on. If the participants genuinely want to convince one another, they must make the 
pragmatic assumption that they allow their “yes” and “no” responses to be influenced 
solely by the force of the better argument.
40
  
 
I see no necessary reason why the norms from the 1701 Montréal treaty should be thought to 
conflict with, or even worse – to wind up being sabotaged by, Habermas’s own characterization 
of the norms of pragmatic discourse.  
 
Instead, I think they can be adjusted to fit closely enough to make discourse theory useful in the 
context of assessing indigenous interactions with settler state legal regimes. Habermas’s norm of 
“equality” in access and rights to participate in discourse seems to have no clear parallel among 
those I have derived from the ogimaag remarks, and therefore might be the most obviously 
troublesome to reconcile. However, the intuition supporting the equality norm is that of personal 
autonomy. Given the treaty basis for relations between indigenous and settler parties in the 
colonial era, the equality norm can be seen to express a fundamental intuition of all indigenous 
parties to treaties: that they were autonomous communities, equal in ‘sovereignty’ (admittedly, 
another slippery term) to the settler powers. This was apparent in Montréal, in spite of Calliére’s 
efforts to assert French dominance. Treaty-making protocols typically emphasized this equality 
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of discourse between the representatives of the various parties, as Mark Walters, John Borrows 
and Sákéj Henderson have all emphasized in their histories of colonial era jurisprudence.
41
  
 
One might respond to this by casting Habermas’s norm as an expression of liberal, individualist 
equality, which if employed as regulative within a discursive situation involving indigenous 
parties would have the effect of delegitimizing the very structures of traditional authority that 
operated collectively in the historical treaty-making context.
42
 I think, however, that this 
important concern can also obscure two points. First, the norm of equality of discourse readily 
coheres with common discursive practices operative within indigenous communities, in which all 
individuals concerned are typically free to speak, or be represented, creating the conditions of 
what Miller (referring to Great Lakes Anishinaabeg) calls "consensus-based society."
43
 Second, 
the liberal presumption that troubles Christie and Turner miscasts the scenario of consultation by 
presuming the state-level legitimacy of whatever administrative body might be conducting 
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Walters argues that despite the colonial mentality, a better line of treaty interpretation, reflecting the 
British acknowledgement of indigenous sovereignty, was reflected in Sir William Johnson’s 1764 Two 
Row Wampum agreement at Niagara. As he notes:  
 Sir John Johnson seemed to share his father's views of the treaty relationship. For example, when 
 he was criticized in 1824 for not ordering the Kahnawake Mohawk chiefs to meet with their 
 Indian Department agent, he stated: On this subject I think it necessary to remind you, that the 
 Indians have been always considered by His Majesty's Government as Allies, and not as Vassels; 
 and under all the circumstances of the case, I could not feel myself Justified in Commanding 
 the Chiefs to attend upon W. Doucet, when it is evidently his duty to attend upon  them.  
See Walters’ “Brightening the Covenant Chain: Aboriginal Treaty Meanings in Law and History after 
Marshall” (2001) Dalhousie Law Journal 24(1) 75. See also Henderson’s “First Nations Legal 
Inheritances” in Canada: the Míkmaq Model” (1995) Manitoba Law Journal 23(1) 1, and Borrows, supra 
p. 110 n. 38.  
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Supra p. 125 n. 13, at 103. The complicated question of whether consensus describes either discursive 
practices or ideals within indigenous legal orders is more than I can address here. I note that Mohawk 
anthropologist Audra Simpson favours terms such as “refusal” or dissensus to characterize crucial 
functions of public discourse within Mohawk circles, as well as with settler state forces, and dismisses 
ethnographic tendencies to valorize tradition and consensus as forces shaping Iroquoian ‘culture.’ See her 
“On Ethnographic Refusal: Indigeneity, ‘Voice’ and Colonial Citizenship” (2007) Junctures 9(1) 67.  
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hearings, reviews, or tribunals. It also undervalues the participation of indigenous parties as 
amounting to only special interests or collections of individuals, and hence, disregards the 
representative legitimacy of all parties. Given the adjustments to Habermas's position that I 
recommended above, which incorporate the necessary collective standing of treaty parties into 
the model of an 'ideal' discourse situation, we could see the equality norm as being a key 
embodiment of appropriate treaty protocol. 
 
The other norms are more easily reconcilable. What I have characterized as the Montréal norm of 
pragmatic translatability, in which party A’s conviction can be sufficiently transferred across a 
linguistic or cultural gap to become understandable to party B, obviously shares in the 
expectation of truthfulness. Without that expectation, there would be no reason to assume that a 
translated conviction, aim or need could reflect the conviction, aim or need actually held by party 
A. Further, the expectation of non-coercion shares with the Montréal expectation of consent-
giving and promise-making the necessary assumption that parties are freely able to form 
conclusions and make agreements reflecting their basic understandings.  
 
Finally, both the norm of responding solely to the better argument and the norm of being able to 
critically assess the holding of promises require the assumption that pragmatic discourse is 
capable of being sufficiently rational to make assessments of the worth of arguments and the 
consistency of words and actions. This assumption of a common rational potential to the conduct 
of pragmatic intersocietal discourse received voice in Montréal in the words of the Kahnawake 
representative, L'Aigle, who said in response to Calliére’s proposals: 
 All your views are so just and so reasonable, that one would have to not be a man  to 
 refuse to submit to them. You must therefore believe that neither the diversity of the 
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 many languages they speak, nor their particular interests and resentments,  will by any 
 means be an obstacle to the proper understanding in which you order them to live 
 together in the future.
44
 
 
L’Aigle’s regard for a common ability to engage in rational reflection occurs widely throughout 
the speeches of indigenous speakers in treaty conferences during the period, though it remains 
beyond my scope to survey the philosophical commitments evident within this oratorical 
tradition. A critic operating out of a post-colonial or post-modernist perspective might dismiss 
such statements as an ironic reflection of Enlightenment era “noble savage” discourse.45 I would 
only note that the same appeal to common rationality appears among contemporary indigenous 
legal and political theorists. Seneca scholar John Mohawk, for instance, describes 
Haudenosaunee legal order as grounded in just such assumptions. As he portrays the tradition: 
  [T]he Peacemaker was required to convince a very skeptical audience that all 
 human  beings really did possess the potential for rational thought, that when encouraged 
 to use rational thought they would inevitably seek peace and the belief in the principles 
 would inevitably lead to the organized enactment of the vision. 
  The test of this thinking is found in the converse of the argument. If you do not 
 believe in the rational nature of the human being, you cannot believe that you can 
 negotiate with  him. If you do not believe that rational people ultimately desire peace, you 
 cannot  negotiate confidently with him toward goals you and he share. If you cannot 
 negotiate with him, you are powerless to create peace. If you cannot argue around those 
 beliefs, the principles cannot move from the minds of men into the actions of society.
46
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 In their study of the pitfalls of the BC treaty process, sociologists Andrew Woolford and R.S. Ratner 
characterize in Habermasian terms what they refer to as “Aboriginal rationalism.” Although noting the 
congruence between discourse theory and the position adopted by several BC First Nations’ negotiating 
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favour of legal challenges and protest actions. Given the prominence of both legal action and protest 
within Habermas’s own understanding of public sphere discourse, however, their dismissal of the theory’s 
relevance to the stances of indigenous BC treaty parties may well be premature. See their “A Measured 
Sovereignty: the Politics of Nation-Making in British Columbia” (2004) The Canadian Journal of Native 
Studies 24(2) 283 at 296. 
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 Mohawk, “Origins of Iroquois Political Thought” in Joseph Brucha (ed.) New Voices from the 
Longhouse: an Anthology of Contemporary Iroquois Writing (Greenfield Center NY: Greenfield Review, 
1989), at 221. Other proponents of disengagement with the sec. 35(1) legal regime in Canada include the 
late Patricia Monture-Argus. Monture-Argus, also referencing John Mohawk, makes an argument for 
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Even Gerald Taiaiake Alfred's contemporary call for militant ethnic nationalism, and a 
resurgence of his Mohawk warrior tradition in rejection of a potential intersocietal legal order in 
Canada, draws on sufficiently similar assumptions about discourse and communication to 
indicate a parallel (though admittedly unacknowledged) set of concerns with Habermas.
47
 Alfred 
portrays his warriors as engaged in verbal struggles over the legitimacy of continued colonial 
rule, noting that “[l]egitimation (acceptance and support for colonial institutions) is the 
fundamental battlefield.”48 The colonial state’s alternative to violence is a structure of authority 
so pervasive it sinks into the inner lives of the subjugated. Thus when indigenous people accept 
the legitimacy of colonial rule, they are succumbing to the designs of colonial forces.
49
 As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, the question of legitimacy is also central to Habermas’s 
discourse theory. It would be a weak reading of that theory not to note that even despite their 
apparent differences on the usefulness of law (differences that I don’t think would really hold up, 
though I won’t pursue them here), that both Habermas and Alfred conceive legitimacy as 
something established through communicative action, that is, through critical public discourse; 
that they both highlight the role of creative non-violence or civil disobedience as communicative 
                                                                                                                                                             
communication across the lines of colonial society that entail expectations about discourse that would 
correspond to those within Habermas’s work. “When the world is looked at in a holistic way, everyone’s 
opinion carries with it a similar weight. The way voice is legitimated in Aboriginal society is vastly 
different from that of the societies that settled here [Canada].” See her Journeying Forward, supra p. 106 
n. 30, at 42. 
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 Alfred depicts his indigenous warrior figure as fulfilling a primarily communicative role. To do this, he 
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legitimacy, see his Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom (Peterborough ON: Broadview, 
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Power” (1977) Social Research 44(1) 3. 
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efforts; and that they both conceive communicative power as an effort to deploy claims about 
truth in the public sphere.   
 
Another point of similarity is in the norm of unfettered honesty that Habermas says must 
function as a marker of genuine communication aiming to establish the truth of some state of 
affairs in the world. It is hard to imagine Alfred holding that such a norm should be dismissed as 
a residue of colonial traditions. He appears to invoke this same norm when he says that warriors 
must communicate the truth, and that the test of whether the truth is spoken is whether the 
speaking took courage. Like Habermas, he regards language-use oriented to the truth as a critical 
force, a danger to the vested interests of colonialism’s beneficiaries, because such words and 
ideas are “convincing in their logic and so grounded in social, cultural and political reality that 
there is imminent possibility of their affecting and shaping the actions of people:”  
 Words can, in fact, be powerful shocks to the system and are capable of causing people to 
 rethink their identity and their place within colonialism. But if they are to be powerful 
 enough to cause crises in the contradictory consciousness of the colonized individual, the 
 words must be dangerous and must push people outside the bounds of their comfort zone 
 and beyond acceptability. The test of whether one's words are contentious in this sense is 
 this question: How much guts does it take to say what you are thinking and to be who you 
 are?
50
   
While advocating his disruptive “strategy of contention,” he also draws a clear line between the 
symbolic, communicative action he proposes as the tool for warriors, and violence: 
 [W]hat I am acknowledging is that peace and harmony are only possible if we take 
 the possibility of contention to its limit. That limit is reached by developing a 
 renewed sense of pride in bold and serious disruptions of the status quo. Reaching 
 that limit is only possible if we discipline ourselves to reject the promotion of 
 offensive violence as the means of advancing our struggle; if we commit to using  words, 
 symbols and direct non-violent action as the offensive weapons of our fight on a 
 battlefield that is the critical juncture of contention and conflict; if we push disruptive 
 direct action tactics right up to the point that they will become a means of violent attack 
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 upon our adversaries … we should have faith in the power of our ideas and in our ability 
 to communicate our ideas without resorting  to the mute force of violence to bring our 
 message to people. We should seek to contend, to inform our agitating direct actions with 
 ideas, and to use the effects of this contention to defeat colonialism by convincing people 
 of the need to  abandon the cycle of subjugation and conflict and join us in a relationship 
 of respect and sharing.
51
  
 
Alfred’s mixture of communication terms with obviously power-laden terms –  using words “as 
offensive weapons” on a “battlefield,” and his drawing inspiration from Ghandi’s non-violent, 
truth-laden, strategic campaign against British colonialism, is instructive when set next to 
Habermas’s own acknowledgement of power and language-use: “the unforced force of the better 
argument.”52 Though Alfred here sounds consistent with Foucauldian political visions, one might 
ask how these powerful words and symbols are supposed to be effective in confronting Canada’s 
legal/political order, and its citizen beneficiaries. Not through violence, which he renounces, and 
not through preaching to the converted, since he frames this strategic discourse as able to 
convince “people [that is, non-indigenous people] of the need to abandon the cycle of 
subjugation and conflict and join us in a relationship of respect and sharing.” The “power of our 
ideas,” if with Arendt the ideas are not expressions of violence; must be an analogy for their 
truth.
53
 It seems sufficient to me to note that this assumption of an ability to communicate truth 
regarding the legacy of colonialism across a Canadian social divide fraught with fear, suspicion 
                                                 
51
 Ibid. at 77. 
 
52
 See Allen supra p. 93 n. 6.  
 
53
 In German, as in English, the concept of “power” is deeply ambiguous. Though German employs 
Macht for power and Gewalt for violence (or force), Habermas notes that Arendt reserves Weber’s 
definition of power, as the ability to impose unimpeded a will on others, for violence itself. See her 
complaint against English-language ambiguities regarding power, force, violence and authority in On 
Violence (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1970), at 43-46. For Habermas’s reading of the Weber/Arendt 
disagreement, see supra p. 141 n. 47, at 3. For a discussion of the problems descending from English 
translations of Weber’s concept of power, see Isidor Walliman, et al “Misreading Weber: the Concept of 
‘Macht’” (1980) Sociology 14(2) 261. 
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and outbursts of violence, is on a close par with Habermas’s own view of truth as an anticipatory 
ideal for the conduct of public discourse focused on assuring the legitimacy of legality. 
 
A final point in comparing norms of discourse might arise even if one does detect important 
differences between Habermasian assumptions and those contained within the discursive 
practices of indigenous communities. I am not claiming that such practices could be best 
understood as entailing Habermasian norms, that is, within historical or social contexts that 
might be termed 'pre-contact' or 'traditional.' Instead, I am only concluding that the expectations, 
norms or conditions of ideal discourse as glossed here would be ones that indigenous parties 
engaged in intersocietal, legally-significant dialogue situations, such as treaty-formation and 
consultation, would likely regard as capable of insuring just and reasonable outcomes, and 
therefore, norms worthy of respect.   
 
What discourse theory helps us see is that intersocietal public discourse as developed between 
settler and indigenous parties in North America often functions at two levels. Thus, it includes 
within the range of legally significant discourse communication that is performative in nature, 
and can encourage us to acknowledge that rational legitimacy arises out of such performances. 
Included within this range of the performative would also be discourse that is affective rather 
than linear and propositional. Habermas’s critics on the left have generally argued that he 
dismisses the significance of these aspects of communication. I am arguing, as have others, that 
it is more the case that he has avoided rather than dismissed these aspects, and that discourse 
theory grounded in legitimacy through consent must give a strong affirmation to the potential 
legal significance carried in such forms of communication. However, it seems precipitous to 
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limit the legal significance of indigenous communicative acts to their performative basis, when it 
seems clear that the modes of oratory, and the models of treaty negotiation, historically practiced 
in North America took great care to engage in pragmatic uses of discourse as well.  
 
The intersocietal context of legal discourse requires attention to pragmatic concerns. This is not a 
sleight of hand colonial trick. Any performance in any context can require supplementation 
through a turn to the pragmatic. To do more than clap or hoot in response to a powerful musical 
performance requires those of us listening to speak, to compare impressions, to inquire into what 
seemed murky, and to defend our impressions when they are challenged. In the same way, 
indigenous and settler parties were compelled to turn to the pragmatic when the performance-
based legitimacy of their assumptions regarding legal obligations required clarification, or were 
challenged, in situations involving other parties not sharing those performance practices. This is 
not to say that the performances were insignificant, or irrelevant to a rational establishment of 
legal obligation. 
 
The reason these performances are intersocietally significant as legal discourse, and not simply 
within a given community, is that their function as what Sinclair called bagijiganan, “offerings” 
is the inevitable discursive basis of legal legitimacy. The reason to accept another group’s 
performance-based discourse is because it raises the jointly resolvable question of what sort of 
relationship are we going to produce here, and how do we find agreement on what will make that 
relationship binding? These questions will likely entail pragmatic reflection, though not of the 
sort considered rational by Justice McEachern in Delgamuukw (1991). Instead, as Habermas 
argues, pragmatic discourse is grounded in the continually necessary, and legally significant, 
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question of how we ought to address the task of establishing and maintaining social solidarity. 
As I want to show in the next section, this is the question that Canada’s courts have said is at the 
heart of the duty to consult.   
 
To recap, I have argued in the last two chapters that although Habermas’s discourse theory is 
subject to limitations regarding his own efforts to reference indigenous peoples’ political and 
legal stances within modern liberal constitutional orders, these limitations are not inherent 
roadblocks to the use of his theory. I have tried to show that critiques of his work do not yield 
reasons to avoid him. I have also tried to show that an effort to acknowledge the distinctiveness 
of indigenous legal orders, characterized to a great extent (though certainly not exclusively) by 
their oral and performance base, still must recognize the need for pragmatic discourse in 
attempting to employ these orders within an intersocietal context. The treaty-making processes 
long practiced in North America, and likely in many more contexts than I am able to draw upon 
here, demonstrate the strong tendency of indigenous negotiators and representatives to refer to 
just the sorts of assumptions regarding legally significant discourse that Habermas has identified 
as necessary to employ in developing a just, pragmatically legitimate legal order. That such a 
legal order in North America must be an intersocietal legal order in order to justly deal with the 
longstanding claims of indigenous communities, is a conclusion that I believe Habermas would 
have to concur with. Accordingly, in the following chapters, I will examine Canada’s doctrine of 
the duty to consult and where necessary accommodate Aboriginal and treaty rights from the 
perspective of his theory. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Discourse Norms and the Duty to Consult: Narrative and Justification 
 
In Chapter 1, I laid out the ways in which the Supreme Court of Canada has constructed its 
doctrine of the duty to consult on the basis of a number of communicative practices. I suggested 
there that the strong reliance upon acts of communication to establish the nature of Aboriginal 
and treaty rights affirmed and recognized by the Constitution Act, 1982 was peculiar.
1
 In Chapter 
2 I outlined the themes in Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of law relevant to this discussion 
of the duty to consult. In Chapters 3 and 4 I then argued that limitations to discourse theory, and 
its perceived distance from what we might regard as some of the distinctive features of North 
American indigenous legal orders, should not be thought of as derailing it from usefully 
addressing law’s creative role in addressing relations between indigenous and settler 
communities in Canada.  
 
In this chapter and the next I want to lay out how I see discourse theory enabling a better view 
for regarding the duty to consult than we find generally deployed within Canada’s courtrooms 
and decision-making bodies, as well as across the complex whole of its public sphere. I would 
not conclude that the communicative preoccupation in envisioning Aboriginal rights and the duty 
to consult itself is mistaken, especially in light of the political failure on various fronts during the 
                                                 
1
 Although I won’t pursue this here, it might also be that this is part of the reason the courts have 
described them as sui generis. 
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1990s to provide them with a firmer shape. However, what I hope to demonstrate from the 
perspective of discourse theory is that a better understanding of this communicative 
preoccupation is possible; better in both a normative sense, and in the implications it would offer 
for improving the destructive situation facing indigenous and settler communities struggling over 
law in Canada.  
 
In my reading of SCC decisions in Chapter 1, I emphasized how the court has made use of 
various communicative practices in constructing the doctrine of the duty to consult. The court’s 
explanations of these practices constitute an intellectual scaffold, providing the duty to consult as 
a legal doctrine with what the court has regarded as its necessary and sufficient support. Key 
practices include: narrating the emergence of Aboriginal rights as a progressive story of Canada, 
framing the state as capable of offering satisfactory justifications for its infringements (including 
those of third parties) on Aboriginal and treaty rights, urging a national engagement with the task 
of reconciliation, and invoking a standard of the honour of the Crown. From the standpoint of 
discourse theory, while these practices may well be necessary in giving shape to the duty to 
consult, they are not sufficient as a form of communicative action – at least, as they remain 
framed within the courts’ opinions. I argue that their insufficiency as supports for the duty to 
consult stems from their weak construal of what is legally relevant about these particular acts of 
communication. They are all communicative practices that we might employ generally, and the 
courts have offered no gloss to their distinctive legal use. 
 
Each of these practices might readily be seen to entail at least two pragmatic assumptions, that is, 
assumptions about the communicative task the practice performs. When we offer a justification 
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of government decisions, say to renew a timber-cutting permit, to plot a winter road, or to tighten 
restrictions on fishing along a stretch of a given river, we assume that providing a rational 
justification of the renewal or restriction is actually possible. We must also assume that those 
who learn of the justification will find it rationally acceptable. Communication “oriented” 
towards mutual understanding, as Habermas puts it, requires us to make such assumptions. 
However, it might be that we really assume something else. Contrary to the first assumption, we 
might not believe that a rationally convincing justification is actually possible. Contrary to the 
second, we might doubt that those we communicate with regarding our justification can be 
rationally expected to find it credible. On Habermas’s account, the extent to which such an effort 
to justify a policy change or a new regulation actually stems from these two additional 
assumptions, would indicate that our communicative effort is less a form of “communicative 
action” than a form of “strategic action.” Granted, as his critics have pointed out, the absolute 
separation of communicative from strategic action may well be impossible to achieve within the 
real world, and in Chapter 2 I argued that these elements of discourse theory need to be regarded 
merely as ideal-types in the Weberian sense.  
 
As articulated in SCC decisions since 1990, the duty to consult still remains clouded with 
practical, political and legal difficulties. Practically, for First Nations, the federal government, 
and the provinces, the financial burdens associated with challenges to state and corporate action 
under the duty to consult are considerable. This is especially true for First Nations, which 
frequently lack the financial and administrative resources to respond adequately to consultation 
challenges.
2
 Politically, the seemingly perpetual position of First Nations seeking to defend 
                                                 
2
 Kaitlin Ritchie highlights three funding problems First Nations face in participating in consultation 
efforts: 1) Only four Canadian provinces currently have programs making funding available. 2) 
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treaty and Aboriginal rights through legal challenges to generally applicable regulations, to 
development projects threatening off-reserve traditional lands, to changes in federal and 
provincial policies affecting First Nations; are all generally met with suspicion and hostility from 
the Canadian public at large.
3
 Legally, despite more than twenty years of development, the duty 
to consult doctrine still carries ambiguities and implications that yield more occasion for conflict 
and challenge than it does clarity and security for protection of First Nations’ treaty and 
Aboriginal rights.
4
 From a discourse perspective, then, at a minimum the doctrine is difficult to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Agreements providing funding from corporations interested in development affecting First Nations 
remain voluntary. 3) Funds available under environmental assessment or other regulatory processes are 
only available to First Nations when the proposed action triggers the need for a broader assessment or 
review in accord with the mandate of departments or agencies, such as the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency. See her “Issues Associated with the Implementation of the Duty to Consult and 
Accommodate Aboriginal Peoples: Threatening the Goals of Reconciliation and Meaningful 
Consultation” (2013) University of British Columbia Law Review 46(2) 397, at 426-27. 
 
3
 To assess this by only one anecdotal measure, consider the webpage comments generally attached to any 
coverage of First Nations issues in the press. As Tiredofbeingovertaxed wrote following a July 2014 
Globe and Mail story on continued BC First Nations’ challenges to the Northern Gateway pipeline 
construction, “Let the endless extortion commence! Thanks supreme court, I can't wait to pay more for 
everything so the parasites can continue doing nothing.” Available at <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 
news/british-columbia/first-nations-challenge-northern-gateway-pipeline-in-new-court-action/ 
article19608617/comments> accessed 15 October 2014. Or, as Vancouverite Kenneth McGechen wrote in 
response to a December 2014 Vancouver Sun story about the federally unrecognized Hwlitsum First 
Nation’s land claim: “Stop this nonsense. This is almost becoming laughable. BC you are screwed. The 
government should grow some balls now or the lazy useless tax avoiding Indians will take them too!” 
<http://www.vancouversun.com/life/land+claim+seeks+massive+territory+South+Coast+including+Stanl
ey+Park/10431709/story.html> accessed 3 December 2014. 
 
4
 For instance, Janna Promislow highlights the growing tendency to relieve administrative tribunals and 
municipalities of obligations to consult, which she argues has the effect of making consultation less 
protective of First Nations interests than the “fundamental justice” available to all Canadians under sec. 7 
of the Charter. As she reads the impact of post-Hadia Nations jurisprudence:  
 [T]hrough critical points of departure from established administrative law principles, courts and 
 tribunals have narrowed tribunal jurisdiction in relation to the duty to consult relative to tribunal 
 jurisdiction over other constitutional matters. This narrowing permits governments and 
 legislatures to avoid the changes in administrative decision-making anticipated by Haida Nation 
 and arguably required to implement the duty to consult in a manner that is capable of promoting 
 reconciliation. 
In her casting of the impact of post-Haida Nation refinements of the duty to consult: “a decision maker's 
obligation to consult has potentially less legal content than a decision maker's obligation to decide in 
accordance with the requirements of procedural fairness, which in administrative law is treated as a 
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place along an ideal continuum of strategic/communicative action. If the duty to consult is to 
amount to something more than strategic action, that is, if it is to provide a wider sense of legal 
legitimacy, one that can genuinely contribute to ameliorating the long-damaged, essentially 
colonial relationship between Canada and First Nations and other indigenous communities, then 
clarifying how the practices entailed in the duty to consult approach the standard of Habermas’s 
discourse principle – “D” – would be worthwhile. Contrary to the views of his critics, who often 
see him imposing, Kant-like, universal standards of legitimacy so refined that only the angels 
might hope to pass their muster, I think that the discourse theory of law can be practically useful. 
In particular, it can indicate how an appropriate standard of legal legitimacy could be found or 
established either embedded within Canada’s institutions, or in concurrence with norms of 
discourse held by both courts and indigenous communities. Habermas’s discourse conception of 
legal legitimacy offers us a way to regard the duty to consult as a potential step towards a legal 
order that indigenous parties could find worth subscribing to, despite the evidence that Canada’s 
law has historically focused on cementing colonial power over indigenous communities and 
individuals. In what follows, then, I will address each leg of the duty to consult’s scaffold.    
 
To refresh, discourse theory distills into the principle that: “Just those action norms are valid to 
which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational [or practical] 
discourses.”5 Additional clarifications, the contributions of others more than Habermas himself, 
have stressed that D entails such pragmatic requirements as communicative conditions of 
equality, yes/no responses to challenges, commitments to truthfulness. As I emphasized above, 
                                                                                                                                                             
question of law." See her "Irreconcilable? The Duty to Consult and Administrative Decision Makers" 
(2013) Constitutional Forum 22(10) 63, at 64.  
 
5
 BFN, at 107; DEN, at 66.  
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these additional pragmatic requirements have never been framed as the sum and extent of D, 
meaning, I think, that the principle is flexible enough to be capable of functioning in tandem with 
pragmatic requirements that may be employed within other, non-western worldviews, as I 
demonstrated in relation to historical Anishinaabe communicative practices related to treaty-
making described in Chapter 4.  
 
One might object that this is to hold the law to an extra-legal standard. However, as I indicated 
above in comparing Habermas and H.L.A. Hart on the legitimacy of legality, Habermas is as 
resistant as is Hart to holding law subject to morality. D, he stresses, is not a moral principle. 
Rather, it is what he also calls the “democratic principle,” that is, a communicatively construed 
Rechstaat or “rule of law.”6 Additionally, this objection fails to account for the fact that the 
common law duty to consult itself is not really articulated as a purely legal concept (conceived in 
Hartian or Weberian terms), as I will show. As well, it would fail to consider the crucial ‘extra-
legal’ foundations of Canadian constitutional law, as the SCC affirmed in the Quebec Secession 
Reference.  
 
A) Narrating the history of Aboriginal rights in Canada 
As I described in Chapter 1, the court in the earlier cases portrayed the duty to consult as a 
product of Canada’s historical development, particularly in Sparrow. There Dickson C.J. 
provided a narrative of Aboriginal rights, running from the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to up to 
the years just prior to his own writing. Whether in law or literature, narratives are crucial means 
of communication, and work, as James Boyd White has emphasized, by providing control of a 
                                                 
6
 BFN, at 110-11. 
 
153 
 
vast range of other possibilities of description, meaning, inference.
7
 But if narrative is a form of 
control, how did the court in Sparrow come by its specific control of the developmental narrative 
of Aboriginal rights in Canada? In fiction, we can readily grant an author control of her 
narrative; but when the narrative concerns a country’s history – which above all lacks the 
unifying figure of an author – the question of alternate accounts is difficult to dismiss. 
Admittedly, narrative is a function of discourse that Habermas does not really address. However, 
the question of narrative as control dovetails with his basic concerns, such as the relation 
between communication and legal legitimacy, in ways that still make discourse theory helpful in 
highlighting difficulties within the doctrine of the duty to consult. 
 
Although Dickson C.J. recounted particulars of Canada’s legal history, his narrative also 
embraced at key points a more general, public, frame of reference. His concern with “the 
meaning of the constitutional recognition and affirmation of the existing aboriginal right to fish 
for food and social and ceremonial purposes”8 does not yield a narrative simply delineating the 
conflicting judicial interpretations of the Royal Proclamation, as occupied the courts in such 
historic cases as St. Catharines Milling and Lumber (1887, 1888), Ontario v the Dominion 
(1909), Calder (1973), or R. v White and Bob (1966), as I will discuss below. In those cases, and 
in many others, the courts sought to establish the legal implications of the Royal Proclamation as 
directly deducible from the text of the Proclamation: whether that meant, for instance, that 
Indians either had or did not have rights in the soil – and whether or not any such rights were 
                                                 
7
 See his The Legal Imagination, supra p. 30 n. 70, at 249. Drawing on the work of Robert Cover, Gordon 
Christie suggests that narratives “police meaning, working to keep unified a community capable of 
diverse forms of thought and action.” See his “Indigeneity and Sovereignty in Canada's Far North: the 
Arctic and Inuit Sovereignty” (2011) The South Atlantic Quarterly 110(2) 329, at 338. 
 
8
 Sparrow, supra p. 15 n. 21, at 1101. 
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themselves the product of the Proclamation, or whether the Proclamation had the force of statute, 
or whether or not it applied to British Columbia.
9
 Despite the conflicting interpretations that have 
resulted, such cases relayed an arc of the national narrative that has emphasized consistency 
between the Proclamation and the historical development of the country. That is, they have 
demonstrated that “Crown” sovereignty has cohered with the presence of Aboriginal rights, 
whether the courts have seen these as deriving from “the goodwill of the Sovereign,"10 or as 
existing from “time immemorial.”11  
 
In the Supreme Court’s consideration of St. Catharines Milling and Lumber, for instance, 
Taschereau J. concurred with the majority that sovereignty entailed a weak form of Aboriginal 
rights effective within the historical development of Canada. His conception of what I called the 
arc of historical narrative appears in his use of several temporal terms to indicate the scope of 
sovereignty (“for the present,” “thereafter,” “at any time,” “when he would think,” “forever”):  
 The words "for the present," in this and the next clause, are equivalent to a reservation by 
 the king of his right, thereafter or at any time, to grant these lands when he would  think it 
 proper to do so. He reserves for the present for the use of the Indians all the lands in 
 Canada outside of the limits of the Province of Quebec as then constituted. Is that, in 
 law, granting to these Indians a full title to the soil, a title to these lands? Did the 
 sovereign thereby divest himself of the ownership of this territory? I cannot adopt that 
 conclusion, nor can I see anything in that proclamation that gives to the Indians forever 
                                                 
9
 That it did not, was Judson J.’s view in Calder, supra p. 95 n. 11, at 323. 
 
10
 This was likewise his view, ibid. at 328, and reflected the influence of Saint Catharines Milling and 
Lumber v the Queen (1887) 13 SCR 577 . 
 
11
 The Statute of Westminster (1275) set this common law term to the accession of Richard I (3 
September 1189) in order to limit claims to land rights, or seisin. See Michael Asch On Being Here to 
Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 42-43 for 
a brief engagement with political scientist Tom Flanagan over the implications of the term in Canada. See 
also, Van der Peet, supra p. 2 n. 3, at 35-37, where Lamer C.J. provided an extensive discussion of time 
immemorial, or what he came to refer to as the “pre-contact period” (ibid. at 60), as providing the source 
of sec. 35(1) rights. He derived this temporal view from US Chief Justice John Marshal’s opinions, 
Johnson v M'Intosh, supra p. 96 n. 12, and Worcester, supra p. 91 n. 4 
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 the right in law to the possession of any lands as against the crown [sic]. Their occupancy 
 under that document has been one by sufferance only. Their possession has been, in law, 
 possession of the crown.
12
 
 
That Aboriginal rights fit weakly within this historical arc may also be indicated by the use of the 
present perfect tense: “has been,” which conveys no forward temporal trajectory.  
 
In upholding the SCC’s view that Ontario rather than the federal government held title to the 
lands at dispute in that case, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council also affirmed a weak 
reading of Aboriginal rights consistent with sovereignty, and effective historically, or at least 
“for the present.” As Lord Watson put it:  
 Whilst there have been changes in the administrative authority, there has been no change 
 since the year 1763 in the character of the interest which its Indian inhabitants had in the 
 lands surrendered by the treaty. Their possession, such as it was, can only be ascribed to 
 the general provisions made by the royal proclamation in favour of all Indian tribes then 
 living under the sovereignty and protection of the British Crown. It was suggested, in the 
 course of the argument for the Dominion, that inasmuch as the proclamation recites that 
 the territories thereby reserved for Indians had never been "ceded to or purchased by" 
 the Crown, the entire property of the land remained with them. That inference is, 
 however, at variance with the terms of the instrument, which show that the tenure of the 
 Indians was a personal and usufructuary right, dependent upon the good will of the 
 sovereign. The lands reserved are expressly stated to be "parts of Our dominions and 
 territories;" and it is declared to be the will and pleasure of the sovereign that, "for the 
 present," they shall be reserved for the use of the Indians, as their hunting grounds, under 
 his protection and dominion.
13
 
 
Similarly, in 1909 the Supreme Court observed in the “Indian Annuities Case:” 
 
 A line of policy begotten of prudence, humanity and justice adopted by the British Crown 
 to be observed in all future dealings with the Indians in respect of such rights as they 
 might suppose themselves to possess was outlined in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
 erecting, after the Treaty of Paris in that year, amongst others, a separate government for 
 Quebec, ceded by that treaty to the British Crown.  
 
                                                 
12
 Supra p. 154 n. 10, at 647-48. 
 
13
 St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v the Queen [1888] UKPC 70, at 5. Accessed 
<http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/1888/1888_70.html>. 
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 That policy adhered to thenceforward, by those responsible for the honour of the Crown 
 led to many treaties whereby Indians agreed to surrender such rights as they were 
 supposed to have in areas respectively specified in such treaties.
14
  
 
These fruitful co-generators of imperial policy: “begotten of prudence, humanity and justice,” 
produced what Strong J. had earlier, with perhaps a touch of realpolitik, portrayed as “a well 
known fact of Canadian history which cannot be controverted.”15  
 
Even when the courts began to cast Aboriginal rights in a stronger vein, they still stressed the 
continuity between those rights and sovereignty. Concurring with the majority opinion in R. v 
White and Bob, Norris J.A. summarized the impact of the Royal Proclamation on Canada’s 
historical recognition of Aboriginal rights: 
 For the British, the Proclamation of 1763 dealt with a new situation arising from the war 
 with the French, in North America, which Indians to a greater or less degree took 
 an active part on both sides, and incidentally from the Treaty of Paris of 1763 which 
 concluded that war. The problem which then faced the British was the management of a 
 continent by a power, the interests of which had theretofore been confined to the sea 
 coast. As exploration advanced, the natives of the interior and the western reaches must 
 be pacified, trade promoted, sovereignty exercised and justice administered, even if only 
 in a general way, until such time as British settlement could be established. It was a 
 situation which was to face the Imperial power in varying degree and in various parts of 
 
In that same narrative, Norris J.A. quoted from the work of the noted western Canadian historian, 
A.S. Morton:  
                                                 
14
 Province of Ontario v Dominion of Canada [1909] 42 SCR 1, at 103-04. 
 
15
 As he considered the “more liberal treatment accorded to the Indians” by British policy derived from 
the Royal Proclamation:  
To ascribe it to moral grounds, to motives of humane consideration for the aborigines, would be 
to attribute it to feelings which perhaps had little weight in the age in which it took its rise. Its 
true origin was, I take it, experience of the great impolicy of the opposite mode of dealing with 
the Indians which had been practised by some of the Provincial Governments of the older 
colonies and which had led to frequent frontier wars, involving great sacrifices of life and 
property and requiring an expenditure of money which had proved most burdensome to the 
colonies.  
See his dissent, though not on this point, in the Canadian SCC decision in Saint Catharines Milling, supra 
p. 154 n. 10, at 609-10. 
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 The promise which won over the warlike Five Nations was that they would enjoy their 
 territory undisturbed, and that no lands were to be taken from them but by formal 
 purchase by His Majesty the King. Thus they would be protected from the dreaded 
 encroachment of colonists. To us who have experienced the peaceful working out of such 
 a policy, from the purchases by the Hudson Bay Company of the rights to build their forts 
 down to the long succession of Indian treaties which preceded the settlement of the 
 North-West, this policy appears as doing no more than justice to the Indians, quite apart 
 from the treaties which promised it to them - no mere scraps of paper, surely. So far from 
 precluding the manifest destiny of the White Race on this continent, it really provided for 
 an orderly and peaceful expansion.
16
 
 
Although framing the development of Aboriginal rights in terms of providing for “orderly and 
peaceful expansion” and the “manifest destiny of the White Race,” Norris J.A. also indicated that 
the earlier narrative of congruence between sovereignty and Aboriginal rights was at least more 
complicated than it appears within the work of turn-of- the-century jurists such as Chancellor 
Boyd or Lord Watson. For instance, he noted that his own historical narrative stood in opposition 
to the contentions of the state in the question of the summary convictions of Clifford White and 
David Bob for hunting deer without a permit.  
 It is well that what is now attempted by the enforcement of the game laws against the 
 Indians in this case be understood. This is not a case merely of making the law applicable 
 to native Indians as well as to white persons so that there may be equality of treatment 
 under the law, but of depriving Indians of rights vested in them from time immemorial, 
 which white persons have not had, viz., the right to hunt out of season on unoccupied land 
 for food for themselves and their families.
17
  
 
 In view of the argument before us, it is necessary to point out that on numerous 
 occasions in modern days, rights under what were entered into with Indians as solemn 
 engagements, although completed with what would now be considered informality, have 
 been whittled away on the excuse that they do not comply with present day formal 
 requirements and with rules of interpretation applicable to transactions between people 
 who must be taken in the light of advanced civilization to be of equal status. Reliance on 
                                                 
 
16
 Ibid. at 637, quoting from Morton’s History of the Canadian West to 1870-71 (1939). 
 
17
 Ibid. at 648. 
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 instances where this has been done is merely to compound injustice without real 
 justification at law.
18
  
 
The quote above also demonstrates that his narrative is complicated, at least at this one point, by 
a depiction of conflicts between Canada’s rule of law and Aboriginal rights. In these “modern 
days,” rights are “whittled away” by “formal requirements,” amounting to the perpetuation of 
“injustice” without “justification.” 
 
The SCC decision in Calder, which built on White and Bob, also conveyed the historical arc, 
though without really sharpening it in the potentially critical direction that Norris J.A. had 
suggested there. Instead, like the earlier cases, it also squarely framed the congruence between 
sovereignty and Aboriginal rights by means of the Royal Proclamation (which the Nisga’a claim 
had in part relied upon).
19
 As Hall J. put it: 
 Its force as a statute is analogous to the status of Magna Carta which has always been 
 considered to be the law throughout the Empire. It was a law which followed the flag as 
 England assumed jurisdiction over newly-discovered or acquired lands or territories. It 
 follows, therefore, that the Colonial Laws Validity Act applied to make the Proclamation 
 the law of British Columbia. That it was regarded as being the law of England is clear 
 from the fact that when it was deemed advisable to amend it the amendment was effected 
 by an Act of Parliament, namely, the Quebec Act of 1774. In respect of this 
 Proclamation, it can be said that when other exploring nations were showing a ruthless 
 disregard of native rights England adopted a remarkably enlightened attitude towards the 
 Indians of North America. The Proclamation must be regarded as a fundamental 
 document upon which any just determination of original rights rests.
20
  
 
The split decision in Calder regarded the application of the Royal Proclamation to British 
Columbia, and hence to the question of title for the Nisga’a before the court. Neither side, 
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however, found reason to question or qualify the narrative of Aboriginal rights as already 
embraced in Canada’s history, or as coherent with the idea of British sovereignty.   
 
In Sparrow, by contrast, Dickson C.J.’s narrative of the historical “background of s. 35(1)”21 is 
not simply more complicated than the one Norris J.A. provided in R. v White and Bob; it also 
conveys the suggestion that the congruent relation between sovereignty and Aboriginal rights 
does not really hold in Canadian history. Sparrow thus could have potentially threatened to 
subvert the historical arc. As the chief justice summarized the policy of the colonial period: 
It is worth recalling that while British policy towards the native population was based on 
respect for their right to occupy their traditional lands, a proposition to which the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 bears witness, there was from the outset never any doubt that 
sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested in 
the Crown. . . . And there can be no doubt that over the years the rights of the Indians 
were often honoured in the breach.
22
 
 
His dual emphasis on the lack of “doubt” – no doubt about sovereignty, and no doubt about 
frequent breaches of Indian rights – places this narrative within a different context from those in 
which references to British policy and the Royal Proclamation of 1763 had previously appeared.  
 
Here, the focus is not on providing an initial source to outline the force of a consistently 
functioning legal concept. The potential for doubt that Dickson C.J. dismissed is not the doubt of 
legal experts who may disagree with the reading of a case. Instead, the dismissing of doubt refers 
to the apparent solidity of more common knowledge. The recognition that “Indian rights were 
often honoured in the breach” is a simple historical statement, reflecting content known, or 
knowable, to Canadians in general and not simply to their legal experts. Its fatalism bears 
similarity to Justice Reed’s nod in the US case Tee Hit Ton: “every schoolboy knows” the basic 
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 Sparrow, supra p. 15 n. 21, at 1102. 
 
22
 Ibid. at 1103, citations removed. 
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facts of US-Indian history.
23
 If we assume that the uses of “doubt” in both of these sentences is 
consistent, then it seems likely that the usage in relation to “sovereignty” and “title” evident 
within Dickson C.J.’s reference to the Royal Proclamation of 1763 also appeals to the 
understanding held among a more public audience. That is, Sparrow positions the assessment of 
the legal status of Aboriginal people and their rights in Canada within the range of public 
discourse. Thus, while the narrative in Sparrow indicates that it is engaged in describing a 
consensus about that which cannot be doubted; it is not simply making claims of propositional 
truth here. Instead, the narrative is also an action guide, a spur for consent as much as a statement 
about what is consented to; and consequently, capable of being evaluated at the level of 
pragmatic discourse.  
 
Pragmatically, the narrative opens to the achievement of a consensus of rational Canadians on 
two evidently conflicting points. The first is the solidity of state “sovereignty,” which is the 
underlying fact, the Grundnorm, of Canada’s history. The second is the character of Canadian 
history. Real world conflicts, amounting to honouring Indian rights “in the breach,” might be 
thought to shake the solidity of sovereignty in Canada, or to define that sovereignty in a darker 
manner than it presents itself within the Royal Proclamation of 1763 (that of the benevolent, 
Christian monarch concerned for his “loving subjects”). It suggests that the public’s range of 
common knowledge regarding what is “in the breach” could amount to a chastened 
understanding of what I called the ‘national imaginary,’ above. It also runs counter to the 
                                                 
23
 As Justice Reed put it there: “Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent 
were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres 
by treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that deprived 
them of their land.” See Tee-Hit-Ton supra p. 95 n. 11, at 289-90. It also registers with Strong J.’s regard 
of facts “which cannot be controverted” about Canadian history, above.   
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narrative provided since Saint Catharines Milling. The earlier narratives of law’s embrace of 
Indians all indicated continuity between the foundation of law in sovereignty, and the 
implementation of law in practice. Dickson C.J.’s narrative, however, grounded in his two 
certainties that cannot be harmonized on their face, indicates a deep-seated point of tension in 
Canada, at the very least, between law as provider of order and law as provider of justice.  
Our history has shown, unfortunately all too well, that Canada's aboriginal peoples are 
justified in worrying about government objectives that may be superficially neutral but 
which constitute de facto threats to the existence of aboriginal rights and interests.
24
  
 
Thus, the consensus that Canada’s sovereignty has extended through time actually amounts to a 
history of injustice. There would be no other way to harmonize the two contending certainties 
than through recognition (on the part of the public as well as its legal experts) that Canada’s 
historical relationship with indigenous peoples is fundamentally dark. 
 
How did Dickson C.J. cope with this recognition? From a discourse perspective, the narrative 
that Dickson C.J. developed in Sparrow does two things. In reaching for a public audience, the 
narrative necessarily opens to a public range of response. That is, it raises the practical necessity 
of a new consensus, the achievement of mutual understanding, about what is incapable of being 
doubted: the conflict between sovereignty and breaches of Indian rights. At the same time, 
however, it also indicates the difficulty in establishing any such consensus: since the 
government’s consistent approach to issues of Aboriginal rights has been to frame them as 
merely political. As the chief justice noted: “By the late 1960s, aboriginal claims were not even 
recognized by the federal government as having any legal status.”25 Similarly, he noted the 
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state’s persistent refusal to recognize the legal substance of Aboriginal claims in all the main 
policy developments within that era: the “White Paper” (1973), the James Bay Northern Quebec 
Agreement (1975), and the creation of a “comprehensive claims” mechanism (1981), a tendency 
he also found extending into government arguments in Guerin (1984).
26
  
 
The pragmatic question of how to grapple with public recognition of such a history could have 
provided the courts with an opportunity to call for, and to ensure a worthwhile process for, the 
sorts of soul-searching national reflection, and measures of redress, undertaken in post-apartheid 
South Africa or post-WWII federal Germany during the same period as Sparrow was being 
considered. Dickson C.J, however, avoided the potential traumas of such reconsiderations, and 
turned the narrative itself in a redemptive, or what I called above a more ‘progressive,’ direction. 
Thus, he reined in the narrative with the conclusion that sec. 35(1):  
represents the culmination of a long and difficult struggle in both the political forum and 
the courts for the constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights. The strong 
representations of native associations and other groups concerned with the welfare of 
Canada's aboriginal peoples made the adoption of s. 35(1) possible.
27
 
 
He then capped the conclusion with a quote from legal scholar J. Noel Lyon on the impact of sec. 
53(1): “It renounces the old rules of the game under which the Crown established courts of law 
and denied those courts the authority to question sovereign claims made by the Crown.”28 
 
What stands out here from a discourse perspective is the disparity between the two tendencies in 
the narrative. First, although having developed the potentially threatening theme that sovereignty 
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and Aboriginal rights stand in conflict throughout Canadian history, Dickson C.J. did not use this 
assessment of legality to question any of the underlying assumptions within the Canadian legal 
order regarding Aboriginal peoples. Instead, he drew sec. 35(1) as a redemptive achievement, 
invoking a quote from a legal scholar to mark its significance – though he could have framed this 
significance himself. Second, although highlighting the public role of “native associations” in 
lobbying for sec. 35(1)’s inclusion in the Constitution Act of 1982, and acknowledging the 
importance of the “aboriginal perspective” regarding the nature of the fishing right defended by 
Ronald Sparrow, he did not rely upon anything like an “aboriginal perspective” in framing his 
narrative.
29
  
 
Thus, although in principle Dickson C.J. upheld Sparrow’s claim of infringed rights against the 
DNR drift net regulation revision, authorized under sec. 12 of the B.C. Fisheries Regulations, 
from a discourse perspective his ruling raises many suspicions. Not the least of these is that this 
first leg of the emerging duty to consult’s scaffolding was already weakened by its approach to 
discourse itself. Instead of Dickson C.J. conceiving of Aboriginal rights as opening an occasion 
for mutual understanding – an aim that would have easily followed from his casting of the 
tension between sovereignty and Aboriginal rights, and his casting this as an issue of public 
discourse regarding whether the particular legal status of indigenous communities in relation to 
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 A critic might say that I am making a Whiggish argument here. However, at the time of his writing 
Sparrow, a fairly wide range of scholarship concerning Aboriginal perspectives on legal standing was 
available in Canada, the US, and other common law regimes, some of which I mentioned in chapter 4. As 
well, during those same decades, the intellectual thrust of many of the “native associations” that he 
acknowledged certainly included claims not only of grievances to be represented within the courts, but of 
challenges to the very basis of sovereignty insisted upon by the Canadian state. For a history of the 
jurisprudence, scholarship and (to some extent) advocacy reflecting the impact of these perspectives in 
the post-WWII era, see Paul McHugh Aboriginal Title: the Modern Jurisprudence of Aboriginal Land 
Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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the Canadian state is best expressed in the affirmation of rights within the constitution, he crafted 
a doctrine that gave controversial powers of judicial review to the courts.
30
 The ‘game change’ 
that he let Prof. Lyon indicate, within the text of Sparrow itself, has much less to do with any 
shift in thinking about the legal standing of indigenous people in Canada, and much more to do 
with clarifying, or extending, the power of the court itself.  
 
Consequently, the chief justice cast the real import of sec. 35(1) – and correspondingly wound up 
maintaining the control of his narrative – by foregrounding the court’s role: through sec. 35(1) 
the court gains the ability to resolve the historic tension between sovereignty and Aboriginal 
legal standing. As he put it: 
There is no explicit language in the provision that authorizes this Court or any court to 
assess the legitimacy of any government legislation that restricts aboriginal rights. Yet, 
we find that the words "recognition and affirmation" incorporate the fiduciary 
relationship referred to earlier and so import some restraint on the exercise of sovereign 
power. Rights that are recognized and affirmed are not absolute. Federal legislative 
powers continue, including, of course, the right to legislate with respect to Indians 
pursuant to s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. These powers must, however, now be 
read together with s. 35(1). In other words, federal power must be reconciled with federal 
duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification of any 
government regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights.
31
 
 
The reconciliation required here (between power and duty) apparently resolves the tension in the 
narrative between sovereignty and rights “honoured in the breach.” However, it does this in a 
way that leaves sovereignty unalloyed – and makes the future breaching of Indian rights subject 
to a case by case process of consideration. He spoke of that process as one of “justification,” and 
envisioned the task of consultation itself as simply one component of this process. He did not 
                                                 
30
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describe the act of consultation in detail; although the considerations he included within the 
process of justification: providing a “clear and plain” expression of sovereign intentions to 
infringe a right,
32
 and articulating a “valid objective” to regulation of rights,33 indicate that any 
consultation undertaken as a result of the Sparrow decision would conceivably raise troublesome 
issues from within targeted indigenous communities.  
 
For instance, from a discourse perspective, and reflecting Habermas’s view of the establishment 
of legal legitimacy as “rational legitimacy” – meaning that legal decisions are “supposed to be 
rationally grounded in the matter at issue so that all participants can accept them as rational 
decisions”34 – the threshold of justification here seems low, and the conception of consultation 
weak, or at least undeveloped. This suggests that as far as its first leg of scaffolding goes, 
Dickson C.J. broached the duty to consult in a way that would ensure its result more in securing 
the Canadian state’s potential for communication as “strategic action” rather than as action 
oriented towards genuine mutual understanding and social solidarity with Aboriginal parties 
(whatever those might actually entail in the real world).  
 
I have described the chief justice’s narrative as “progressive” here, because it yields an improved 
state of affairs that seems to respond to a new situation: the “game change” of sec. (35)1, and the 
upsetting of the traditional claims of the coherence of state sovereignty and Aboriginal standing. 
At the same time, it does this in a way that maintains continuity with the past, while providing a 
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future controlled by elites in possession of increased technical knowledge, and ambivalent about 
the impact of democratic approaches to matters of law and policy.
35
 His narrative might have 
moved in a different direction. For instance, it might have reconsidered the Royal Proclamation, 
along the lines that John Borrows has indicated in his own narrative reconstruction of the 
Proclamation’s place within Canadian law, as requiring a much fuller attention to questions of 
rational legitimacy than Dickson C.J. provided in his reference to the “aboriginal perspective.”36 
To have done that, however, would have reduced the possibility of controlling the narrative, and 
opened Canadian law towards what Habermas calls the “permanent risk of dissensus.” The chief 
justice did say that sec. 35(1) meant that by “giving aboriginal rights constitutional status and 
priority, Parliament and the provinces have sanctioned challenges to social and economic policy 
objectives embodied in legislation to the extent that aboriginal rights are affected.”37At the same 
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 Although the term may resonate more in consideration of American history than Canadian, where its 
fate seems bound up with a particular political party, it seems to me useful here; although I employ it only 
loosely. In American historiography, the “Progressive Era” (roughly 1880-1920) is characterized by the 
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time, however, the courts have been keenly interested in reining in the implications of those 
challenges. Building upon Sparrow, the SCC confronted the question of rational legitimacy again 
with a short-reined consideration of the task of justification, which I turn to below. 
 
B. The task of justification in Sparrow, Delgamuukw and beyond 
The court’s second leg of the duty to consult’s intellectual scaffolding is the practice of 
justification, regarded as necessary on the basis of sec. 35(1), in order to clarify the legitimacy of 
infringements upon Aboriginal rights. Beginning in Sparrow, and with refinements added in 
Gladstone, Delgamuukw, and Haida Nation, the court has developed a test for justifying 
infringements, in the process moving the duty to consult into the centre of the task of 
justification.  
 
The test developed in Sparrow requires the preliminary determination of whether a right has 
been “extinguished.”38 Dickson C.J. explained that the traditional reliance upon an observable 
inconsistency between a right and a regulation or piece of legislation was inadequate, and 
insisted instead upon the “clear and plain intention” reading of legislative purpose, rather than 
“valid enactment.”39 After having determined that a right has not been extinguished, and that 
                                                 
38
 As an example of this thinking, grounded in the idea of ‘parliamentary supremacy,’ Dickson C.J. 
quoted from a 1980 case: “Once a statute has been validly enacted, it must be given effect. If its necessary 
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was Baker Lake (Hamlet) v Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, [1980] I FC 518 (TD). 
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168 
 
“prima facie interference”40 has affected the practice of the right, the chief justice said that courts 
would then need to assess the question of justification, recognizing that “the contours of a 
justificatory standard must be defined in the specific factual context of each case.”41 To do this 
would nevertheless generally require addressing two questions: first, whether the infringement 
reflected a valid legislative objective, meaning objectives more precisely articulated than “public 
interest,” and reflecting “compelling and substantial” aims, such as conservation, or public 
safety.
42
 Second, is the question of whether the infringement is in keeping with the “special trust 
relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-a-vis aboriginals.”43  
 
Consultation itself is only one tool to ensure that the process of justification can be 
accomplished, and Dickson C.J. regarded it as playing its most direct role at the stage of 
determining prima facie infringement. As explained here, it could conceivably be a means by 
which a department or a court could find out about the “aboriginal perspective” on a given right, 
although the chief justice does not mention it in his brief reference to this perspective.
44
 It would 
also enable a government body to inform a community about its aims. As the chief justice 
framed this in relation to the impact of the drift net length regulations on Musqueam rights: 
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 As he framed it in reference to the infringement of Ronald Sparrow’s Musqueam Band fishing rights:  
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The aboriginal peoples, with their history of conservation-consciousness and 
interdependence with natural resources, would surely be expected, at the least, to be 
informed regarding the determination of an appropriate scheme for the regulation of the 
fisheries.
45
 
 
Thus, as depicted in its initial consideration, consultation regarding infringement of Aboriginal 
and treaty rights emerged in only a sketchy formulation: “at the very least,” a single component 
of a larger requirement that the state justify those aims affecting indigenous communities. The 
task of justification, however, received further consideration from Lamer C.J. in Gladstone
46
 and 
Delgamuukw.
47
  
 
Lamer C.J. extended the task of justification from the Sparrow domain of conservation 
regulations affecting “subsistence” treaty rights (“food and social and ceremonial purposes”)48   
to infringements on commercial fishing rights (Gladstone) and the larger question of  
“Aboriginal title” (Delgamuukw). He viewed his work in the latter two cases as building 
consistently upon the approach to justification laid out in Sparrow; and the two chief justices did 
share some common understanding regarding the task of justification as a communicative 
practice, as I will elaborate below. However, Lamer C.J. also added qualifications to the 
justification task, in particular, explaining what I will call its “social weighting” in a way that 
transforms the task as Dickson C.J. first broached it. For Dickson C.J., the larger implication of 
sec. 35(1), as I noted above, meant that it demonstrates the Canadian state’s determination to 
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sanction “challenges to social and economic policy objectives embodied in legislation.”49 The 
priority allocation to Musqueam fishers derived from consideration of his justification test “may 
place a heavy burden on the Crown.”50 For Lamer C.J., on the other hand, the implication seems 
more the opposite. Despite his frequent reference to the communicative practice of reconciliation 
(which I will consider in the next chapter) and despite his significant attention to issues of 
“aboriginal perspective,” his statements on the justification process are primarily concerned with 
reining in the potential impact of sec. 35(1). Given – as I argued in the previous section – that 
Dickson C.J.’s own efforts in Sparrow amount to a reining in, Lamer C.J.’s efforts seem even 
more oriented towards lightening Canada’s “burden.”  
 
Dickson C.J., for instance, maintained that Aboriginal rights “recognized and affirmed” are 
nevertheless “not absolute,” and that although sec. 1 of the Charter did not apply to sec. 35(1): 
“Legislation that affects the exercise of aboriginal rights will nonetheless be valid, if it meets the 
test for justifying an interference with a right recognized and affirmed under s. 35(1).”51  
However, in Sparrow Dickson C.J. did not even mention “the Oakes test” that is, his own prior 
work in elaborating the limiting force of sec. 1 on Charter rights.
52
 Lamer C.J., by contrast, in 
Gladstone and Delgamuukw devoted considerable energy to expanding the scope of justified 
infringements on Aboriginal and treaty rights. He did this by drawing explicitly upon the Oakes 
decision to characterize justified infringements as based on the same principles as the rights 
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infringed upon. As he put it: “the purposes underlying the rights must inform not only the 
definition of the rights but also the identification of those limits on the rights which are 
justifiable.”53 As he melded the concept of justifiable infringement from Sparrow and Oakes, this 
meant  
that the objectives which can be said to be compelling and substantial will be those 
directed at either the recognition of the prior occupation of North America by 
aboriginal peoples or -- and at the level of justification it is this purpose which may 
well be most relevant -- at the reconciliation of aboriginal prior occupation with the 
assertion of the sovereignty of the Crown.
54
  
 
The use of “directed at” and “purpose” in this passage suggests that “compelling and substantial” 
reasons for infringing rights are themselves to be thought of as animated by, intentionally shaped 
by, the same legal aspiration as has recognized Aboriginal and treaty rights. What might strike 
the reader as odd here, is that Lamer C.J. wound up equating the limit on a right with the 
meaning of the right itself, as though compelling efforts to infringe are animated by the same 
intention as would be found in upholding or practicing the right. Thus, he was able to conclude 
Gladstone (though calling for a new trial due to insufficient evidence) in far-ranging general 
terms, that  
objectives such as the pursuit of economic and regional fairness, and the recognition of 
the historical reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by non-aboriginal groups, are 
the type of objectives which can (at least in the right circumstances) satisfy this 
standard.
55
 
 
Although tied to the singular concern of the case’s commercial fishing claim, Gladstone 
transformed the task of justification from that laid out in Sparrow. In Sparrow, Canada appears 
in the view of Dickson C.J. ready to shoulder as a general principle that a “heavy burden” could 
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easily attend its recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights. In Gladstone, this burden seems 
much less likely to occur, in effect shifting the social weighting being contemplated. Lamer 
C.J.’s fullest statement of his view of these justifiable objectives only emerged in Delgamuukw.  
 
There, in discussing the task of justification, he laid out in clear and broad terms the sorts of 
compelling and substantial aims that could infringe upon Aboriginal title, but could accordingly 
also affect other rights. As he put it (and as I quote again from Chapter 1 for convenience): 
The general principles governing justification laid down in Sparrow, and embellished by 
Gladstone, operate with respect to infringements of aboriginal title. In the wake of 
Gladstone, the range of legislative objectives that can justify the infringement of 
aboriginal title is fairly broad…..In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, 
mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of 
British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, the building of 
infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are the 
kinds of objectives that are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the 
infringement of aboriginal title. Whether a measure or government act can be explained 
by reference to one of those objectives, however, is ultimately a question of fact that will 
have to be examined on a case-by-case basis.
56
 
 
I assume the chief justice’s listing of a “fairly broad” range of development efforts indicates that 
basically no form of development or resource extraction lies outside the range of being justifiable 
as a possible substantial and compelling infringement on Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
 
If so, from a discourse perspective, the practice of justification tied to the duty to consult raises 
several troublesome issues, and, I believe, can’t really amount to, as he put it, a process by which 
“a measure or government act can be explained by reference to one of those objectives,” even if 
augmented by a “case-by-case” consideration of facts. What exactly, then, does the court 
envision as justification? As I indicated in Chapter 1 regarding justification as a communicative 
practice, at the minimum, for justification to function in a pragmatic mode, it would have to 
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entail a reception of a justificatory effort. Within logic, mathematics, or natural science, that is, 
inherently deductive forms of expression, justification as proof-making is incidental to the act of 
reception. In pragmatic discourse, however, justification remains an inherently multi-party 
endeavour, being otherwise meaningless. In Habermas’s terms, it would involve one party’s 
advancement of, and another party’s consideration of, a set of validity claims. The only way to 
conceive of pragmatic justification without such a reception, is to regard the justificatory process 
as a kind of legal pronouncement, or what Habermas calls a “discourse of application.” 
However, Sparrow, as I noted above, dismisses as insufficient regard for the nature of Aboriginal 
and treaty rights, the courts’ longstanding practice of equating pronouncements of duly 
constituted authority with the relevant measure of validity.  
  
In place of abandoning a ‘positivist’ approach, or what Weber called “formalist legal 
rationalism,” 57 to legitimating policy and regulation, however, the court has inadequately 
addressed the discursive character of justification. Drawing upon Sparrow’s admission that sec. 
35(1) “does not promise immunity from government regulation in a society that, in the twentieth 
century, is increasingly more complex, interdependent and sophisticated exist within a complex 
society” Lamer C.J. substituted a clearly utilitarian moral calculus. Although he framed this in 
terms of “reconciliation” – which I address in the following chapter – as a statement of “general” 
principle regarding the task of justification, on his account holders of Aboriginal and treaty rights 
are, in the end, required to take their position as merely some among the many. As he put it in 
Gladstone:  
 Because, however, distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a 
 broader social, political and economic community, over which the Crown is sovereign, 
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 there are circumstances in which, in order to pursue objectives of compelling and 
 substantial importance to that community as a whole (taking into account the fact that 
 aboriginal societies are a part of that community), some limitation of those rights will be 
 justifiable.
58
 
 
From a discourse perspective, we can leave aside for the moment the petitio principii involved in 
framing the idea of a “community as a whole,” as well as the moral consideration that Lamer C.J. 
raises as a form of justification.
59
 The initial question to address is how this approach to 
justification could be defended simply as a validity claim belonging to pragmatic discourse.  
 
If the court is envisioning communication around the process of justification as oriented by the 
aim of providing for mutual understanding, that is, if it is a process of communicative action, 
then on what basis can the court say that “distinctive aboriginal societies” are required to take 
their place within “the broader” community? If pragmatic statements achieve their validity 
because those to whom they are addressed also consider them worth consenting to, then any such 
statement would be recognizably legitimate only if those “distinctive aboriginal societies” 
concurred that their place in the social order entails the presumed acknowledgment of this role. 
The other possible reasons to hold in favour of their acceptance of such a role are either that they 
have been forced to by some act of domination, or that they are – whether by nature or history – 
dependent upon the “community as a whole.” Since both of these assumptions seem clearly a 
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 Gladstone, supra p. 26 n. 57, at para. 73. 
 
59
 In her dissent in Van der Peet, McLachlin J., as she was at the time, noted critically that Lamer C.J.’s 
construction of justification on the basis of what I have called social weighting. As she put it: 
The Chief Justice's test, however, would appear to permit the constitutional aboriginal fishing 
right to be conveyed by regulation, law or executive act to non-native fishers who have 
historically fished in the area in the interests of community harmony and reconciliation of 
aboriginal and non-aboriginal interests (Van der Peet, supra p. 2 n. 3, at para. 307). 
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part of the colonial legacy, which the court often claims to reject,
60
 they cannot really be the 
basis for a validity claim offered by the court as an approach to the justification of infringements.  
 
Another option for making sense out of the court’s configuration of the social weighting called 
for in Gladstone and Delgamuukw is to regard it not as oriented towards mutual understanding, 
but as a piece of strategic action. Habermas’s characterization of the expanding autonomy of 
systems of money and power noted in Chapter 2 certainly resonates with Lamer C.J.’s list of 
justifiable developments. Habermas’s casting of the tension between system and lifeworld can 
easily (though not perfectly) resonate as a characterization of legal conflicts between First 
Nations and Canada. As he puts it: 
The point is to protect areas of life that are functionally dependent on social integration 
through values, norms and consensus formation, to preserve them from falling prey to the 
systemic imperatives of economic and administrative subsystems growing with dynamics 
of their own, and to defend them from being converted over, through the steering medium 
of law, to a principle of sociation that is, for them, dysfunctional.
61
 
 
I think scholars such as James Tully and Taiaiake Alfred (whose views I addressed in Chapters 3 
and 4) would concur with Habermas’s earlier rendition of such a congruence between law and 
“systemic imperatives.” However, consistently applying such a view of the discourse of 
justification developed around the duty to consult would also entail a cynical admission 
regarding the dark spread of Habermas’s “juridification,” or what Tully, following Foucault, 
calls the “juridical.” That is, it would enervate the possibility of legal discourse serving as 
anything more than power’s handmaid.  
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 For example, there is Dickson C.J.’s assessment that the common tendency to devalue the seriousness 
of treaties “reflects the biases and prejudices of another era in our history. Such language is no longer 
acceptable in Canadian law and indeed is inconsistent with a growing sensitivity to native rights in 
Canada.” See Simon v the Queen, supra p. 17 n. 27, at para. 21.  
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 TCA2, at 373. 
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Consequently, the available options to regarding justification as communicative action seem 
equally unattractive. Instead, I think the court’s emphasis on justification needs to be understood 
as a clear expression of the will to achieve mutual understanding. However, it can only function 
in such a way when pragmatic discourses between Canada and First Nations and other 
Aboriginal communities operate under broader norms of discourse. I identified such norms 
above as figuring within discourse theory (Chapter 2) and within the legal and diplomatic 
communicative practices of indigenous communities – assuming that my example of discursive 
Anishinaabe doodem practices (Chapter 4) rings sufficiently true for other indigenous legal 
orders.  
  
Norms relevant to the justification process would include Habermas’s norm that one must be 
able to make a "yes/no" response without coercion, or what I characterized above as the 
Anishinaabe “equality” norm operating during the 1701 treaty-making at Montréal. Employing 
such norms, the recipients of efforts to justify a policy or a regulation would have to be able to 
respond within a framework oriented towards mutual understanding. Otherwise, such recipients 
of state justificatory efforts could only respond out of coercion, at the minimum – out of a sense 
of forced choice, or out of an awareness of not being co-creators of the legal arrangements within 
which they live. As I laid out in Chapter 2, for discourse theory, the very foundation of legal 
legitimacy arises out of the effort to reach mutual understanding. This is not the hypothetical 
version of consent associated with the social contract tradition. Rather, it is the necessary 
potential engagement with law-making available to anyone living within a particular legal 
framework. Justification within the scope of the duty to consult therefore can only be a process 
177 
 
of argumentative persuasion – in which uncoerced agreements are possible to obtain, as are 
disagreements.  
 
Canada’s courts have shied away from acknowledging this necessary potential for Habermas’s 
“dissensus” within any communication oriented towards mutual understanding. The closest step 
towards a discourse perspective so far, is the one taken by McLachlin C.J., who offered an aside 
in the 2014 Tsilhqot’in Nation title case advising parties interested in indigenous lands to “avoid 
a charge of infringement or failure to adequately consult” by obtaining consent.62 But this is 
merely a cost-benefit weighing of legal strategies, not a statement of her reading of the force of 
the law. As well, she undercut the value of this advice as a statement of First Nations’ positions 
within consultation dialogues oriented towards mutual understanding by holding that their 
consent is not necessary to obtain as long as justification (determined by the courts) can be. 
Thus: 
 To justify overriding the Aboriginal title-holding group’s wishes on the basis of the 
 broader public good, the government must show: (1) that it discharged its procedural duty 
 to consult and accommodate, (2) that its actions were backed by a compelling and 
 substantial objective;  and (3) that the governmental action is consistent with the Crown’s 
 fiduciary obligation to the group: Sparrow.
63
 
 
This antinomy between consent and justification contained within Tsilhqot’in Nation indicates 
quite clearly that, despite its decades of reflection on Aboriginal and treaty rights since Sparrow, 
the court retains either a strategic view of justification, or else a poorly-framed understanding of 
justification as a communicative practice.  
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 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra p. 43 n. 107, at para. 97. 
 
63
 Ibid. at para. 77. 
 
178 
 
In Sparrow itself an embryonic version of the communicative dimension of justification was 
evident. For instance, there Dickson C.J. contrasted the courts’ earlier view of justification as 
determination of valid enactment with his proposed replacement of “compelling and substantial” 
aims, such as conservation.  
While the "presumption" of validity is now outdated in view of the constitutional status 
of the aboriginal rights at stake, it is clear that the value of conservation purposes for 
government legislation and action has long been recognized. Further, the conservation 
and management of our resources is consistent with aboriginal beliefs and practices, and, 
indeed, with the enhancement of aboriginal rights.
64
  
  
In this statement a communicative core is evident, though it remains undeveloped. The 
conservation aim of the regulation is asserted to be compatible with “aboriginal beliefs and 
practices,” and the “enhancement” of rights. Presumably, this would only be knowable on the 
basis of contributions to the development of the state’s conservation aims from indigenous 
parties. As general reflections occupied with more than Ronald Sparrow’s specific drift net 
length, the statements would work best if accompanied by demonstrations of the asserted 
compatibility. As it stands, the reader is left having to insert external sources illustrating just 
what indigenous conservation aims Dickson C.J. had in mind. This elision forecloses the 
possibility of disagreement from indigenous parties who may well object to the design and 
operation of the state’s conservation apparatus. From a discourse perspective, concerned 
especially with the development of legal legitimacy, what might be especially troubling here 
(and in countless other cases where indigenous individuals face prosecution for summary 
offenses, chiefly violations of fish and game regulations) is that a genuinely communicative 
effort to reach mutual understanding regarding the shape of conservation regulations remains 
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 Sparrow, supra p. 15 n. 21, at 1114. 
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completely off the radar for Canada’s courts, legislative and administrative bodies.65 Thus, even 
in Sparrow the task of justification in which the duty to consult is enmeshed employs an 
artificially constrained view of discourse focused on obtaining mutual understanding. 
 
In recent years a potentially more adequate view of justification (from a discourse perspective, at 
least) has emerged in the well-known, and in Canada the oft-dismissed, principle of “free, prior, 
and informed consent” (FPIC) included in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), and in other instruments reflective of emerging norms in 
international law.
66
 A number of First Nations have inserted FPIC clauses in their own protocols 
regarding consultation, or into their economic development policy statements. The treaty group 
NAN, the Nishnawbe Aski Nation, for instance, has determined that: “Proposed private 
                                                 
65
 This point may be simply unnecessary to mention. The gulf between such a discourse theory vision of a 
rationally legitimate approach to resource management in Canada and the current regime is rarely 
bridgeable. The power imbalances between administrators, enforcement personnel, the courts, and those 
individuals arrested for violation of hunting and fishing regulations, appear frequently in the very tone of 
lower court decisions. See, for example, the numerous duty to consult cases in Alberta, which has 
maintained an aggressive effort to control indigenous access to and use of natural resources: R. v 
Lefthand, 2007 ABCA 206. Alberta has conducted undercover, or sting, operations in its efforts to control 
indigenous breaches of game laws: R. v Janvier, 2005 ABPC 194. 
 
66 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295 (2007). Article 
32(2) reads:  
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through 
their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the 
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in 
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. 
Ambiguities in UNDRIP regarding the meaning of “consent” stem from Article 32’s relationship to 
Article 3 – acknowledging “self-determination” and to Article 18, which states that: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect 
their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own 
procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions. 
“Participation” would soften the implications of “consent,” which is how states and corporate bodies have 
elected to read the declaration, while “self-determination” would strengthen it. Mauro Barelli accounts for 
this range of meaning by pointing out the gaps between initial draft versions of UNDRIP, composed by 
indigenous representatives, and the final version, reflective of input from various states. See his “Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Developments and Challenges Ahead” (2012) International Journal of Human Rights 16(1)1, at 10-11. 
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development or Canadian government policy that affects any part of the NAN territory cannot 
proceed without the FPIC of the affected NAN First Nation or First Nations.” 67 Although not 
drawing on UNDRIP, in 2007 the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group petitioned the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights against Canada for (among several charges) its failure to consult 
regarding sale of traditional lands, drawing on similar concepts contained within the 
Organization of American States’ American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, to 
which Canada has subscribed.
68
 Increasingly, corporations, umbrella groups such as the Boreal 
Leadership Council, and financial institutions ranging from Canada's TD Bank to the World 
Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation, have also begun including statements of their 
intent to comply with FPIC in pursuit of development opportunities that could affect Aboriginal 
or treaty rights – although their interpretations of "consent" frequently vary among themselves 
and from those of First Nations.
69
 At the same time, other First Nations governing bodies have 
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 Available at <http://www.nan.on.ca/article/requirement-for-free-prior-and-informed-consent-in-nan-
496.asp> accessed 21 September 2014. 
 
68
 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Canada P592-07 Hul'Qumi'num Treaty Group - 
Admissibility Report (2007), available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/ 
Canada592.07eng.htm> accessed 21 September 2014. The American Declaration is available at 
<https://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.American%20Declaration.htm> accessed 28 
September 2014. The Hul'Qumi'num petition drew on Articles 2, 13 and 23. Over Canada’s objections 
that domestic measures of relief were available to the Treaty Group, the Commission found that it had 
jurisdiction over the matter, and sufficient cause to consider the HTG petition, although the outcome of 
their consideration remains undecided as of my writing here. Even though the Declaration is not a legally 
binding document, the Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights treat it as legally 
binding on member states. See Tara Ward “The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous 
Peoples' Participation Rights within International Law” (2011) Northwestern Journal of International 
Human Rights 10(2) 57 at 61. 
 
69
 As one example of an industry-related social responsibility group's acknowledgment of FPIC, consider 
the Boreal Leadership Council's position that corporations need a "pro-active" adoption of FPIC. Their 
report includes the provision to "Respect decisions by Aboriginal groups (including non-consent) rather 
than falling back on government rules that fall short of consent." See their "Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent in Canada" (Ottawa: Boreal Leadership Council, 2012) at 16. Available at <http:// 
www.borealcanada.ca/lead-council-e.php> accessed 28 September 2014. Much of the reflection on FPIC 
within corporate investment circles is sensitive to developing bottom-line implications, as recognized by 
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made no reference to FPIC – although the Cree Nation Mining Policy reflects the simultaneous 
desire to support mining development and to do so from within a framework reflective of Cree 
values and interests.
70
 
 
On at least a few occasions, the courts have briefly considered submissions drawing upon 
UNDRIP’s FPIC clause, though consistently finding it vague or inapplicable to Canada. For 
instance, in the most recent ruling, the B.C. Supreme Court held that UNDRIP: 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Ethical Funds investment group: "If FPIC has not yet fully arrived, it’s clearly on the horizon. 
Progressive companies must begin to review this standard and consider its adoption." Ethical Funds 
Sustainability Perspectives – Briefing Notes for the C-Suite, Feb. 2008, at 4. Available at 
<https://www.neiinvestments.com/Documents/Research/FPIC.pdf> accessed 28 September 2014. At the 
same time, the wide embrace of FPIC within corporate structures has come about largely because of 
ambiguities within the term “consent.” Cathal Doyle & Jill Cariño point out, for example, DeBeers 
Canada’s shift between its 2008 policy, which employed the term “consent,” and its substitution in 2013 
of “free, prior and informed consultation.” “Making Free, Prior and Informed Consent a Reality, 
Indigenous Peoples and the Extractive Sector” (Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links, 2013) at 41. 
Available at: <www.piplinks.org/makingfpicareality> accessed 22 September 2014. Global mining 
corporation Rio Tinto’s policy similarly states that “Rio Tinto’s position is that it conforms to free prior 
informed consultation, recognising that there are definitional problems with the word ‘consent’ and that 
many countries reserve ultimate decisions on developmental permitting to the sovereign state.” See its 
Communities Standard (2011), available at 
http://www.riotinto.com/documents/ReportsPublications/Communities_standard.pdf, accessed 28 
September 2014. See also the International Finance Corporation’s 2012 Performance Standard 7: 
Indigenous Peoples, available at <http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1ee7038049a79139b845 
faa8c6a8312a/PS7_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES> accessed 28 September 2014. Shalanda H. 
Baker argues that the limited view of consent within the IFC policy still allows for a risk-oriented 
contractual relationship between indigenous and corporate parties, in which financial burdens of social 
and environmental impacts are shifted to the developer in exchange for consent, in “Why the IFC's Free, 
Prior, and Informed Consent Policy Does Not Matter (yet) to Indigenous Communities Affected by 
Development Projects” (2012) Wisconsin International Law Journal 30(4) 668 at 696. 
 
70
 The guiding principle of this policy states that:  
The Cree Government will support and promote the development of mineral resources within the 
territory of Eeyou Istchee that provides long term social and economic benefits for the Cree and 
that addresses sustainable development in compliance with the environmental and social 
protection regime of the JBNQA and that is compatible with the Cree way of life and protection 
of Cree rights in the Cree Territory.  
See Cree Nation Mining Policy (2010-07), at 4. Available at <http://www.gcc.ca/pdf/ENV000000014 
.pdf> accessed 21 September 2014.  
 
182 
 
has not been endorsed as having legal effect by either the Federal Government or the 
Courts. Canada is a signatory to the UNDRIP, but has not ratified the document. The 
Federal Government, in announcing its signing of the Declaration, stated that the 
Declaration is aspirational only and is legally a non-binding document that does not 
reflect customary international law nor change Canada’s domestic laws. 71 
Canada has recently confirmed its political position on the unsuitability of FPIC as a legal 
principle. In September 2014, its ambassador to the UN explained Canada's refusal to concur 
with a second statement from the UN General Assembly on indigenous peoples' rights:  
  Agreeing to paragraph 3 [reaffirming FPIC] of the Outcome Document would 
 commit Canada to work to integrate FPIC in its processes with respect to implementing 
 legislative or administrative measures affecting Aboriginal peoples. This would run 
 counter to Canada’s constitution, and if implemented, would risk fettering Parliamentary 
 supremacy.  
  Canada does not interpret FPIC as providing indigenous peoples with a veto.  
 Domestically, Canada consults with Aboriginal communities and organizations on 
 matters that may impact their interests or rights. This is important for good governance, 
 sound policy development and decision-making. Canada has strong consultation 
 processes in place, and our courts have reinforced the need for such processes as a matter 
 of law. Agreeing to paragraph 20 would negate this important aspect of Canadian law and 
 policy.
72
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 See Snuneymuxw First Nation v Board of Education – School District #68, 2014 BCSC 1173, at 59. 
The first case addressing FPIC was Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation v National Automobile, 
Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), Local 444, 2007 
ONCA 814 (CanLII), decided in the same year as the UN General Assembly passed UNDRIP, without (at 
the time) Canada's concurrence. There the court noted that: 
 While international law often is of assistance in the interpretation of domestic legal and 
 constitutional norms, the general language of the Draft Declaration does not, in my 
 view, provide any meaningful assistance to the resolution of the specific issue of Canadian 
 constitutional law presented here (ibid. at 46). 
In Hupacasath First Nation v Canada (Foreign Affairs), 2013 FC 900 (CanLII), at 51, the court found 
that appellants had failed to submit evidence that UNDRIP was relevant to Canadian law.  
 
72
 Paragraph 3 of the “Outcome Document” reaffirms the General Assembly members’ commitments to: 
consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own 
representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting 
and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them, in accordance with 
the applicable principles of the Declaration. 
Paragraph 20 reads: 
We recognize commitments made by States, with regard to the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, to consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed 
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources. 
See UN General Assembly “Outcome document of the high-level plenary meeting of the General 
Assembly known as the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples” A/69/L.1 (15 September 2014). 
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At the same time, Canada’s courts may well be moving closer to endorsing the view that 
international standards of indigenous rights amount to customary law. LaBel J. for instance, 
found in Hape that international norms not in conflict with Canadian domestic law are 
incorporated domestically without the necessity of legislative approval: 
In my view, following the common law tradition, it appears that the doctrine of adoption 
operates in Canada such that prohibitive rules of customary international law should be 
incorporated into domestic law in the absence of conflicting legislation. The automatic 
incorporation of such rules is justified on the basis that international custom, as the law of 
nations, is also the law of Canada unless, in a valid exercise of its sovereignty, Canada 
declares that its law is to the contrary.
73
  
 
As regards consent being an appropriate measure of justification and successful consultation, 
Canada does not at present have legislation that would on its face actually prevent the adoption 
of a strong FPIC prohibition on development or regulation without indigenous consent. Instead, 
policy is grounded, I believe, and as it appears in the UN ambassador’s statement, on slippery-
slope fears of what a consent requirement would do to economic development. 
 
 From a discourse perspective, what FPIC places before the courts, and before any other body 
engaged in consultation with First Nations or other indigenous communities aiming to develop 
mutual understanding, is the pragmatic necessity for such bodies to thematize why they would 
regard consent as unnecessary to obtain in advance of a development project or the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Available at <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/L.1> accessed 26 September 
2014. For the text of Canada’s response, see "Canada’s Statement on the World Conference on 
Indigenous Peoples Outcome Document," available at <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/prmny-
mponu/canada_un-canada_onu/statements-declarations/other-autres/2014-09-22_WCIPD-PADD.aspx> 
accessed 26 September 2014.  
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 R .v Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R, at para. 39. For an argument that Hape’s explanation of the relation between 
Canadian law and customary international law should bear on Canada’s sec. 35(1) obligations, see First 
Nations Leadership Council Advancing an Indigenous Framework for Consultation and Accommodation 
in BC, at 53. Available at <http://www.fns.bc.ca/pdf/319_UBCIC_IndigActionBook-
Text_loresSpreads.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014. 
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implementation of a regulation. That is, it forces those bodies to articulate a reason, a 
Habermasian “validity claim,” for why they hold the superior position of being able to dismiss 
lack of consent from a First Nation or other indigenous community. This is intrinsic to the 
communicative task of legal justification, which seeks to present decisions as “rationally 
grounded in the matter at issue so that all participants can accept them as rational decisions.”74 In 
Canada, one might object, my hypothetical depiction of the courts forced to articulate such 
underlying reasons is clearly an extra-legal intellectual hurdle that these duly authorised bodies 
are in no need of considering. Admittedly, my conception of the responsibility of the courts as 
well as the state to make such articulations is dependent upon the discourse theory argument that 
the public sphere “surrounds” the courts.75 Nevertheless, both the courts and the Canadian state 
have often indicated that the only reason they are able to provide for denying consent, in a 
discursive situation intended to bring mutual understanding, is “the assertion of the sovereignty 
of the Crown,”76 or, as the UN ambassador’s statement above indicates it, "Parliamentary 
supremacy." That same statement buttresses the ambassador’s reference to parliamentary 
supremacy by noting the Tsilhqoti'n Nation decision (though without mentioning it specifically) 
that in Canadian law "the Crown may justify the infringement of an Aboriginal or Treaty right if 
it meets a stringent test to reconcile Aboriginal rights with a broader public interest."  
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 BFN, at 199. As part of his concept of “dialogical governance,” James Sákéj Henderson also frames the 
relationship between the court and the public sphere as multi-valent. As he puts it: 
 The Court has emphasized the generation of a latent alliance between judicial decisions 
 concerning the realization of constitutional rights that connects with Aboriginal peoples' 
 grassroots movements and mobilization to constitutional dispute settlement as an  interactive 
 source of dynamic governance (supra p. 132 n. 29, at 62). 
 
75
 BFN. at 442. 
 
76
 Gladstone, supra p. 26 n. 57, at para. 72. 
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A lack of consent, however, remains an inherent possibility in any set of pragmatic 
communicative acts oriented towards mutual understanding, unless the party that might refuse 
consent concurs that it actually has no such ability to refuse. The question is not whether a 
legislature has granted an indigenous community such a power. Rather, it is whether a party has 
chosen to exclude itself from possessing this most basic feature of rationality.
77
 To hold 
otherwise is to also hold that the rights "recognized and affirmed" in sec. 35(1) are actually the 
product of a legislative act – a conclusion that the courts (though often not the state) have 
resisted. This position is rightly rejected, because it would entail holding that throughout 
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 That such a possibility is inherent within rational human nature is a basic feature of philosophical 
liberalism. Both Hobbes and Locke tied consent to the rational drive for self-preservation. As Locke put it 
in his discussion of “prerogative”:  
And therefore, though the people cannot be judge, so as to have, by the constitution of that 
society, any superior power, to determine and give effective sentence in the case; yet they have, 
by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men, reserved that ultimate 
determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind, where there lies no appeal on earth, 
viz. to judge, whether they have just cause to make their appeal to heaven. And this judgment 
they cannot part with, it being out of a man's power so to submit himself to another, as to give 
him a liberty to destroy him; God and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself, as to 
neglect his own preservation: and since he cannot take away his own life, neither can he give 
another power to take it. 
See his Two Treatises of Government (London: Whitemore, Fenn and Brown, 1821) chp. 14, sec. 108. 
Available at https://archive.org/details/twotreatisesofg00lockuoft, accessed 29 September 2014.  To deny 
consent, then, is to deny rational nature. And while exactly this presumption is part of traditional notions 
of Indian wardship in the US and Canada, such notions should not continue to function within law.  
 The SCC’s approach to the dismissal of previously enshrined legal doctrines concerning 
indigenous peoples, however, is itself part of the problem. The court frames its rejections of the 
ideological underpinnings of traditional doctrines in the gentle tones of one observing a shift in the 
weather rather than in an explicit rejection of the hold of evil ideas. Thus, in Simon, Dickson C.J. rejected 
the colonial assumptions of savagery and civilization employed in R. v Syliboy, [1929] 1 DLR 307, in 
terms that make the passage of time itself the active force in the dismissal of contemptible assumptions: 
 It should be noted that the language used by Patterson J. illustrated in this passage, reflects the 
 biases and prejudices of another era in our history. Such language is no longer acceptable in 
 Canadian law and indeed is inconsistent with a growing sensitivity to native rights in Canada 
 (Simon, supra p. 17 n. 27, at 399). 
More recently, although the court had submissions from interveners in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case 
focused on the “doctrine of discovery” – the historical source for settler state notions of title, McLachlin 
C.J. only stated that the “doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the land prior to European assertion 
of sovereignty) never applied in Canada, as confirmed by the Royal Proclamation” (supra p. 43 n. 107, at 
para. 69) reducing to an anachronism the interveners’ concern with the ongoing influence of that most 
powerful doctrine.  
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Canada's history its "Crown" has provided a kind of initial legal garb to those indigenous parties 
with whom it sought to form a relationship, as though they were previously legally naked; 
instead of accepting that they were already clothed in legal garb of their own making. 
Justification, if it is an instance of establishing the rational legitimacy of a regulation or piece of 
legislation, and in the specifically "intersocietal" context necessary for rational legitimacy 
between Canada and First Nations and other Aboriginal communities, can only occur upon the 
mutual consent of the parties affected.
78
  
 
When Canada's government denies that indigenous communities possess a “veto,” and when its 
courts defer to this political viewpoint, the issue lurking underneath is the long festering matter 
of "sovereignty."
79
 Although the justification leg of the duty to consult scaffolding leads 
necessarily to consideration of sovereignty, the court has most consistently referred to it in 
relation to the third leg, that of "reconciliation,” which I will address below. Unfortunately, this 
seems from a discourse perspective rather like having to change the subject before successfully 
concluding a pragmatic resolution, and at a minimum indicates that the court should not continue 
to avoid giving full consideration to the continued role the of the doctrine of Crown sovereignty 
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 Admittedly, Lamer C.J. came close to acknowledging this in Van der Peet, referring there to both Mark 
Walters and Brian Slattery “suggesting” that the appropriate understanding of law in Canada was an 
“intersocietal” one (supra p. 2 n. 3, at para. 42). 
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 That is, assuming for argument’s sake that “veto” has a clear meaning in practice, which it may well not 
have, but which I won’t pursue further here. Part of the slipperiness of “veto” is apparent in Delgamuukw, 
where Lamer C.J. does say that consultation may “require the full consent of an aboriginal nation, 
particularly when provinces enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal lands” (supra 
p. 13 n. 16, at para. 168). This acknowledgment of full consent related to infringements on hunting and 
fishing rights, in a case regarding infringement on title, is less than a direct endorsement of full consent. 
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in Canada’s relations with indigenous people, a point that indigenous parties and legal theorists 
have been advocating for some time.
80
                                                 
80
 One recent example is Henderson’s model of “dialogical governance.” Habermas’s own vision of the 
not-yet realized political (rather than economic) form of the European Union, contended for in The Crisis 
of the European Union: a Response (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), bears some resemblance to 
Henderson’s argument for a dynamic constitutional form of democratic governance inclusive of 
indigenous voices. As Henderson casts the discursive basis of this form of governance:  
Dialogical relationship operates jointly to resolve common jurisdictional challenges on a 
consensual foundation rather than relying on rivalry, coercive legislation, and policy-making 
dominated by majorities in federal and provincial governments. The underlying constitutional 
principle of the dialogical relationship between the Crown and First Nations is based on the fact 
that they are constitutionally protected with a distinct constitutional voice…. The Crown and First 
Nations must seek a just convergence of Aboriginal and treaty rights under the principle of 
constitutional democracy and federalism (supra p. 132 n. 29, at 57). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Discourse Norms and the Duty to Consult: Reconciliation and “Honour of the Crown” 
 
A. The theme of reconciliation in the duty to consult 
Although the third leg of the duty to consult scaffold, “reconciliation,” may seem to be as much a 
task as is justification, I refer to it as a theme. Justification suggests, for the courts, particular 
procedures, tests, and sorts of arguments. With reconciliation, finding particular measures 
comparable with, for instance, the cost-benefit analyses implied within Delgamuukw’s vision of 
generally justifiable projects, is virtually impossible. And if, even though Sparrow rejected it, 
justification might still be glossed as satisfied by demonstrating that a regulation or piece of 
legislation is a “valid enactment,” there are no equivalent textual or formal demonstrations to 
indicate that reconciliation has occurred.  
 
As a term, “reconciliation” is prone to considerable ambiguity. Legal historian Mark Walters, 
however, has argued that reconciliation does possess a legal meaning, one developed by the 
courts in the years since 1982, largely through the same cases that have determined the duty to 
consult.
1
 At the same time, however, he claims to see three common but separate meanings of 
reconciliation: resignation, relationship and consistency, each operating within sec. 35(1) 
jurisprudence, as well as within such state-sponsored efforts to respond to indigenous frustrations 
                                                 
1
 See his “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” pp. 165- 91, in Will 
Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir (eds.) The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of Canada.
2
 Several authors have charted the conflicting approaches to reconciliation that have 
animated treaty-making strategies, pursuit of claims, and development of public rhetoric, on the 
parts of Canada, the provinces, and a variety of First Nations.
3
 The term then as employed within 
legal discourse, remains deeply contested. 
 
A survey of the most influential statements from the SCC regarding reconciliation shows little 
effort to probe the meaning and appropriate usage of the term itself. As I noted above, Dickson 
C.J. in Sparrow initially used “reconcile” to frame the relationship between “federal power and 
federal duty,” envisioning then a judicial task of finding consistency. I draw two conclusions 
from this usage. The first is that this particular cast of the term is quite derivative. The OED, for 
instance, lists the use of “reconcile” as “make consistent” (either of theories and facts, or 
collections of numbers) as the tenth and eleventh, out of twelve different streams of use. The 
second conclusion, is that in this usage one might presume that there seems little call for 
Habermas’s discursive approach to law, since an effort to achieve this form of reconciliation 
would require no multi-party communication oriented towards mutual understanding.  
 
                                                 
2
 It remains well beyond my scope here to examine the relationship between the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s use of the term and its employment within the mandates of the RCAP, or the TRC – which was 
established after the primary formulations of reconciliation within the case law that produced the doctrine 
of the duty to consult. See the 2006 “Mandate for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” available at 
<http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/File/pdfs/SCHEDULE_N_EN.pdf> accessed 30 September 
2014. For an critical reading of the process of reconciliation in Canada, see Jennifer Henderson and 
Pauline Wakeham “Colonial Reckoning, National Reconciliation?: Aboriginal Peoples and the Culture of 
Redress in Canada” (2009) ESC: English Studies in Canada 35(1)1. 
  
3
 See, for instance, Rachel Ariss and John Cutfeet supra p. 41 n. 100; Carole Blackburn “Producing 
Legitimacy: Reconciliation and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Rights in Canada” (2007) The Journal of 
the Royal Anthropological Institute (13)3 621; and Egan, supra p. 118 n. 52. 
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In its main expression within the SCC texts, the term underwent a startling transformation in the 
Aboriginal rights decisions of Chief Justice Lamer. In his statements on the duty to consult in 
Delgamuukw, he brought into play the transformed vision of reconciliation that he laid out most 
extensively in Van der Peet, and then augmented in Gladstone.  As he first cast it, the purpose of 
sec. 35(1) was “directed towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies 
with the sovereignty of the Crown.”4 Further on, he framed this purpose as “reconciling pre-
existing aboriginal societies with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over Canada.”5 A brief 
search of CanLII reveals that this formulation of reconciliation (pre-existence of aboriginal 
societies with the assertion of Crown sovereignty) has been quite influential – being quoted or 
closely paraphrased in over half of the 392 cases that refer to “aboriginal rights” and 
“sovereignty” in the same sentence. It might seem that we could detect a gradual move away 
from this sort of construction, since in Tsilhqot’in Nation McLachlin C.J. came to speak simply 
of “reconciling Aboriginal interests with the broader public interests,”6 “the broader interests of 
society as a whole,” 7 or “the interests of all Canadians.”8 However, in the last instance she did 
this while explicitly equating her own with the formulation of Lamer C.J. Also, in 2013, she 
applied the original Lamer formulation in Metis Nation.
9
 Another variation, although much more 
infrequently employed in other decisions (only 19 times – although this may be more tied to its 
                                                 
4
 Van der Peet, supra p. 2 n. 3, at para. 31. 
 
5
 Ibid. at para. 57. 
 
6
 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra p. 43 n. 107, at para. 71. 
 
7
 Ibid. at para. 82. 
 
8
 Ibid. at para. 125. 
 
9
 Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), [2013] 1 SCR 623, at paras. 9 and 66. 
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specific context), is her statement in Haida Nation that “[t]reaties serve to reconcile pre-existing 
Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty.”10 Another usage in Haida Nation 
contrasts “the prior Aboriginal occupation of the land with the reality of Crown sovereignty.”11 
In Mikisew Binnie J. provided still another usage that might have led away from that of Lamer 
C.J.. He claimed there to be concerned with: “the reconciliation of aboriginal peoples and non-
aboriginal peoples and their respective claims, interests and ambitions.”12 This usage, which 
seems stripped of several key Van der Peet assumptions, CanLII indicates has only been drawn 
on 18 times in subsequent decisions.  
 
What is intriguing about Lamer C.J.s’ framing of reconciliation is that for all its apparent 
congruence with the sort of pragmatic orientation to discourse that Habermas says is central to 
the legitimacy of law, it actually avoids grappling with just the discursive conditions which 
would make reconciliation rationally legitimate. Three points illustrate this. The first arises in his 
statement that reconciliation concerns “pre-existing aboriginal occupation” on the one hand and 
“asserted Crown sovereignty” on the other. While this may seem like a potentially useful pairing 
to hold in juxtaposition, it is more like equating apples and oranges. Throughout Lamer C.J.’s 
depiction of reconciliation in Van der Peet, and subsequently, he juxtaposed a sociological 
category with a political category. Thus “pre-existing aboriginal occupation” refers to 
“distinctive” groups “with their own practices, customs and traditions.”13 Lamer’s focus on 
                                                 
10
 Haida Nation, supra p. 1 n. 2, at para. 20. 
 
11
 Ibid. at para. 26. 
 
12
 Mikisew, supra p. 41 n. 101, at para. at 1. 
 
13
 Van der Peet, supra p. 2 n. 3, at para. 44.  
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indigenous societies as sociological entities, rather than as autonomous political entities 
grounded in independent legal orders, is in keeping with the courts’ traditional casting of the 
relationship between the two different sorts of legal orders. This is apparent in St. Catharines 
Milling and Lumber, and extends backwards into the foundations of liberal political thought in 
the work of theorists such as Hobbes, if not further.
14
 That it remains substantially unquestioned, 
places a troublesome validity claim at the heart of Canada’s position in its discourse with First 
Nations, who have consistently framed their own discourse with settler parties as stemming from 
their continued position as autonomous legal/political entities. 
 
This miscasting of the dialogical situation between a sociological and a political entity leads to 
the second problematic assumption in Lamer C.J.’s conception of reconciliation. To see 
indigenous societies in sociological terms leads easily to the trope of parts and wholes, in which 
Canada has continually cast its discourse with indigenous nations. Alexander Morris, for 
instance, in conference at Fort Carlton for what became Treaty 6, framed his opposition to Cree 
demands by saying that the Crees were merely some of the Queen’s many children. As he 
wrestled with the contending implications of his portrait of the Queen as a benevolent and 
generous figure, and the constraints of parliamentary budgets: “I cannot undertake the 
responsibility of promising provision for the poor, blind and lame. In all parts of the Queen’s 
dominions we have them; the poor whites have as much reason to be helped as the poor Indian; 
                                                 
14
 As he expressed a common 17
th
 century European impression of New World inhabitants in his “state of 
nature” argument: “For the savage people of America, except the government of small families, the 
concord whereof depends on natural lust, have not government at all” in Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme 
and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil Oakeshott edition (New York: Collier 
MacMillan, 1962 [1651]) 1/13, at 101. 
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they must be left to the charity and kind hearts of the people.”15 Not only did he situate the Crees 
as parts of the larger whole of settler society, Morris also portrayed them as in competition for 
the Queen’s bounty with other indigenous communities: “you have to think only of yourselves, 
we have to think of all the Indians and of the way in which we can procure the money to 
purchase all the things the Indians require.”16 In the same way Lamer in Gladstone conceived of 
reconciliation requiring the adjustment of the part (aboriginal) with the “community as a whole” 
(Canada at large).
17
 As I noted above, this same view extends into McLachlin’s C.J.’s thinking in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation. In this conception, which the court following Lamer C.J. has been most 
inclined to view in terms of the force of large-scale, and inevitable, economic, technological and 
demographic transformations; the imaginable consultation paradigm is always one of adaptation 
– minimally destructive one hopes – but nevertheless, adaptation to the forces that have always 
already structured the larger whole, and which it merely seeks to extend. Reconciliation then 
means adaptation to the inevitable, as Walters notes.
18
 
 
The third problematic assumption in the court’s consideration of reconciliation leads from the 
second. If reconciliation is a process of adjustment between parts and wholes, where does the 
legitimacy of the part’s adjustment to the whole come from? In the language of reconciliation, 
such an adjustment can only be thought of as a reflection of the power of the larger whole. 
However, the term’s usage in this way is only really thinkable in one semantic context, one 
                                                 
15
 The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories (Toronto: 
Belfords, Clarke and Co., 1880 [Cole reprint, 1971]), at 217. 
  
16
 Ibid. at 218. 
 
17
 Gladstone, supra p. 26 n. 57, at para. 73. 
 
18
 Walters, supra p. 188 n. 1, at 179. 
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unfortunately never acknowledged by the court, even though it is, as the OED indicates, the most 
basic stream of usage in English. Reconciliation is, at bottom, a theological term, the product of 
the Christian tradition’s conception of a means to restore an alienated relationship between God 
and humanity, or in the Apostle Paul’s writings, the whole of creation with the Creator. In this 
tradition, the relation between parts and whole, or between lesser and greater power, may well 
make sense.
19
 If the creation reflects the design of the Creator, then as the product of the Creator 
it could be expected to respond with the kinds of adjustments that reconciliation seems to require 
of First Nations in Canada. And, in that tradition, the creation’s acknowledgement of the Creator 
is a communicative act that is both pragmatic and performative: it requires repentance, a human 
act of will and promise-making. However, the Creator’s part in reconciliation is an offer of grace 
and benevolence, not one of necessity. Within a pragmatic legal context, oriented towards mutual 
understanding – which any meaningful act or process of reconciliation must be – reconciliation 
must be seen as a relationship between legal equals. 
 
Another implication of this theological core to the term reconciliation may well be at the heart of 
the inadequately discursive cast of Lamer C.J.’s original formulation. As he put it, reconciliation 
concerned the “assertion of Crown sovereignty.” The idea that sovereignty can be asserted is 
discursively troublesome (that is, how it could be readily responded to without coercion), apart 
from imagining a creative power similar to that held within biblical tradition, which envisions 
God creating the world with a word, and in the Christian account, conceives of the world’s 
                                                 
19
 As Paul put it in one influential text: 
For in him all the fulness of God was pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself all 
things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross. And you, who once 
were estranged and hostile in mind, doing evil deeds, he has now reconciled in his body of flesh 
by his death, in order to present you holy and blameless and irreproachable before him 
(Colossians 1:20-21). 
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redeemer himself being a word. Apart from having that sort of pedigree, how a state could 
imagine its relations with other parties to have been successfully structured by a one-sided 
assertion is impossible to entertain, other than as a kind of flawed validity claim.
20
  
 
Certainly, indigenous parties in Canada have long rejected this formulation. Pragmatically, their 
rejections are sufficient to make questionable the assertion, which could only have credible 
meaning through an act of consent. Instead of what we might call this assertional sovereignty, 
Henderson has also argued that indigenous nations have consistently held to what he refers to as 
“dialogical sovereignty,” in his description of Míkmaq legal order.21 We can see this pragmatic 
stance evident in statements such as those of Wabanaki and Míkmaq representatives at the 1725 
Boston conference that led to ratification of the Wabanaki Compact. Henderson quotes two 
responses to the English assertion of Crown sovereignty. From the Wabanki representative: 
“when you hae ask'd me if I acknowledg'd Him for king i answer'd yes butt att the same time 
have made you take notice that I did not understand to acknowledge Him for my king butt only 
that I own'd that he was king his kingdom as the king of France is king of His.” As well, the 
Míkmaq representatives responded that they would: “"pay all the respect & Duty to the King of 
                                                 
20
 One could interpret the court’s use of “assertion” as a kind of implicit critique of the claim to 
sovereignty, as though the court were consistently distinguishing between de jure and de facto.  
McLachlin C.J. does employ this distinction at one point in Haida Nation, saying: 
 This process of reconciliation flows from the Crown’s duty of honourable dealing toward 
 Aboriginal peoples, which arises in turn from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty 
 over an Aboriginal people and de facto control of land and resources that were 
 formerly in the control of that people (supra p.1 n. 2, at para. 32). 
However, the Lamer usage suggests nothing of such an implicit critique. This move would be more 
recognizable had the courts taken this practice up more broadly, or had they referred to a “presumed” 
sovereignty. Further, if the case law concerned with reconciliation and consultation did reflect an implicit 
critique of Crown sovereignty, I am inclined to think this would have encouraged the justices to provide a 
more direct examination of the concept by now. 
 
21
 See his “First Nations Legal Inheritances” supra p. 138 n. 41, at 12.  
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Great Britain as we did to ye King of France, but we reckon our selves a free People and are not 
bound."
22
 
 
Finally, the theme of reconciliation employed by the court (and echoed in numerous lower court 
decisions, in provincial and federal policy statements, and adopted into the public discourse of 
First Nations, advocacy groups of various stripes, and the public faces of corporations and 
industry umbrella groups) raises a discursive claim that is inherently historical. To reconcile 
must mean to bring something together again: re-concile. As I said above, its usage as merely 
bringing together (without a previous state of alienation) is derivative, and is evident in 
McLachlin C.J.’s statement in Haida Nation: “Balance and compromise are inherent in the 
notion of reconciliation.”23 Still, the courts cannot credibly maintain that the duty to consult 
serves to bring together again, to form compromises on varying interests, in the necessarily 
historical sense the term requires. Canada’s history is not one in which formerly amicable parties 
were somehow alienated from each other. To employ the term in a pragmatic validity claim that 
could withstand scrutiny, the courts and Canada would have to point to an earlier amicable state, 
and be able to provide an explanation for an ensuing period of alienation that indigenous nations 
who have participated in this alienation could concur with. Instead, as the progressive narrative 
of Canada indicates, and which I argued above constitutes the first support for the duty to 
consult, the court has tried to frame Canada’s history as a move from darkness to light, from 
injustice to justice. If one instead responds that the historical treaty relationship demonstrates just 
                                                 
22
 Both in his “Empowering Treaty Federalism,” supra p. 102 n. 23, at 254. 
 
23
 See Haida Nation, supra p. 1 n. 2, at para. 50. Her point there was clearly made in light of a derivative 
sense of reconciliation. In its theological, or even its personally intimate cast, balance and compromise are 
far from central to the gist of the term. Neither the Mosaic covenant nor the crucifixion of Jesus involve 
compromise, nor is it necessarily central to moments of personal reconciliation which typically, 
somewhat like the theological casts, employ themes of atonement and forgiveness.  
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such a shift from amicability to alienation, then the progressive narrative undergirding the duty 
to consult would fail. As well, one would not be able to make such a response by referring to the 
treaties as Canada or its courts have understood them. The post-Simon dismissal of R. v Syliboy 
is not the demonstration of this. Rather, Syliboy and St. Catharines Milling demonstrate that the 
treaty relationship was, for both Canada and the courts, seen within the colonial gaze that 
accompanied the assertions of sovereignty.  
 
The only way to hold to a discursively useful meaning of “reconciliation” as it might support the 
duty to consult, is to approach it from the perspectives of those indigenous nations that signed 
treaties in good faith, made uncountable but costly adjustments to their lives, institutions, and 
economies, and shared their worlds generously, though not in acts of subjection to superior 
power or legitimate authority. But this would mean, as Borrows, Henderson and many others 
have argued for some time now, abandoning the very notion of sovereignty that reconciliation 
tries to protect. It would require a fundamental consideration of the “intersocietal” basis of 
Canada’s law, and not merely the brief and indirect acknowledgment that Dickson C.J. provided 
in Van der Peet.
24
 It would also require accepting that historical and contemporary treaty 
relationships have to be regarded as founded on legal equality in order to attain rational 
legitimacy. 
 
 
                                                 
24
Van der Peet, supra p. 2 n. 3, at para. 50. There, acknowledging the influence of Mark Walters, he 
mentioned an approach to defining an aboriginal right that “takes into account the aboriginal perspective 
while at the same time taking into account the perspective of the common law. True reconciliation will, 
equally, place weight on each.” The chief justice was, however, only referring to the definition of a 
particular right in the context of making a claim before a court. He was not advocating a more full-
fledged consideration of an intersocietal approach to Canada’s legal relations with indigenous nations. 
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D. The “honour of the Crown” as discursive ideal 
In Haida Nation McLachlin C.J. referred to the “historical roots of the principle of the honour of 
the Crown” which suggested to her that “it must be understood generously in order to reflect the 
underlying realities from which it stems.”25 Nowhere in her opinion, however, is there any more 
specific reference to what those historical roots might be.
26
 Given its central role in steering the 
consultation process developed to ensure the protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights, and to 
achieve the national goal of reconciliation, the lack of attention to documenting the historical 
function and usage of the term “honour of the Crown” seems at best incomplete. If the court had 
simply chosen to begin employing the term as a common expression, that would raise one sort of 
question about its suitability in a legal setting. However, to allude to a history and then not 
document it raises other questions about the discursive aims in its employment. Given its central 
role in supporting the duty to consult, these discursive aims are worth clarifying.  
 
Scholarship on the “honour of the Crown” is not extensive; but reference to it within recent case 
law is. As well, reference to it within administrative protocols, policy statements from various 
government departments, and the promotional literature of large numbers of corporate resource 
developers, or law firms advising such clients, is certainly extensive. It also appears in the 
position papers of First Nations governance groups, NGOs concerned with Aboriginal rights or 
environmental issues, and in documents produced by individual First Nations. Perhaps this wide 
spread usage (that is, especially since Haida Nation in 2004) means that the “honour of the 
Crown” is readily transparent, and in no need of critical scrutiny by the justices who have 
                                                 
25
 Haida Nation, supra p. 1 n. 2, at para. 17. 
 
26
 Mariana Valverde, supra p. 39 n. 95, at 969, has also commented on this absence, though without 
pursuing it as I do here. 
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employed it, or by the scholars who interpret their work.
27
 Ontario’s 2006 draft guidelines on 
consultation, for instance, note that: “The Crown’s duty to consult has its source in the honour of 
the Crown and the constitutional protection accorded Aboriginal rights and treaty rights under 
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.” That document quotes from McLachlin C.J.’s Taku 
River opinion (although without including her judgment that the province of British Columbia 
held an “impoverished vision of the honour of the Crown” found earlier in the same paragraph): 
 In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, the Crown must act honourably, in accordance 
 with its historical and future relationship with the Aboriginal peoples in question. The 
 Crown’s honour cannot be interpreted narrowly or technically, but must be given full 
 effect in order to promote the process of reconciliation mandated by s. 35(1).
28
 
 
Given the contemporary significance of the “honour of the Crown” as an ideal standard for the 
court to employ in assessing government conduct related to Aboriginal and treaty rights, the first 
issue to clarify is what the term’s history of use indicates about its basic meaning, and the range 
of its employment.  
 
A rough scan of the 1,174 SCC decisions on CanLII employing the root term “honour” indicates 
that in over 90% of those decisions, dating back to the court’s initial term in 1876, “honour” 
itself was used only in reference to someone holding a court office: “the Honourable.”29 Only 
                                                 
27
 For instance, although the updated federal guidelines on consultation paraphrase at several points the 
usage of “honour” in Haida Nation, the list of definitions supplied in annex A of that document does not 
include “honour.” See Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation: Updated Guidelines for Federal 
Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult (Ottawa: DIAND, 2011) at 61. Available at <http://www.aandc-
aadnc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014649> accessed 15 October 2014. 
   
28
 “Draft Guidelines for Ministries on Consultation with Aboriginal Peoples Related to Aboriginal Rights 
and Treaty Rights” Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs (Ontario, 2006). Available at <https://www.ontario.ca/ 
government/draft-guidelines-ministries-consultation-aboriginal-peoples-related-aboriginal> accessed 5 
October 2014. See also Taku River First Nation v B.C., [2004] 3 SCR 550, at 24. 
 
29
 The same sort of scan applied to the whole of Canada’s jurisprudence available on CanLII emphasizes 
this pattern of usage even more dramatically. Out of the 193,875 decisions employing “honour” in some 
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fifteen decisions employed it as a personable attribute: a “man of honour,” or, somewhat 
differently in one decision – the “honour of a woman.”30 In thirty to forty cases it was tied to a 
financial or contractual agreement: “honouring a cheque” or a contract. In only 34 cases has 
“honour of the Crown,” or in one variant from 1915 – “the honour and dignity of the Crown” – 
itself appeared.
31
 Prior to Sparrow, which introduced it into more general usage in Aboriginal 
rights cases (that is, in 28 of the 34 SCC cases employing the term), it occurred in only a handful 
of SCC opinions concerned with Indians.  
 
An SCC decision from 1895 marks the first use of “honour of the Crown” in relation to Indians. 
Appearing before the SCC, Ontario’s counsel, S.H. Blake, argued that the Indian parties to the 
Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850 were said to:  
 retain---and it is specified in the treaty as all that they do retain---the right to fish and 
 shoot on all the other lands until the Government chooses to sell them; but the moment it 
 gives them away, or sells them, or leases them, that ends it. They take a certain sum of 
 money down, and they take the promise of the Government, which embraces the honour 
 of the Crown, which embraces all, it may be, that might come from the lands, which 
 embraces all the revenues of the Government. They take that promise and set absolutely 
 free all these lands; and if these lands are not set absolutely free from any trust and from 
 any interest, then the whole object of the treaty is utterly and entirely defeated.
32
 
 
The honour embraced here is not framed as bearing on whether or not the “object of the treaty” is 
“defeated.” The concern is rather simply that the acquisition of the lands might be put at risk if a 
                                                                                                                                                             
form, 174,208 do so only as an attribute of office. 466 refer to the “honour of the Crown,” and of those, 
447 are Aboriginal or treaty rights cases, only eight of which were considered prior to Sparrow. 
 
30
 This last occurred in an appeal from a manslaughter case, The King v Hughes, [1942] SCR 517, at 523. 
 
31
 R. v Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co., [1915] 50 SCR 534. 
 
32
 The Province of Ontario v the Dominion of Canada and the Province of Quebec; In Re Indian Claims 
(1895), 25 SCR 434, at 13. Available at http://gsdl.ubcic.bc.ca/collect/firstna1/archives/HASH01 
ce/9e4969b7.dir/doc.pdf, accessed 28 September 2014.  
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trust was thought to have been established. That case concerned whether the provinces of 
Ontario and Quebec or the federal government bore the financial responsibility for increasing the 
annuities owed Huron-Robinson treaty partners due to profits generated from the development of 
treaty lands. “Honour of the Crown” also appeared in Gwynne J.’s dissenting opinion. Both 
parties, then, expressed an understanding of the issue as tied to the “honour of the Crown.” In 
Gwynne J.’s opinion, honour is cast less glibly than it appears in the words of Ontario’s counsel:   
…the British sovereigns, ever since the acquisition of Canada, have been pleased to 
adopt the rule or practice of entering into agreements with the Indian nations or tribes in 
their province of Canada, for the cession or surrender by them of what such sovereigns 
have been pleased to designate the Indian title, by instruments similar to these now under 
consideration to which they have been pleased to give the designation of "treaties" with 
the Indians in possession of and claiming title to the lands expressed to be surrendered by 
the instruments, and further that the terms and conditions expressed in those instruments 
as to be performed by or on behalf of the Crown, have always been regarded as involving 
a trust graciously assumed by the Crown to the fulfilment of which with the Indians the 
faith and honour of the Crown is pledged, and which trust has always been most 
faithfully fulfilled as a treaty obligation of the Crown.
33
 
 
The issue of whether or not the treaty constituted a “trust” did not turn on the meaning of the 
“honour of the Crown.” For both parties, honour is a quality expressed through the “pleasure” of 
the Crown, a descriptive characteristic, not a critical standard external to the pleasure – the will, 
or prerogative – of state power.34 
                                                 
33
 Ibid. at 27. 
 
34
 In Ross River Dena Council v the Attorney General of Canada, supra p. 95 n. 11, the Yukon Supreme 
Court dismissed an appeal from the Ross River Dena First Nation, concluding that the plaintiff’s 
argument that the “honour of the Crown” obligated Canada to undertake post-Confederation treaties with 
western tribes, and to fulfill promises for compensation contained in the 1870 Rupert’s Land and North-
western Territory Order (U.K.), 23 June 1870 (R.S.C. 1985, II/9), reflected a non-justiciable 
understanding of both “promise” and “honour of the Crown.” Drawing on testimony of legal historian 
Paul McHugh, the court concluded that neither term, historically, could be enforced against the royal 
prerogative, ibid. at 150. The relevant promise for compensation regarding the surrender came from an 
1867 speech from the Dominion to the Queen, maintaining in part that: 
  And furthermore that, upon the transference of the territories in question to the Canadian 
 Government, the claims of the Indian tribes to compensation for lands required for 
 purposes of settlement will be considered and settled in conformity with the equitable 
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This same gloss on honour – that it is readily embodied in government action, more a description 
than a standard – is evident in Ontario v the Dominion (1909). As I noted above in regard to this 
decision’s narrative of British policy derived from the Royal Proclamation, the JCPC said the 
policy led “those responsible for the honour of the Crown” to establish “many treaties whereby 
Indians agreed to surrender such rights as they were supposed to have in areas respectively 
specified in such treaties.”35 This is to say that the treaties of surrender, in which all rights 
outside of those remaining at the pleasure of the state were given up, were consistent with the 
“honour of the Crown.” 
  
Additionally, at times justices have employed the term more as a critical standard, though 
generally only in dissent, that is, in order to heighten their opposition to a ruling in favour of an 
expression of state power. For instance, in Bonanza Mining, a non-Indian case from 1915, 
Idington J. argued that the appeal of a joint-stock mining company incorporated in Ontario, but 
having licenses from the federal government for claims in Yukon Territory, was wrongly 
dismissed, and in a way that triggered his concern for the “honour and dignity of the Crown.”36 
In his dissent in George (1966), Cartwright J. made the first critical use of the term in Canadian 
Indian law, in his distinction between the idea of the sovereign’s honour and Canada’s actions 
towards Indians, while quoting from Lord Edward Coke’s opinion in the 1613 St. Saviour's 
Southwark (Churchwardens) case:  
                                                                                                                                                             
 principles which have uniformly governed the British Crown in its dealings with the 
 aborigines (ibid. at para. 1).  
 
35
 Supra p. 200 n. 32, at 103.  
 
36
 Supra p. 200 n. 31, at 570.  
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 If two constructions may be made of the King's grant, then the rule is, when it may 
 receive two constructions, and by force of one construction the grant may according to 
 the rule of law be adjudged good, and by another it shall by law be adjudged bad; then for 
 the King's honour, and for the benefit of the subject, such construction shall be made that 
 the King's charter shall take effect, for it was not the King's intent to make a void 
 grant….37 
 
Cartwright J.’s turn to the work of Coke to support his critique of state regulation is significant. 
Coke’s long-running (and personally costly) battles as a jurist and as an opposition member of 
Parliament to constrain royal power were grounded in his determination to advance the rule of 
law over the prerogative of the sovereign.
38
  
                                                 
37
 R. v George, [1966] SCR 267, at 279. For Churchwardens (1613), see The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, 
(Dublin: J. Moore, 1793), v 5, image 494. Available at: Eighteenth Century Collections Online, accessed 
3 October 2014.  
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 In the only other opinion invoking Churchwardens (1613) in Canadian law prior to Marshall ([1999] 3 
SCR 456, at para. 43),  R. v Walker, [1970] SCR 649, at 662, Martland J. wrote for the majority, with 
Cartwright C.J. concurring, that: 
The Crown, just as much as individuals, is obligated to perform its contracts. Such obligation may 
be discharged by appropriate statutory provisions, but in the absence of clear statutory authority, 
it cannot evade that obligation (ibid. at 665). 
Of the other five opinions referring to Churchwardens (1613), one, like Walker, was a non-Aboriginal 
rights case concerned with leasing park lands: Abbott v Canada, [2001] 3 FCR 342. The other four are 
Marshall, Manitoba Métis Foundation (2013 SCC 14, at para. 73) , Beattie v Canada, 2005 FC 715, and 
the more recent Corporation de négociation Ashuanipi c. Canada (Procureur général), 2014 QCCA 920.  
 For an overview of Coke’s approach to common law and his battles with proponents of James I’s 
royal prerogative, see Jason S. Crye “Ancient Constitutionalism: Sir Edward Coke's Contribution to the 
Anglo-American Legal Tradition” (2009) The Journal of Jurisprudence 3(2) 235. Coke’s often-quoted 
remark on the role of precedent: “Out of the old fields must come the new corn,” and his own ability to 
find precedent in decisions rendered hundreds of years before his own time, may well indicate that the use 
of honour in Churchwardens is applicable to its use in Canadian courts. My point is simply that it can’t be 
regarded as having played the sort of historically significant role that McLachlin C.J. or the courts post-
Marshall have suggested. See Allen D. Boyer Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan Age (Stanford CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2003) at 155, and Crye, ibid. at 249. For a recent argument that Coke’s 
approach to common law reasoning was as much an effort to ensure the authority of the king as it was to 
protect the “ancient constitution,” see David Chan Smith “Remembering Usurpation: the Common 
Lawyers, Reformation Narratives and the Prerogative, 1578–1616” (2013) Historical Research 86(234) 
619. 
 The other precedent citation giving substance to the historically rooted vision of the “honour of 
the Crown” is Roger Earl of Rutland’s Case (1608), 8 Co. Rep. 55. See The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, 
(Dublin: J. Moore, 1793), v 4, image 304. Available at: Eighteenth Century Collections Online, accessed 
3 October 2014.  As with Churchwardens (1613), this is also only cited in Marshall, Manitoba Métis 
Foundation, and the other two opinions just mentioned above. In both of those additional cases, the 
courts’ dismissal of the appeals rejected the appellants’ “honour of the Crown” invocations. Ashuanipi 
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However, this critical construction of the “honour of the Crown” in Churchwardens (1613): that 
it serves to block the actual aims of royal, or in Canada’s case – federal or provincial – power, is 
difficult to maintain when viewed through the history of the “honour of the Crown” as used by 
the courts. Admittedly, in Marshall (1999), and more recently in Manitoba Métis Federation 
(2013), Churchwardens appears quoted as it was in George.
39
 And it may well be that this is 
what McLachlin C.J. meant in referring to the “historical roots of the principle.” These 
references, though, do little to demonstrate the kind of continuity that one would think the 
“historical roots” of a major legal principle would be capable of demonstrating.  
 
In the 33 years between George and Marshall, reference to Cartwright’s dissent in George only 
crops up within three opinions in Canada’s courts, while five other opinions incorporate the 
majority view. In two of those appearances, both dissents, one referred to Cartwright, and 
Cartwright himself (by then SCC chief justice), authored the other. The two dissenting opinions 
mention neither the “honour of the Crown” nor Churchwardens, although Cartwright C.J.’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
concerned an Innu association’s financial irregularities in the use of DIAND land claim research funds. In 
Beattie an individual of non-Indian status, but married into a Treaty 11 family, attempted to collect treaty 
annuity payments for himself. 
 In Scott v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 BCSC 1651, a non-indigenous case invoking the 
Aboriginal rights conception of the “honour of the Crown,” the British Columbia Supreme Court traced 
its English lineage: 
 No Canadian court has applied the doctrine of the Honour of the Crown outside of the 
 Aboriginal context, although it was referenced in the context of the sale of land: Doe dem. 
 Henderson v Westover (1852), 1 U.C.E. & A. 465 (U.C.C.E.A. at 468) and in the context of 
 statutory interpretation: R. v Belleau (1881), 7 SCR 53 at 71 and Windsor & Annapolis Railway 
 Co. v R, (1885), 10 SCR 335 at 371. It was also referenced in England in the context of a 
 criminal prosecution: The King v Garside and Mosley (1834), 2 A.D. & E. 266, 111 E.R. 103 
 (K.B.) at p. 107: “We are not to presume that any promise made by the King even to the meanest 
 and most criminal of his subjects will not be sacredly observed”. These older decisions (two of 
 which predate the Confederation of Canada) suggest that the Honour of the Crown doctrine has a 
 lengthy history that extends beyond the Aboriginal context (ibid. at para. 30). 
 
39
 Marshall, supra p. 203 n. 38, at para. 43.  
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fellow dissenter in Daniels v White, Hall J., does refer to a statement in the 1932 Alberta case R. 
v Wesley, which employs a critical use of the term “honour.”40 Thus, the one opinion in pre-sec. 
35(1) jurisprudence that actually incorporates Cartwright’s view of the honour of the Crown as a 
critical principle against state action is the 1981 Ontario Court of Appeals judgment in Taylor 
and Williams.
41
 In the approximately 25 opinions since the recognition of Aboriginal and treaty 
rights in sec. 35(1), references to George’s affirmation of provincial laws over treaty rights 
appear in approximately 15 denials of Aboriginal appeals; while references to the Cartwright 
dissent occur in eight approvals of Aboriginal appeals, and in two dissents.
42
   
 
If this brief survey of the usage of the “honour of the Crown” is fair, then rather than maintaining 
that the term has served historically as a principle critical of royal power, it seems just as apt to 
say that, historically, Canada’s courts have employed the term in an affirmation of either royal or 
                                                 
40
 Hall quoted R. v Wesley [1932] 4 DLR 774, where McGillivray J. had written: 
 In Canada the Indian treaties appear to have been judicially interpreted as being mere 
 promises and agreements….Assuming as I do that our treaties with Indians are on no higher plane 
 than other formal agreements yet this in no wise makes it less the duty and obligation of the 
 Crown to carry out the promises contained in those treaties with the exactness which honour and 
 good conscience dictate and it is not to be thought that the Crown has departed from those 
 equitable principles. 
 Quoted in Daniels v White, [1968] SCR 517, at 533.   
 
41
 Regina v Taylor and Williams (1982), 34 OR (2d) 360. Quoting Cartwright J. In regard to treaty 
interpretation, McKinnon J. added – in a passage itself often quoted in post-sec. 35(1) jurisprudence  – 
that “the honour of the Crown is always involved and no appearance of ‘sharp dealing’ should be 
sanctioned” (ibid. at 12). 
 
42
 Opinions making a precedent of the George ruling include many similar to R. v Steinhauer, 1985 
CanLII 1891 (ABQB), upholding the summary conviction of Clifford Steinhauer, a “treaty Indian,” for 
illegal use of a gill net; or R. v Eninew; R. v Bear, 1984 CanLII 2691 (SK CA), upholding two separate 
summary convictions for hunting in violation of the Migratory Birds Convention Act, R.S. C. 179, s. 1. 
More recently, and despite the finding in R. v Blackbird (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 385, at 11 that George had 
been rendered obsolete by Sparrow, George has reappeared in Hiawatha v Minister of the Environment 
2007 CanLII 3485 (ON SCDC) at 55, and Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and 
Natural Resource Operations),2014 BCSC 568 (CanLII) at 181. In both of those opinions, findings for 
provincial approval of development plans (a subdivision on a burial ground, and a ski resort on a sacred 
site) proceeded after dismissing the significance of the George dissent.   
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legislative power. Or, one might even conclude that it has played a very small historical role, at 
best. It may be that its function is more of what I referred to in Chapter 1 as an example of 
Hobsbawm’s idea of an “invented tradition,” than as the historically functional concept 
suggested by McLachlin C.J. (though one might argue in response that it is rather a “legal 
fiction,”43 and still an adequate tool for addressing obligations under the duty to consult). A 
second point of trouble, as I also noted earlier, is that the concept carries a presumed obviousness 
evident in the burgeoning extent of its usage post-Haida Nation. I think a discourse perspective 
can uncover even deeper difficulties than are evident within its historically ambiguous usage, 
despite widespread efforts to employ it as a critical principle in recent jurisprudence.  
 
Scholars have highlighted the reflection of inherited extra-legal connotations within the “honour 
of the Crown.” In particular, James Sákéj Henderson refers to the Crown as “a mystical concept 
that represents the constitutional authority for the existence of federal or provincial governments. 
However, since the expression of government has never been a juristic entity, it is a vague legal 
fiction of British law.”44 Henderson’s characterization of the “Crown” as a mystical entity cannot 
                                                 
43
 Drawing on the work of Lon Fuller, collected in his Legal Fictions (Stanford CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1967), Karen Petroski, in a recent study of US Supreme Court usage of the term “legal fiction,” 
notes that when the justices refer to a legal fiction, “it is a sign that the explanation in question is coming 
close to the limit of what the writer perceives as justifiable to readers who are outsiders to the legal 
community’s conventions. The term functions as a label for other legal terms, or for concepts named by 
legal terms, that cannot be succinctly justified in lay language, but are nevertheless accepted by judges 
and lawyers as ingredients of conventional forms of legal reasoning.” In her “Legal Fictions and the 
Limits of Legal Language” (2013) International Journal of Law in Context 9(4) 485, at 498. 
44
 Henderson, supra p. 132 n. 29, at 30. As I noted in Chapter 1, John Borrows and Mariana Valverde 
have also employed what we could call a debunking strategy in considering the impact of the “Crown” on 
Aboriginal law in Canada, and in refutation of McLachlin C.J.’s Haida Nation denial that the “honour of 
the Crown” is a “mere incantation” (supra p. 1 n. 2, at para. 16). See Borrows, supra p. 38 n. 94, and 
Valverde, supra p. 39 n. 95. 
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be lightly dismissed. The papers collected from a 2010 conference held in the Senate, in Ottawa, 
and endorsed by the Harper government and the “Friends of the Canadian Crown,” for instance, 
demonstrate the many fronts on which the “Crown” functions as a mystical authority. In that 
volume the ceremonial installation of Governor General David Johnston in 2010 is described as 
“sublime.”45 The “real purpose” of royal symbols is said “to express a psychological truth, the 
significance of which can only be grasped if the correspondence between the material object and 
the spiritual quality is understood.”46 The Queen or her representative are said to possess 
“liturgical authority” in opening Parliament.47 The “Crown” is described as the “fount of all 
honour.”48 John Fraser, master of Toronto’s Massey College, is quoted from remarks delivered at 
a 2000 Ascension Day Service, saying:  
 The fact remains that the magic and mystery behind our Constitution is all tied up with a 
 hereditary monarchy. It is our past, which if denied, will confound our future; it is our 
 dignity, which if cast carelessly aside, will make us crasser people; it is the protection of 
 our rights, which if abandoned could lead to demagogic manipulation.
49
  
On the other hand, in addition to the suspicion that Henderson casts on the lingering influence of 
“mystical” thinking on law (though perhaps “theological” is a better term), he also offers a deep 
endorsement of the legal implications of linking this particular conception of the “Crown” to 
honour.  
                                                 
45
 Paul Benoit “State Ceremonial: the Constitutional Monarch’s Liturgical Authority” in Jennifer Smith 
and D. Michael Brown (eds.) The Evolving Canadian Crown (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2012), at 132. 
 
46
 Ibid. at 130. 
 
47
 Ibid. at 133. 
 
48
 Christopher McCreery “The Crown and Honours: Getting it Right” in Smith and Brown ibid, at 139. 
 
49
 Jacques Monet “Reflections on the ‘Canadianization of the Crown: a Modest Proposal” in Smith and 
Brown ibid., at 213. 
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The honour of the Crown transforms the mystical and symbolic concept of the Crown 
into a protecting entity for the rights of Aboriginal peoples, rather than the constitutional 
authority and legitimizing principle for treaties with First Nations and the existence of 
federal or provincial governments. The honour of the Crown is more than the concept of 
legitimacy of governmental action developed slowly over the centuries in England and 
Britain. It provides the foundational idea in British constitutional theory and history for 
sovereignty, which shields the rights of Aboriginal peoples from negative government 
action. This new concept creates a deep divergence between the historical fictions of the 
concept of the Crown in British common law tradition as developed from central royal 
courts through royal writs, the Crown's role in treaties, imperialism and colonization, and 
its present responsibilities in the Constitution of Canada and its underlying principles.
50
 
 
The “honour of the Crown” plays a crucial role in his conception of “dialogical governance,” 
amounting to the “central principle of constitutional supremacy of Aboriginal and treaty 
rights.”51 Henderson assembles the many references to the concept within post-sec. 35(1) 
jurisprudence, weaving them together to show that the court has provided Canada with a strong 
vision of its obligation to transform its relationships with indigenous nations.
52
 He provides a 
confident expression of the “honour of the Crown” as the key to a dynamic transformation of 
Canada’s legal and political order, capable of infusing both the duty to consult and the renewal 
of treaty relationships. He proceeds, however, without serious attention to the discursive 
implications of the court’s reliance upon honour as the primary ideal for assessing Canada’s 
relations with First Nations and other indigenous communities. At the same time, in making 
honour the operative critical principle within his dialogical mode of governance, he is clearly 
                                                 
50
 Henderson, supra p. 132 n. 29, at 30-31. 
 
51
 Ibid. at 52. 
 
52
 For instance, he lists the following seven descriptors derived from “honour of the Crown” references in 
duty to consult cases:  
It is always at stake in the Crown's dealings with Indian people. It arises with the Crown's 
assertion of sovereignty over Aboriginal lands. It obligates the Crown to treat Aboriginal peoples 
fairly and honourably, and to protect them from exploitation. It continues when ownership of the 
underlying title is vested in the Crown. It requires the Crown to act with honour and integrity. It 
avoids even the appearance of "sharp dealing." It is involved in the resolution of claims (ibid. at 
54). 
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interested in increasing the prominence of discourse itself as central to the principled depiction of 
rejuvenated legal relations between Canada and indigenous nations. He emphasizes that the 
ultimate upshot of a discursively renewed political order requires the creation of a full-fledged 
new branch of government, and laments its failure:    
As long as the Crown fails to establish a distinct branch of government for Aboriginal 
peoples based on their constitutional rights to perform this role, with more democratic 
accountability and greater investigative, technical, financial, and administrative resources 
than the traditional judiciary now enjoys, dishonourable action will not be remedied.
53
 
 
However, from a discourse perspective, I doubt that the “honour of the Crown” as developed  
 
within the duty to consult jurisprudence has the capacity to lead Canada in the direction that 
Henderson advocates. Nor do I think that its proponents can show that it leads to more consistent 
outcomes than could be obtained by considering state actions affecting Aboriginal and treaty 
rights through concepts of justice, or a critical view of the rule of law, such as Lon Fuller as well 
as Habermas have provided (and as I discussed in Chapter 2). 
 
If we examine the “honour of the Crown” as a discursive practice, we have to begin with the 
recognition that this particular form of honour cannot be sequestered from the usage of “honour” 
within other pragmatic contexts, if only because the courts do not provide “honour” with a 
specifically legal gloss. The political theological heritage of the “Crown” cannot be thought to 
shape what such a standard might be, unless one could obtain agreement from parties in dialogue 
oriented towards mutual understanding, that this heritage was especially apt in their particular 
communicative context (a hearing, a tribunal, a public meeting). Even so, the political 
theological heritage is never made a theme of discourse in the courts. As I demonstrated above, 
Canada’s courts have employed the term overwhelmingly in the context of simple attributions of 
                                                 
53
 Ibid. at 56. 
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status or office to individuals appearing before or functioning within the settings of the courts, a 
usage I will return to below. 
 
Its next most common usage stems from the context of financial transactions, in which one 
“honours” one’s debts. This second usage is equivalent to saying that one is willing to be bound 
by one’s promises, the germ of its function as a critical term. In this vein, honour requires 
individuals to act against inclinations that might be more immediately satisfying or protective of 
their self-interest. It envisions conduct willingly undertaken according to a higher standard: 
dueling, for instance, required an indifference to the results of a contest that one would only 
undertake in order to maintain one’s honour.  
 
Examples of the indifference that is key to employing honour as a critical standard of conduct are 
available across a wide range of cultural contexts. As historian David Chaney argues in his 
examination of changing approaches to honour in modernizing Britain, the code of honour 
employed by the classic figure of the English gentleman entailed a cultivated appearance of 
indifference to consequences. Chaney equates this English form of honour as indifference with 
that of the Balinese cockfighters whom Clifford Geertz characterized some time ago as engaged 
in a kind of “deep play.”54 Writing in the same decade as Geertz, French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu captured what is discursively at work in the use of honour, with his characterization of 
                                                 
54
 See his “The Spectacle of Honour: the Changing Dramatization of Status” (1995) Theory, Culture & 
Society 12(1) 147, at 153. Geertz, in his influential “Notes on a Balinese Cockfight,” portrayed the contest 
of honour in cockfighting as a communal demonstration of status, which becomes more visible the more 
equal are the odds in a particular fight. Those who play for money rather than honour are “highly 
dispraised by the ‘true cockfighters’ as fools who do not understand what the sport is all about, vulgarians 
who simply miss the point of it all.” See his The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic, 1974) at 
434. 
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it as “symbolic capital.” As capital, honourable action extends something: solidarity, protection, 
hospitality, resources; to someone in need of such generosity. But, it also incurs indebtedness to 
and dependence upon the one who appears to function on the basis of a higher standard of 
conduct. Key to the operation of the code of honour, he stresses (in ways similar to Chaney), is 
the disinterested, or “seemingly ‘gratuitous’ surrender” of wealth in order to gain more wealth 
and prestige, a process he refers to as “social alchemy.”55   
 
In these examples, the logically distinguishable employment of honour as a marker of status and 
its invocation of a higher standard of disinterested conduct are intertwined (as they likely are 
within any use of the term). In both forms of use, however, they are performative acts: they 
transform, commit, revive or insure, securing the elevation of the one who receives honours. 
Chaney emphasizes the inherent connection between employment of the term “honour” in a wide 
range of public contexts, and the performance of ceremony. He suggests that: 
the language of honour is a mode of dramatization. An individual is singled out for public 
attention through a form of ceremony. A self-conscious ritual of performance may only 
take place on very specific occasions when the possession of honourable status is 
formally recognized, but the deference that is due to honour is displayed and confirmed 
in myriad ceremonializations.
56
 
 
However, in the context of modern Britain, and within western societies in general, these 
ceremonies, once primarily contests of violence between individuals, are now produced largely 
through the media of professional sports and mass entertainment. While that consequent sort of 
celebrity status carries with it some of the older notion of a life conducted according to a higher 
standard, that standard is no longer the critical sense of indifference that required English, and 
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 See his Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), at 179-81. 
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 Chaney, supra p. 210 n. 54, at 148. 
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other, men of honour to renounce the substance of their wealth for the sake of their honour alone. 
Consequently, those ceremonies have come to reflect the opposite of indifference to outcomes, 
generally demonstrating celebrity commitment to self-advancement.
57
 
 
Clearly, the courts are more likely to be employing the “honour of the Crown” as a critical 
standard of conduct, bearing some linkage to honour’s earlier cultivated sense of indifference, 
than to those standards operative in the mediated dramas of sports and entertainment. As 
Dickson C.J. maintained in Sparrow, the consequence of recognizing Aboriginal and treaty 
rights in sec. 35(1) requires the state to plausibly accept a substantial “burden” on its actions. In a 
small number of cases, the courts have employed the concept of the “honour of the Crown” in 
order to quash state projects or the permitting of corporate developments. Some of these cases 
have aimed directly at the extraction of resources (Haida Nation, Halfway River First Nation,
58
 
or more recently Ehattesaht First Nation 
59
), while others have aimed more indirectly at public 
management (Mikisew). Cases such as Sparrow or Marshall have loosened some of the hold of 
federal or provincial regulations on indigenous users of resources in particular contexts.  
 
However, it seems just as reasonable to conclude that the courts have sought to tighten the 
implications of the “honour of the Crown” because they have recognized that the appropriate 
level of indifference necessary to deal justly with the depths and extent of indigenous grievances 
                                                 
57
 Links between law, ceremony and honour are depicted in Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, supra  p. 
88 n. 2. For a study of ceremony and politics in modern sports grounded in Foucault’s work on power and 
ceremony, see Varda Burstyn The Rites of Men: Manhood, Politics and the Culture of Sport (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1999).   
 
58
 Halfway River First Nation v British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), 1999 B.C.C.A. 470. 
 
59
 Ehattesaht First Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations, 2014 
B.C.S.C. 849. 
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in Canada would involve a very great burden. As I noted above in relation to the theme of 
“reconciliation,” Haida Nation seemed most intent on constructing an understanding of 
reconciliation as a kind of negotiation. Similarly, if maintaining the “honour of the Crown” is 
consistent with conducting hard-nosed negotiation in modern treaty agreements or in resolving 
outstanding title claims, it is unlikely that the state’s representatives will feel inclined towards 
exhibiting the honourable “indifference” of a duelist or an aristocratic gambler. Nor will the 
court be likely to back away from the crabbed versions of reconciliation and justification it has 
reiterated from Delgamuukw to Tsilhqot’in Nation. The ease with which the chief justices moved 
from acknowledging the solidity of Aboriginal rights to the pressing need to lighten such rights 
by weighing them against the needs of the larger society, as Lamer C.J. did in Gladstone, is 
difficult to grasp if such weighting is supposed to reflect a standard of honour consistent with its 
historical range of meaning. Or, as McLachlin C.J. collated the themes of reconciliation, honour 
and consultation with the end result of negotiation: 
 I conclude that consultation and accommodation before final claims resolution, while 
 challenging, is not impossible, and indeed is an essential corollary to the honourable 
 process of reconciliation that s. 35 demands. It preserves the Aboriginal interest pending 
 claims resolution and fosters a relationship between the parties that makes possible 
 negotiations, the preferred process for achieving ultimate reconciliation.
60
   
 
Her tendency in Haida Nation to shape honour into a concept that really only pushes towards the  
 
act of compromise is clear in her gloss on the meaning of accommodation:  
 
The accommodation that may result from pre-proof consultation is just this – seeking 
compromise in an attempt to harmonize conflicting interests and move further down the 
path of reconciliation. A commitment to the process does not require a duty to agree. But 
it does require good faith efforts to understand each other’s concerns and move to address 
them.
61
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Haida Nation, supra p. 1 n. 2, at para. 38. 
 
61
 Ibid. at para. 49. 
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Her conditioned gloss here seems (to this reader, at least) written to reassure settler interest 
groups that consultation regarding Aboriginal and treaty rights will not necessarily place them in 
danger of losing out in legal contests with First Nations. Such harmonizing of “conflicting 
interests,” and avoiding any compulsion to agree, are both far removed from the effort to uphold 
honour grounded in indifference to consequences. 
 
“The honour of the Crown” is now the primary normative standard available for First Nations 
and other indigenous communities to employ in settings of legal challenge, or affecting decisions 
and discourse within arenas of policy formation, or within the public sphere as a whole. Its 
strength as a normative standard within the context of Canada’s courtrooms might be assessed, at 
least roughly, by noting the proportion of court decisions that have held for indigenous plaintiffs 
who have employed it in their complaints against the state. To take only two examples for the 
sake of my argument here, and disregarding the merits of any of the cases, according to CanLII, 
in Alberta, the Court of Queen’s Bench has decided 15 such cases since Sparrow. In 11 of those, 
the indigenous parties’ claims were dismissed. Of the five cases that went on to appear before the 
Alberta Court of Appeal, all five were dismissed. In British Columbia, while the proportion of 
non-dismissals is higher, it still reflects the courts’ predominant tendency to dismiss claims 
invoking the “honour of the Crown.” There, out of the 43 cases appearing before the BC Court of 
Appeal, 37 were dismissed. Of the 87 cases appearing before the BC Supreme Court, 68 were 
dismissed. If these proportions are even roughly reflective of the situations facing indigenous 
parties in other jurisdictions, then simply from the standpoint of its usage, the “honour of the 
Crown” is at best a difficult standard to employ in seeking justice regarding a claim of 
Aboriginal or treaty rights. Further, if we examine the “honour of the Crown” from the 
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standpoint of Habermas’s discourse principle, three features of its use as a “core precept” seem 
especially troubling, particularly if we bear in mind Habermas's distinction between performative 
and pragmatic communication.  
 
1) As I noted above, invocations of honour in a wide range of discursive situations are essentially 
performative. That is, they create or accomplish something outside the communicative context of 
the assertion itself. In this, invocations of honour resemble the performative functions of doodem 
icons, as I discussed in Chapter 4. There, I tried to show that making discursive sense of 
intersocietal treaty-making at Montréal requires that we acknowledge how the doodem icons 
established the legitimacy of that intersocietal legal agreement through their performative 
functions . I argued also, though, that if they did produce the grounds for Anishinaabe consent to 
the treaty, the French agreement was still dependent upon the sufficient translation of those 
culturally deployed meanings through subsequent pragmatic statements, as delivered in the 
oratory of the indigenous Anishinaabe and Haudenosaunee leaders recorded in the treaty text. 
Thus, for intersocietal legal legitimacy, the promise-making enacted in the treaty needs to be 
seen as having been achieved through the combination of both performative and pragmatic 
communicative acts.  
 
This distinction between performative and pragmatic communication oriented towards mutual 
understanding can make sense of the courts’ use of “honour of the Crown.” As I indicated above, 
the attribution of honour is, as Geertz, Chaney, Bourdieu and other scholars have demonstrated, 
performative, even dramatic. That is, it is made real through ceremonies and invocations in 
ritually specific ways. The performative use of this language, which is grounded in the culturally 
216 
 
specific context of English political history and its class structure, could play a legitimate role 
within an intersocietal legal context. However, as performatively based discourse, it cannot be 
expected that the particular performative context that makes it meaningful to courts and 
representatives of “the Crown” will readily translate across cultural boundaries. Even if we 
accept the more robust view of public sphere legal discourse that Habermas advocates (contra 
Rawls), which would make any party’s commitment to employing products of particular 
traditions not shared across the board legitimate contributions to a process oriented towards 
mutual understanding, the performative basis of honour invocation is at best incomplete in a 
discourse situation, and an insufficient means of establishing pragmatic legal legitimacy, 
especially in an intersocietal legal context.  
 
Thus, the court’s deployment of honour language, assuming the court is committed to developing 
a process of mutual understanding regarding First Nations standing in relation to the duty to 
consult, has to be supplemented by a pragmatic turn in its use of honour language. That 
pragmatic turn is parallel to the one reflected in the oratory of the Anisihinaabe and 
Haudenosaunee leaders at Montrèal. There French negotiators were able to absorb a sufficient 
amount of doodem categories and normative expectations, as reflected in the indigenous 
oratorical responses to Callière' own speech, into language they could acknowledge as normative 
statements of binding promises. These pragmatic statements constituted intersocietal critical 
dialogue concerning the commitments being formed by the 1701 treaty, and seem a workable 
illustration of what Habermas means when he says that discourse oriented towards mutual 
understanding requires the possibility of “yes/no” responses. 
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Just as the employment of doodem icons in treaty-making at Montréal also required participants 
to turn from the performative to the pragmatic dimension of discourse, in order to create the 
intersocietal possibility of mutual understanding: consent to the promissory commitments in the 
treaty, so too does the employment of “honour of the Crown” language in the courts. However, 
what remains clouded in the courts' use of honour language, is whether this pragmatic aim 
resembles the ideal-type of “communicative action” – an aim to create possibilities of mutual 
understanding; or whether it resembles the ideal-type of “strategic action” – such as one party 
aiming to increase its control or domination over another (and which Bourdieu found to inhere 
within the code of honour
62).  Canada’s courts have consistently tied the invocation of honour to 
the aim of reconciliation; and if a reader of court decisions credits this linkage, rather than 
suspecting it of masking an aim of domination, then from a discourse perspective we have to ask 
how that aim can be fulfilled in the sorts of discursive situations where honour language occurs. 
 
2) At the heart of any usage of the term “honour” is a particular pragmatic communicative 
situation. Honour cannot credibly be asserted by a single party, unless the honour referred to is 
an inherently personal code, as when I say my own standard of honour prohibits me from doing 
X, or requires me to do Y. As employed within public contexts, honour is awarded, accorded, 
recognized, attributed, bestowed – all taking the passive voice because the one honoured is not 
the actor, but rather the recipient of the action. Even within systems of domination shaped by 
codes of honour, such as families and feudal societies where it provides “symbolic capital,” the 
domineering figure or figures receive their honour from the dominated. I would argue that these 
assumptions of ordinary language use hold true for the courts’ own usage of honour, unless or 
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until the courts have laid out how legal usage in this context should be regarded differently than 
ordinary usage, and which they have not for the “honour of the Crown.”63  
 
Seen from the perspective of Habermas’s discourse principle, how does the “honour of the 
Crown” function as a normative standard for the duty to consult? Consider McLachlin’s 
formulation of it as a principle in Haida Nation: “It is not a mere incantation, but rather a core 
precept that finds its application in concrete practices.”64 One of the striking features of her 
discussion of the “honour of the Crown” in Haida Nation is that this distinction between a core 
precept and concrete practices only receives elucidation in terms of the various concrete 
practices. We thus know what the “honour of the Crown” might mean only by reference to these 
concrete practices. In part, this may be attributed to judicial practice. As Henderson puts it in his 
vision of “dialogical governance,” courts have the limited interpretive function of assessing the 
law in relation to a particular grievance, and not the larger function of addressing systematically 
the nature of legal, political or moral concepts. 
 While the judiciary is obliged to give a decision on specific matters that come before 
 them through litigation, they are not supposed to interpret the Constitution for its own 
 sake or to provide impressive scholarly essays on the meaning of constitutional 
 provisions. Their judicial responsibility is to determine what the Constitution means in 
 order to decide whether a government's impugned statute should be upheld or invalidated. 
 Their interpretation must have relevance to the particular issue.
65
 
 
Thus, the SCC has gradually elaborated the list of applications of the precept of the “honour of 
Crown” as they have dealt with new situations; while various government departments 
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periodically revise their protocols to demonstrate that they are functioning in line with the latest 
application of the duty to consult. Lower courts, meanwhile, have whittled away at broadstroke 
interpretations of its workings – especially when indigenous parties bring their concerns to court 
framed in light of the duty to consult and the “honour of the Crown.” 
 
From a discourse perspective, the problem here is not simply one of legal semantics: as though 
the courts needed to settle on a fundamental definition of the norm of honour, as though it were 
perhaps a “natural kind,” and as though they were instead trying to avoid producing such a 
definition by settling for lengthy references to its attributes or requirements, or what Ronald 
Dworkin calls “manifestations,” in particular legal circumstances.66 Nor is it a more generally 
“philosophical” problem, as though a deep, but obscured, fundamental meaning of honour 
needed exposure by the relentless questioning of a Socrates. My point is simply that McLachlin 
C.J.’s lack of interest in a workable, common sense definition of honour, and her contentment 
with listing its legal attributes, is inconsistent with her own willingness to marshal such 
definitions of other terms in Haida Nation, such as her turn to the OED to define 
“accommodation.”67 Her use of a common source of English definitions there suggests that the 
same concern with ordinary meaning could have helped her explain her emphasis on honour 
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more easily than by the lengthy process of laying out its functional attributes in different 
circumstances. It would also have helped account for some sort of common sense core to counter 
her subsequent statement of what amounts to a notable ethical contextualism: “The honour of the 
Crown gives rise to different duties in different circumstances.”68 Or, as she stated in Manitoba 
Métis Federation: “the duty that flows from the honour of the Crown varies with the situation in 
which it is engaged. What constitutes honourable conduct will vary with the circumstances.”69  
 
3) At the pragmatic level, the “core precept” of the “honour of the Crown” is troublesome as a 
principle because the courts have never approached it as something that needs clarification 
through dialogical responses from those who are subject to it as a norm. Such clarification is a 
necessary feature of honour, since whether it is as a critical norm, or – more commonly in court 
usage – as a marker of status and office, it has public meaning only as something bestowed by 
others. Honour may, as Bourdieu indicated, function as the engine of domination, or even as 
what he called “symbolic violence.” Nevertheless, it is not unidirectional domination or violence. 
A discursively adequate use of honour would have to recognize its function as a pragmatic 
validity claim. That is, in a situation oriented towards mutual understanding, honour should be 
thought of as something that would be attributed by others more accurately than it could be 
asserted by oneself. Thus, in the setting of Canada’s courts, the determination of honour is less 
able to be appropriately applied by judicial figures (themselves still representatives of the same 
Crown that they purport to judge) than it would by those indigenous parties who bring their 
claims of injustice into dialogue with Canada's representatives. 
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In addition, one presented with a validity claim regarding the “honour of the Crown” might 
conceivably ask regarding the courts' use of honour language: how does the "honour of the 
Crown" amount to something more than a statement regarding the willingness to uphold 
promises? As I indicated above, the use of honour as a critical standard of conduct most readily 
amounts to just such a statement. The man of honour is willing to be bound by his word when it 
runs counter to his self-serving inclinations: to provide the funds for cheques written from his 
account, to show up on the field after having accepted the challenge of a duel. Without knowing 
what honour might mean pragmatically, it is impossible to know whether the courts have had in 
mind such a basic norm, or something else. Many of the descriptors offered in Haida Nation, for 
instance, are empty unless a reader presumes a core meaning, or related group of meanings: "The 
honour of the Crown is always at stake."
70
 "[I]t must be understood generously."
71
 "The honour 
of the Crown also infuses the processes of treaty making and treaty interpretation."
72
 "The Crown 
must act with honour and integrity, avoiding even the appearance of “sharp dealing.”73 "In all 
cases, the honour of the Crown requires that the Crown act with good faith."
74
 These by now 
classic expressions from McLachlin C.J. all convey an unworkable vagueness as legal 
statements, unless they are taken to mean something like honour means within other contexts. 
They are not yet clarified by a single sentence taking the form of “To honour means X” within 
the jurisprudence descending from Haida Nation. This gap between what honour might do or 
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require and what honour might be clouds the possibility of deriving clear guidance from the 
courts, especially since the court has said that what it requires differs in each circumstance. 
Glosses such as the “honour of the Crown” requires the state to “act with good faith,” at most, 
can really only be filled in by a clarification along the lines of “and to act with good faith means 
to reliably uphold one’s word.” 
 
If this is a fair reading, however, then there seems an inherent conflict between the pragmatic 
force of such statements, and their legal implications. If the "honour of the Crown" means no 
more than the willingness to fulfill promises, it runs aground, or better, is deflated, on two fronts. 
On the one hand, in Badger the court had already made the equation between honour and the 
fulfillment of promises:  
 First, it must be remembered that a treaty represents an exchange of solemn promises 
 between the Crown and the various Indian nations. . . . Second, the honour of the Crown is 
 always at stake in its dealing with Indian people. Interpretations of treaties and statutory 
 provisions which have an impact upon treaty or aboriginal rights must be approached in a 
 manner which maintains the integrity of the Crown. It is always assumed that the Crown 
 intends to fulfil its promises.
75
  
 
More recently, in Manitoba Métis Federation, McLachlin C.J. stated that the “honour of the  
 
Crown” is not “a cause of action itself; rather, it speaks to how obligations that attract it must be 
fulfilled.”76 What effect does this have on the pragmatic function of the “honour of the Crown”? In 
her subsequent discussion of whether Canada had performed its obligations to the Manitoba Métis 
community stemming from the historic founding of the province of Manitoba, a reader can see how 
she identified the substance of the “honour of the Crown” with the common sense understanding of 
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promise-keeping. There she determined that the lower court holding erred in its agreement with 
Canada’s submissions, that:   
 …the government servants may have been negligent in administering the s. 31 grant. He 
 held that the implementation of the obligation was within the Crown’s discretion and that 
 it had a discretion to act negligently: “Mistakes, even negligence, on the part of those 
 responsible for implementation of the grant are not sufficient to successfully attack 
 Canada’s exercise of discretion in its implementation of the grant.”77  
 
McLachlin C.J., however, found that the promise regarding the allotment of 1.4 million acres to 
Métis children contained in sec. 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, required “diligence” on the part of 
the state. As she put it, “the honour of the Crown requires that the Crown: (1) takes a broad 
purposive approach to the interpretation of the promise; and (2) acts diligently to fulfill it.”78 She 
then presented diligence as a new development of the meaning of the “honour of the Crown,” 
explaining that: 
 This duty has arisen largely in the treaty context, where the Crown’s honour is pledged to 
 diligently carrying out its promises: Mikisew Cree First Nation, at para. 51; Little 
 Salmon, at para. 12; see also Haida Nation, at para. 19. In its most basic iteration, the law 
 assumes that the Crown always intends to fulfill its solemn promises, including 
 constitutional obligations [references omitted]. But the duty goes further: if the honour of 
 the Crown is pledged to the fulfillment of its obligations, it follows then that the honour 
 of the Crown requires the Crown to endeavour to ensure its obligations are fulfilled.
79
  
 
According to her explanation, diligence is a separate consideration, though perhaps still a  
 
corollary, from the making of a promise itself, and honour is what ensures diligence.  
 
 
Pragmatically, however, if I make a promise to you, can you ever assume that your acceptance of 
my promise means anything else other than that you believe I am committed to fulfilling my 
promise? If the promise engages at the level of mutual understanding, that is if I make it under 
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conditions conducive to our formation of trust, I can’t really add anything to your understanding 
of what I have done in making my promise by also saying, “I will work hard to fulfill the 
promise.” That is, if the promise obligates me, I am not any less obligated under it than I would 
be by adding some additional expression of my intention to work diligently to fulfill the promise. 
Otherwise, what is obligatory would not be the promise, but rather the additional commitment to 
diligence.  
 
Further, if I do make a promise that I don’t intend to fulfill with diligence, then we can’t really 
view such a promise as an instance of “communicative action.” Rather, this seems a clear 
example on my part of “strategic action,” since I am intending to accomplish something other 
than the fulfillment of the promise, and which requires me in some way to deceive you. As well, 
if you understood that my making the promise was strategic, you would not be likely to accept 
the promise in the first place – unless you shared that purpose, or had one of your own. In those 
cases, however, the formation of trust would not be a likely goal or consequence of the 
communicative situation.  
 
The communicative assumptions in McLachlin C.J.’s consideration of promise-making and 
diligence in relation to the Manitoba Mètis grievance suggest that the critical standard of the 
“honour of the Crown” remains tied to promise-keeping, despite her effort to clarify it as 
entailing an additional component. Yet, the status of promises to indigenous communities within 
Canada’s law remains weak, despite the lineage of holdings from Badger that treaties represent 
exchanges “of solemn promises.”80 While that may be, the solemn and sacred nature of treaty 
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promises does not seem to mean that they take precedence over legislative intent, as Hall J. 
indicated in his Daniels v White nod to McGilvray J.’s 1932 statement in R. v Wesley that: “In 
Canada the Indian treaties appear to have been judicially interpreted as being mere promises and 
agreements.”81 In a number of cases courts have wrestled with the question of whether or not a 
particular promise was actually made to a First Nation, as in Benoit – concerning a treaty 
promise regarding the imposition of taxes; or Lax Kw’alaams – concerning a promise regarding 
commercial fishing rights.
82
 A more fraught line of cases engages the question of what sort of 
legal implications might stem from such promises as have been made? Here the courts have 
demonstrated a steady tendency to read historical promises as legally empty obligations. 
 
For instance, the lower courts in Manitoba Mètis Federation held that promises are subject to 
parliamentary discretion. McLachlin C.J.’s subsequent effort to reframe the “honour of the 
Crown” does not seem likely to lessen this tendency to weigh parliamentary discretion over 
treaty promises, since the courts in that decision’s aftermath are distinguishing diligence in 
relation to Mètis promises from those promises at issue in other circumstances. As examples of 
this tendency, consider first Ross River Dena Council – though dating from the year prior to 
Manitoba Mètis Federation – where the Supreme Court of Yukon’s Gower J. accepted the 
testimony of legal historian Paul McHugh that historical treaty promises could not be thought of 
as binding Canada to their performance. As Gower J. put it in relation to the Ross River 
argument that the “honour of the Crown” was involved in its compensation claim,  
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 Dr. McHugh opined, and I accept, that the honour of the Crown would not have been 
 considered a justiciable principle at that time and in the specific context of the 1870 
 Order. Today, the principle of the honour of the Crown is clearly justiciable. Is the 
 contemporary principle capable of breathing life into the relevant provision in such a way 
 as to render it currently justiciable and enforceable in this Court? . . . Perhaps, but the 
 argument, if there is one, was not pursued by RRDC.
83
 
 
Although Gower J. here acknowledged that in the contemporary situation the “honour of the  
 
Crown” was “clearly justiciable,” he also cast doubt on its application to any historical matter. In 
addition to the comment above, he voiced his hesitation in accepting McHugh’s apparently 
weightless suggestion that a contemporary setting for determining the legal significance of a 
promise might yield a different conclusion:   
 Having generally accepted Dr. McHugh’s expert opinion evidence that the relevant 
 provision was not intended to have justiciable legal force and effect “at that time”, I am 
 left struggling to discern any reason how or why the relevant provision could have 
 subsequently acquired legal force and effect in order to be enforceable in this Court. 
 Dr. McHugh allowed that, notwithstanding his opinion as an historian that the 
 relevant provision was not intended to be justiciable at the time of its inclusion in the 
 1870 Order, this Court would not be precluded from finding that it has legal force and 
 effect today. I specifically asked Dr. McHugh whether he knew of any examples in 
 Canada or elsewhere where a provision has been found by a court not to have legal effect 
 at the time of its enactment, but because of the evolution of law over time, it took on legal 
 effect. Dr. McHugh answered with the example of Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 20, 
 as an example of the dynamics of interpretation, however I regret to say that I did not find 
 the answer to be particularly helpful.
84
  
That a historian of McHugh’s expertise was unable to direct the court to any decision more 
relevant than a 70 year old English case dealing with national security and German espionage, 
suggests the limited ability of promise-making to provide a firm ground for indigenous 
challenges under the “honour of the Crown.” Courts seem likely to continue finding persuasive 
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McHugh’s argument that legal history and legal theory are inherently different tasks addressing 
the legal legitimacy of Canada’s promises to indigenous communities.85  
 
As a second example of this tendency, consider the post-Mètis Nation Nova Scotia Supreme 
Court ruling in Acadia Nation, which distinguished between the promise to the Manitoba Mètis
 
and the promises made to Mi'kmaq communities under the various 1760-61 treaties at issue in 
Marshall.
86
 In this case, a number of Mi'kmaq chiefs had filed pleadings to induce Canada to 
amend fishing regulations in light of the “moderate livelihood” fishery right recognized in 
Marshall. The court agreed with Canada, that the chiefs’ pleadings for declarations regarding 
Canada’s obligations to amend the Fisheries Act were unsustainable. Their lack of a focus 
around a prosecutable offense, or around a motion for judicial review, hobbled the chiefs’ 
pleadings. The court determined that even though:  
The Chiefs may argue, as their counsel touched on in oral argument, that the 
Crown made “promises” in 1760-61, and though somewhat factually distinct from 
the specific “promise” that Canada made with the Métis as negotiated in the 1870 
Manitoba Act, the honour of the Crown is also engaged here, and the honour of the 
Crown may require that the Crown take a broad purposive approach to the interpretation 
 of the “promise” and to act diligently to fulfill it.87 
Nevertheless, in spite of such possible legal argument, I am still of the view that if 
presented as drafted now, the judge hearing the application would have to exercise their 
[sic] discretion against granting a declaration as sought here because the pleaded facts, 
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(as yet  not expanded upon by evidence of a similar nature) do not provide a clear enough 
picture of the Chiefs’ specific position such that the declaration sought could be said, to 
be supported by or “attached to specific facts” or, present a real, present or threatened, 
dispute to be resolved by the Court.
88
 
As of this writing, in the 10 cases subsequent to Mètis Nation where indigenous parties have 
drawn on McLachlin C.J.’s  explanation of honour of the Crown and diligent fulfillment of 
promises, eight have been dismissed. In one instance, the court held that: “The result of MMF is 
a rather amorphous duty on the Crown which arises upon a ‘solemn promise.’”89 Even without 
considering the various particulars in these cases, the 80% dismissal rate suggests that the courts 
are cautious about acknowledging the further relevance of McLachlin C.J.’s construal of the 
“honour of the Crown.”  
To sum up, in these last two chapters I have examined the four communicative practices 
supporting the doctrine of the duty to consult: the narrative of Aboriginal rights, the task of 
justification, the theme of reconciliation, and the standard of the “honour of the Crown,” from 
the standpoint of Habermas's discourse theory. I have argued that the court has given the doctrine 
weak legs, if its aim has been to provide indigenous parties with a reliable means to address 
issues of injustice against Canada. In its development of the doctrine of the duty to consult, the 
court has avoided the opportunity to consider pragmatic dimensions of discourse within its 
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articulation of the fundamental communicative practices shaping the doctrine. As laid out within 
the jurisprudence, the normative core of the doctrine remains tied to ambiguous extra-legal 
standards, such as reconciliation and honour; and to the employment of discursively lopsided 
procedures, such as narrating the shared history of Canada and engaging in the task of 
justification. Each of the four communicative practices that I identified above is evaluable as a 
discursive norm, capable of being assessed apart from particular views of justice, moral values or 
political ideology.  
 
When probed from the standpoint of Habermas’s discourse principle, each leg of the duty to 
consult reflects continuing commitments on the part of courts to support other doctrines defining 
the legal, political, and historical relations between Canada and indigenous communities, such as 
the “asserted sovereignty of the Crown.” The discourse principle could also be useful in probing 
these additional doctrines. The upshot of such effort might well demonstrate that legal 
assumptions widely held in Canada could be pragmatically reframed. That is, foundational 
assumptions about Canada’s legal order could be regarded as open to reframing in ways that 
would be more appropriate for what has been historically in fact, and normatively in the Supreme 
Court’s often inchoate but aspirational vision, an intersocietal legal order. 
  
 
 
 
 
A Constructive Conclusion 
 
In this work I have offered a normative reading of the doctrine of Canada’s duty to consult, 
which I have grounded in the perspective of Habermas’s discourse theory of law. I have drawn 
on three fundamental assumptions stemming from Habermas’s work. First is his longstanding 
approach to the pragmatic dimension of communicative action, which has informed my accounts 
of discursive norms as standards for evaluating the strength of the duty to consult’s 
communicative practices, the legs of its intellectual scaffold. Second, is the assumption that the 
pragmatic aspect of communication is what enables the development of the rule of law. Third, is 
the assumption that legal legitimacy can only be thought of as rational when it reflects the 
consensus of those who are subject to a system of rules, obligations and penalties. The latter two 
assumptions inform my argument regarding the weakness of the duty to consult as an instrument 
that can serve to increase the scope of legal legitimacy in Canadian law as it impacts indigenous 
people and communities.  
 
I have employed Habermas because I think that discourse theory offers a possibility of what he 
long ago called an “immanent” critique. That is, its use does not impose a critical reading of law 
from the standpoint of a specific metaphysical or ideological position. The discourse theory of 
law differs from other critical readings of law, such as those of the Catholic natural law tradition, 
the critical legal studies movement, or found within the work of legal theorist Ronald Dworkin. 
Such readings often appeal to evaluative assumptions not likely shared by those outside the circle 
of readers already committed to the normative beliefs of the writer. The aim of discourse theory, 
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by contrast, is to provide a normative account of law’s working, in particular the creation of a 
communicatively rational legal legitimacy, which the various parties involved in real-world 
conflicts, and various readers, could all find worth their more-than-begrudging support, because 
of their own investment in the norms guiding discourse. Its success in doing this, of course, 
remains subject to dispute among both legal and political theorists, as well as among those 
scholars more intent, as I have been here, on examining the functioning of discourse in a given 
legal or  political context. Its success and relevance might also be questioned by those actors 
engaged within such real-world contexts.  
 
The confrontations between indigenous peoples and Canada and its courts since 1982 have 
created – or better, renewed – an intersocietal, dialogical context. I have tried to show that 
Habermas’s view of law as discourse makes it suitable for addressing normative questions 
surrounding this legal context. In particular, I have argued that Canada’s duty to consult 
embodies normative requirements for legal legitimacy that arise out of the clash of contending, 
or at least contrasting, legal orders. Canada’s duty to consult has yielded an enormous number of 
such clashes between the state and First Nations and other indigenous communities, and 
promises to yield as many more in the years to come. In order to examine the foundations of the 
duty to consult in light of its specific aim of promoting legally legitimate intersocietal 
communication, I have thought it necessary to proceed with the support of a theoretical 
perspective attuned both to the constraints of power on law, and yet still oriented around the 
normative task of sharpening law’s ability to provide justice.  
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Habermas’s developing positions over the years have been subject to considerable criticism. 
Much of this criticism has remained beyond my scope here. Nevertheless, with my exegesis of 
key themes in his treatment of law in Chapter 2, I have attended to the context in which 
Habermas has worked out these themes, and to contrasting approaches to the concept of legal 
legitimacy, in order to provide readers with an opportunity to weigh my reading of Habermas 
here against their own perceptions and presumptions. His own historical context, that of post-war 
Germany’s reconstruction of a legal order in the aftermath of the Third Reich’s evisceration of 
law, and the near destruction of Germany, may seem far from that of the legal struggles facing 
indigenous communities in contemporary Canada.  
 
I certainly haven’t meant to equate Canada and Nazi Germany. Canada’s rule of law has applied 
poorly, and quite destructively, to indigenous communities and persons. Yet, it has been, if only 
aspirationally, a rule of law; and indigenous legal theorists such as John Borrows and James 
Sákéj Henderson currently seek practical means of harmonizing Canadian law and rejuvenated 
indigenous legal orders. On the other hand, Nazi Germany, as H.L.A. Hart failed (terribly) to 
understand, cannot be represented as functioning on the basis of a rule of law. Nevertheless, in 
both societies, the face of law, whether grounded in the NS Führerprinzip or in Canada’s 
English-heritage “royal prerogative,” has played a destructive role in subjugating ethnic/religious 
minorities (Germany), and self-determining, small-scale, indigenous legal and political orders 
(Canada).
1
 For Habermas, rational discourse provides the only suitable foundation for the 
                                                 
1
 Thus post-war Germany and post-1982 Canada have both struggled (in different ways and to different 
degrees of success) to create legal orders capable of overcoming the destructive impact of law grounded 
in prerogative power on marginal ethnicities (not to mention the German population as a whole) in the 
one, and indigenous peoples in the other. My sense of relevant parallel finds support in the work of Ernst 
Fraenkel, the German-Jewish émigré lawyer. His use of the term Massnahmenstaat to describe the 
fundamental operations of law as a vehicle for political power in Germany could have received a more 
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successful creation and preservation of democratic legal and political order. His focus has largely 
concentrated on the post-war need to recreate, or at least to legitimate, the legal-political 
institutions of German society, and (his more recent interest) the constitutional order of the 
European Union. I have drawn on him, thinking that the creation of a rationally legitimate 
intersocietal legal order in Canada, out of the heritage of prerogative power, requires a similar 
pragmatic foundation. I have argued that the duty to consult, as currently developed, 
demonstrates the weak points in the Supreme Court of Canada’s own turn to communication to 
establish the legitimacy of the law in relation to First Nations and other indigenous communities.  
 
In Chapters 3 and 4 I have provided a response to those critical concerns most directly related to 
this project. In particular, I have acknowledged limitations within Habermas’s understanding of 
the position of indigenous societies as political and legal entities within North America. I have 
suggested adaptations to his perspective that I believe have made it more suitable to my 
discussion of the duty to consult, principally by recasting the discursive foundation of the system 
of rights from that of individual members of a political order to include a discursive view of the 
treaty relationships that are the historical heart of indigenous/settler intersocietal legal order. I 
have also sought to show that his understanding of the norms of pragmatic discourse coheres 
with norms that might be found operating within various indigenous legal orders, or at least 
norms that indigenous parties have employed in the context of intersocietal legal discourse, such 
as in the production of the 1701 treaty at Montrèal. As I have said, how extensive such coherence 
might be, whether it is widely shared across North American indigenous legal orders, or 
                                                                                                                                                             
common English translation than “prerogative state,” perhaps most literally as the “measurement state.” 
Yet, he himself, and not his translator Edward Shils, made the case for describing NS legality as an 
exercise of “prerogative,” drawing the term from James I’s 1613 speech to the Star Chamber. See 
Fraenkel’s The Dual State: a Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1969 [19411]), at 38.  
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operative within indigenous contexts other than in the intersocietal production of treaties, 
remains beyond my scope to consider. My only claim here is that the 1701 treaty, with its 
combination of performative and pragmatic elements, might serve as a useful template for how 
discursive norms can be thought to function within the sort of intersocietal legal situations that 
are brought into being by both the duty to consult, and perhaps as well by Canada’s continued 
need to shape treaties with First Nations. This claim could easily be tempered or confirmed by 
indigenous and other scholars, or representatives or practitioners of indigenous legal orders, and 
who are more familiar with the functions of such legal orders than I am.  
 
I have directed my analysis of the duty to consult to what I have called its intellectual 
scaffolding. Each of the four communicative practices identified in Chapter 1, and examined in 
Chapters 5 and 6, have enabled the court to provide a platform on which Canada and indigenous 
communities can address their frequently contending visions of what it means to engage in 
intersocietal relations ordered by the rule of law. In order to stabilize this platform, the court has 
employed both the common law and its developing sense of its constitutional duty to insure the 
legitimacy of law. The court has oscillated between these two avenues of reading the duty to 
consult. On the one hand, as Dickson acknowledged in Sparrow: “There is no explicit language 
in the provision [sec. 35(1)] that authorizes this Court or any court to assess the legitimacy of any 
government legislation that restricts aboriginal rights.”2 On the other, the court has rested content 
with deriving the sources of the duty to consult from precedent within the jurisprudence of 
Canada and, on occasion, other jurisdictions. As McLachlin C.J. put the common law task in 
relation to the problem in Haida Nation: 
                                                 
2
 Sparrow, supra p. 15 n. 21, at 1109. 
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Our task is the modest one of establishing a general framework for the duty to consult 
and accommodate, where indicated, before Aboriginal title or rights claims have been 
decided. As this framework is applied, courts, in the age-old tradition of the common law, 
will be called on to fill in the details of the duty to consult and accommodate.
3
  
 
As complicated an exercise as this has proven to be, I have argued that it is more complicated 
still. The communicative practices that the court has employed are fundamentally “extra-legal.” 
That is, they have no self-limiting means of being sequestered from the general range of usage in 
other pragmatic communicative contexts. Thus they are practices that may well be inherently 
contested. A likely upshot of such contestability, which reflects the critical input of voices from 
the larger public sphere, means that without more sustained consideration of how they might be 
regarded as specifically legal practices, the volume of cases is not likely to ease off in the years 
ahead. An empirical question that I have not addressed in this project is: might the large number 
of challenges to state action brought under the duty to consult be traced to uncertainties 
stemming from its mixture of extra-legal norms – the communicative practices I detailed in 
Chapter 1, and its incorporation of a wide range of procedural requirements? It may be that 
further clarification of this extra-legal “messiness,” if I can call it that, could reduce these 
challenges. On the other hand, the duty to consult is now the primary tool for First Nations and 
other indigenous communities to employ in their ongoing struggles with the Canadian state. 
Given the state’s steady, or even increasing, desire for resource development and regulation, and 
its continued intent to regulate a broad range of other indigenous interests (family relations, 
financial administration, economic development, education, etc.) these legal challenges don’t 
seem likely to ease off – nor should they, from my perspective.   
 
                                                 
3
 Haida Nation, supra p. 1 n. 2, at para. 11.  
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From the standpoint of discourse theory (or at least my reading of it), the messiness of duty to 
consult jurisprudence provides a strong demonstration of Canada’s lack of seriousness regarding 
its relations with indigenous peoples. Provincial governments and federal departments, business 
concerns, the law firms that serve them, and perhaps even some First Nations governments, may 
all see this messiness as most basically indicating that the law needs settling, that the Supreme 
Court needs to provide certainty above all. The “procedural duty to consult” referred to in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation,4 if secured by courts intent on promoting regularity and filling in gaps, 
would, I imagine, satisfy the concerns of most of these groups. However, as Habermas puts it: 
“legal certainty, which is based on the knowledge of unambiguously conditioned behavioral 
expectations, is itself a principle which must be weighed against other principles.” 5 Applied 
here, this means that the procedures insuring certainty concerning the duty to consult could only 
be regarded as rationally legitimate to the extent that they have been derived from, constructed 
out of, the specific intersocietal context that is the focus of the duty to consult. Only when 
derived from conditions of communicative equality could procedures affecting indigenous 
parties be potentially viewed as legitimate.  
 
Discourse theory suggests another approach to the messiness of the current system than further 
clarification by what Habermas calls “professionally and judicially institutionalized monopolies 
on interpretation” charged with “internal revision according to their own standards.”6 Instead, 
this messiness could also be viewed as an example of the public sphere influence that inevitably 
                                                 
4
 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra p. 43 n. 107, at paras. 77-78. 
 
5
 BFN, at 220. 
 
6
 Ibid. at 222. 
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surrounds the courts and requires discursive responses – and the establishment of discursive 
procedures – that resonate with indigenous parties, that is, could be intersocietally endorsed. 
Approached as a contentious site of law within an intersocietal public sphere, the clarification 
needed of the duty to consult would look somewhat different from that provided so far. The 
extra-legal qualities of the communicative practices that I have argued undergird the duty to 
consult could be seen as markers of a different set of questions. They could perhaps give hope of 
pragmatically achieved answers that would provide the duty to consult with a greater degree of 
legal legitimacy in the intersocietal context that is its focus.  
 
I would suggest that this different sort of clarification might consider the duty to consult’s 
reliance upon extra-legal communicative practices as a positive feature. That is, these practices 
could be seen as spurs for developing a stronger intersocietal basis for Canada’s legal relations 
with indigenous communities. As I have argued, these communicative practices are inherently 
public. They remain frequently embedded within our traditions of moral discourse (or 
theological discourse in the case of reconciliation), and inescapably tied to our imaginative 
projects – that is, our willed envisioning of the legal relations we choose to see ourselves 
maintaining.  
 
I have sought to show that the discursive norms they embody require that these practices be 
extended beyond the range of employment that the courts have been most comfortable 
acknowledging. Admittedly, this assumes that the courts have been sincere in holding that the 
purpose of the duty to consult is to provide for reconciliation, and to respect indigenous rights 
that Canada has most typically “honoured in the breach” – in Dickson C.J.’s so-softly phrased 
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construal of law’s reach in Sparrow. For instance, I have argued that at the pragmatic level of 
communication, one cannot attribute honour to oneself, nor can one justify a policy or decision, 
without consensual feedback from those over whom the claim of honour would hold sway, or 
those who would be affected by the policy or decision. That is, while still considering oneself to 
be functioning within a democratic legal order. 
 
However, the courts have largely been content, thus far, to bolster their vision of the duty to 
consult in ways that would eviscerate the possibility that the duty is likely to promote 
communication “oriented towards mutual understanding,” as Habermas phrases the normative 
goal of pragmatic discourse. When followed into the ground, the pillars of the duty to consult 
rest on extra-legal doctrines that remain unchanged since the colonial era – as the idea of 
reconciling indigenous communities to the “assertion of Crown sovereignty” illustrates. That the 
courts, the Canadian state, and large segments of the public as well, remain content with this 
colonial inheritance can easily give credit to the dark suspicions of Canada’s rule of law found 
within the work of indigenist authors such as Taiaiake Alfred, although it is not confined to 
intellectuals. John Borrows has expressed what he sees as a common and deep-seated suspicion 
of law’s impact on indigenous people:  
Most Indigenous people do not feel it is safe to go to the courts as they are currently 
constituted. Their testimony and history are subject to discrediting cross-examinations 
and harsh burdens of proof. Their legal traditions do not form standards for judgment in 
relation to their testimonies. Furthermore, Indigenous peoples do not find peace or 
security when raising their issues in the political sphere.
7
  
 
Habermas’s discourse perspective, like other critical approaches to law, can also yield the  
 
easy conclusion that law’s general effects on indigenous individuals and communities, and the 
effect of the duty to consult in particular, amount only to “strategic action,” serving to do little 
                                                 
7
 Borrows, supra p. 107 n. 31, at 173. 
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more than advance the hold of money and power over indigenous “lifeworlds.” Although I have 
not really offered a reading of the strategic factors affecting the implementation of the duty to 
consult in particular, or law in general, this does not mean that I think they are insignificant – and 
even capable of deforming any potential for law to serve as a vehicle for justice between Canada 
and indigenous peoples.   
 
Personally, it seems to me a fair reading of the jurisprudence to say that Canada’s courts have not 
yet found their equivalent of the US Brown v the Board of Education, which refuted the long-
standing racial doctrine of separate but equal. As I argued in Chapter 5, at most the courts have 
suggested that times change, and that with those changes certain communicative practices and 
presumptions of value may go by the way. However, doctrines such as the “assertion of Crown 
sovereignty,” or the “doctrine of discovery” cannot be shelved as though they were simply the 
product of another age. For McLachlin C.J. to hold, as I also noted in Chapter 5, that the doctrine 
of terra nullius “never applied in Canada, as confirmed by the Royal Proclamation,” is to scoot 
around an issue that the courts should be expected to confront directly.
8
  
                                                 
8
 By scooting, I mean that the chief justice may only have had in mind the conclusions of Lamer C.J. in 
Van der Peet, that “the maxim of terra nullius was not to govern here”  (supra, p. 2 n. 3 at para. 270). 
But, it is just as likely that she had in mind the academic debates regarding the historical usage of the term 
in Australia (since Lamers C.J. was also referring to Australia). This suggests, however, that she was 
tilting only at a straw man. A number of scholars have demonstrated that terra nullius is not found within 
18
th
 and 19
th
 century international law (at least up until the 1880s), or within the writings of colonial-era 
Australians. Rather, it emerges in the late 19
th
 century work of European lawyers concerned with the 
rationalization of colonial regimes in Africa. More prominently, it appears in late 19
th
 and 20
th
 century 
questions related to exploration and development of, first, the polar regions; and later, lunar space. 
Australia’s Mabo decision, then, famous for overturning the doctrine: “The lands of this continent were 
not terra nullius or ‘practically unoccupied’ in 1788,” therefore only succeeded in defeating an 
anachronism. See Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23, at 56. Or, in Mabo the Australian court 
created a fiction of the fiction of terra nullius. For an influential critique of the “stage-managed” legal 
discourse produced in Mabo, see David Ritter “The ‘Rejection of Terra Nullius’ in Mabo: a Critical 
Analysis” (1996) Sydney Law Review 18(1) 5, at 33. For an overview of the subsequent deeply-politicized 
debate (admittedly, from one of its continuing key players) as well as the history of the term’s use in 
international law, see Andrew Fitzmaurice “The Genealogy of Terra Nullius” (2007) Australian 
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It may be that the courts themselves, by inclination or ideology, or by an understandable sense of 
judicial restraint, cannot be expected to conceive of law in terms of the discursive framework 
that Habermas has advocated, and that I have somewhat recast here in an intersocietal direction. 
However, even if that is so, I can imagine, for the sake of argument at least, a couple of examples 
as to how the courts could still be expected to consider the merits of challenges that might be 
brought under discursive considerations. First, assume that a well-prepared indigenous claim is 
not dismissed for any of the myriad procedural reasons that regularly prove insurmountable, such 
as laches, or the increasing number of dismissals for “collateral attack” that have occurred since 
Lefthand.
9
 Imagine that in its submissions justifying its action: providing a tree farm license, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Historical Studies 129(1) 1. None of this reconstruction diminishes, as these authors acknowledge, the 
necessity of confronting the legal doctrines that did justify, whether prior to or subsequently, the erosion 
of indigenous control of traditional territories in North America. Although the label terra nullius does not 
necessarily fit here, the “doctrine of discovery” does, given that it informs the basis of Indian law in the 
US Marshall cases, incorporated into St. Catharines Milling and Lumber, and discussed uncritically by 
the justices on both sides of the title question in Calder, supra p. 95 n. 11, at 327 and 381); and by 
Dickson C.J. in Guerin, supra p. 17 n. 26, at 378). For a post-Tsilhqot’in Nation mention of the 
“astounding consequences” of the doctrine of discovery in Canada, see Tyendinaga Mohawk Council v 
Brant, 2014 ONCA 565, at 62. For a recent argument that in New France terra nullius was in fact the 
source of key practices undergirding corporate purchase of land, and making any legal doctrine irrelevant 
in the historically causal process of indigenous dispossession, see Edward Cavanagh “Possession and 
Dispossession in Corporate New France, 1600-1663: Debunking a "Juridical History" and Revisiting 
Terra Nullius” (2014) Law and History Review 32(1) 97.    
 
9
 R. v Lefthand, supra p. 179 n. 65. In this frequently cited decision (37 times as of this writing), the 
Alberta appeals court thought the time had come to restrict appeals to the duty to consult arising from 
individual violations of provincial regulations and other indirect challenges to the validity of regulations. 
The court found that: 
 From one perspective collateral attack runs contrary to the rule of law. It undermines the 
 jurisdiction of the courts. Collateral attack also undermines the right of the community to  be 
 consulted before aboriginal rights are impacted. Indeed, the duty of consultation with the 
 community is difficult to reconcile with a legal position that, even after such consultation and the 
 enactment of regulations by a democratically based process, aboriginal individuals might on their 
 own initiative simply decline to accept the regulatory scheme achieved, and disobey it. Collateral 
 attack also usurps the legitimate  jurisdiction of the regulators to manage the fishery. It distorts the 
 respectful relationship that should exist between individuals and their democratic government. 
 Acceptance of collateral attack in one area of legal regulation, moreover, may demoralize the 
 otherwise law‑abiding as to other areas of law (ibid. at para. 24). 
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authorizing the damming of a river, or changing regulations due to conservation concerns; the 
state draws on the “assertion of Crown sovereignty,” or defends its exercise of prerogative on the 
basis of appeals to the division of powers contained in the Constitution Act, 1867.      
 
From a pragmatic discourse perspective, in which underlying presumptions, or “validity claims,” 
can be brought to light and “discursively redeemed,” the assertion of sovereignty should be 
treated as just such a contestable claim. That is, its discursive validity within a pragmatic context 
would be secured best by the concurrence of those it addressed. An indigenous party or its 
counsel could raise pragmatic questions, such as: how is it that the state presumes for itself 
sovereignty over the appellants? Where is evidence of their communal concurrence in the 
assertion of sovereignty? Through what measures did indigenous communities renounce their 
historical self-determination and become subjects of Canada’s sovereignty? Such pragmatic 
questions, grounded only in the appeal to legitimacy achieved through mutual understanding, 
would press the courts to offer compelling accounts of why the communicative practice of the 
“assertion of Crown sovereignty,” or others anchoring the duty to consult, deny the 
communicative standing of indigenous parties as equals.  
 
As a second example, consider again the idea that First Nations lack a “veto” over development 
projects affecting their traditional lands. From a discourse perspective, the courts’ view that the 
duty to consult provides no right of a veto seems inherently backwards. As the courts have cast 
it, the ability of First Nations to say “no” to a project could only be the result of their first having 
been given that right, or that legal standing, by the state. The presumption in discourse theory, as 
I have laid it out, is that, by contrast, all communication oriented towards mutual understanding 
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between rational beings requires the inherent ability to exercise the option of what White and 
Farr refer to as “no-saying,” as I mentioned in Chapter 2.10 Without the ability to disagree: to 
refuse another party’s strategic or pragmatic intent, to object to the other party’s presumptions, or 
the other party’s account of facts; discourse approaching mutual understanding is impossible. 
Although certain social contexts might be exceptions to this option of “no-saying,” they are 
deviations from the fundamental norm of communicative equality. Even to maintain these 
deviations, the power of some over others within given settings (family, school, work, the 
military, prisons) requires a pragmatic explanation that those who don’t stand as communicative 
equals could be expected to acknowledge as legitimate. The public sphere, however, in which the 
law develops as the sinews of democratic, constitutional order, requires communicative equality, 
and always entails Habermas’s “risk of dissensus.” Any effort by the state or the courts to 
explain why they presume that indigenous communities share more with those contexts of 
dependency or subordination than they do with self-determining legal political orders (such as 
provinces) could only be redeemed if indigenous peoples themselves concurred. 
 
However, in Canada’s legal relations with First Nations, most publicly in the duty to consult, 
communicative equality, and the “risk of dissensus” has disappeared from the settings in which 
state and indigenous communities address settler desires to impact indigenous rights or 
interests.
11
 As a successfully “redeemed” pragmatic, communicative act, to assert sovereignty 
would require an affirmation from those who concur to be subject to that sovereignty. To invoke 
                                                 
10
 White and Farr, supra p. 66 n. 39. 
 
11
 That is, if we presume that communicative equality was operative, or at least more operative, during the 
treaty formations of the colonial era, and perhaps, or to a lesser extent, within the formation of the 
numbered treaties.   
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honour is to need the confirmation of those who recognize that honour has been maintained or 
achieved. To justify a policy impacting others is to receive their confirmation that the 
justification is legitimate. To narrate the shared history of Canada’s consideration of Aboriginal 
rights requires the voices of those whose gifts (or what James Sinclair referred to as bagijiganan, 
as I noted in Chapter 4) made the country possible. Without the presumption of communicative 
equality, the communicative practices that have laid the foundations for Canada’s duty to consult 
regarding Aboriginal and treaty rights with indigenous parties remain far from embraceable, and 
far from rationally legitimate.  
 
Perhaps the presumption of communicative equality needs glossing as the American courts have 
done with regard to “reserved rights” in general – meaning that rights are held until willingly 
given up, instead of being created, by an act of treaty. Justice McKenna expressed the ultimate 
reason for the reservation of Yakama fishing rights at issue in Winans as being they are: “not 
much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.” 12 If such 
a construction were put on the pragmatic claim of communicative equality, or if it were regarded 
                                                 
12
 That doctrine was expressed in United States v Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), at 381, and – although 
tied only to the question of water rights – in Winters v U. S., 207 U.S. 564 (1908). It was based on canons 
of treaty interpretation in U.S. law dating back to the Marshall cases, and summarized in Jones v Meehan, 
175 U.S. 1 (1899). In Sioui, Lamers C.J. incorporated this canon into Canadian law with his quotation of 
Jones v Meehan (R. v Sioui, [1990] 1 SCR 1025, at 1036). As Justice McKenna framed these prior rights 
in Winans: 
 The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a part of larger rights possessed by the 
 Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not 
 much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed. New 
 conditions came into existence, to which those rights had to be accommodated. Only a limitation 
 of them, however, was necessary and intended, not a taking away. In other words, the treaty was 
 not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them — a reservation of those not 
 granted (ibid. at 381). 
John Borrows has referred to the US sources of treaty interpretation and what he calls Canada’s 
assumption that “residual powers” belong to the state. See his “Domesticating Doctrines: Aboriginal 
Peoples after the Royal Commission” (2001) McGill Law Journal 46(4) 615, at 626. 
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as what Brian Slattery has called a “generic right,” it would go a long way towards reorienting 
the context in which the courts and Canada have seen the duty to consult to function.
13
  
 
This would mean that the pressing questions of clarification that might be woven into future 
legal challenges to specific development projects could push Canada to justify – to redeem – its 
validity claims regarding how, where, and when indigenous nations lost their presumptions of 
communicative equality. That this justification could only proceed with the concurrence of those 
who are presumed to have lost this condition indicates that Habermas’s vision of justification is 
not that employed by chief justices Dickson, Lamer or McLachlin. However, as I have tried to 
argue at several points, I think this focus on communicative equality coheres with the calls of 
indigenous scholars for a revamping of the legal order that Canada shares with First Nations and 
other indigenous communities. Of course, these same scholars might strongly disagree with my 
seeking to bring them on board.
14
 Nevertheless I think the pragmatically necessary assumption of 
communicative equality provides clears a path for thinking about how any such revamping might 
                                                 
13
 See his “A Taxonomy of Aboriginal Rights,” in Foster, Raven and Webber supra p. 106  n. 31, at 123. 
 
14
 Space prohibits me from addressing this dovetailing any further than I already have in Chapter 4, where 
I indicated that even the stridency of Taiaiake Alfred’s ethnic nationalism reveals a strong communicative 
core. I think this core is also operative within the work of such scholars as Val Napoleon, Henderson, 
Borrows, Dale Turner, and others. Napoleon herself draws on Habermas’s argument for a civic rather 
than an ethnic nationalist legal and political order in Canada, in arguing for a civic view of indigenous 
nationalism in Canada. See her “Extinction by Number Colonialism Made Easy” (2001) Canadian 
Journal of Law and Society 16(1) 113, at 137. See also Turner supra p. 96 n. 14, at 120-121. As well, see, 
generally, Henderson’s “Dialogical Governance,” supra p. 132 n. 29. John Borrows does not directly 
pursue communicative themes in his call for revisioning our thinking of Canada’s constitutional order, 
focusing instead on a more Foucauldian view of legal practices, supra p. 107 n. 31, at 284. Nevertheless, 
his project of reconciling civil, common and indigenous legal traditions entails the position of 
communicative equality that I have argued for here. He notes, for instance, “another important way to 
ensure that our legal traditions remain open to new and healthy influences is to regard them as being 
situated within interpretive communities in which those who are affected by them are able to participate 
in their continued construction,” ibid. at 9-10. 
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proceed. In particular, I think this is so because Canada’s courts can be found to share in this 
same necessary assumption.  
 
The discourse view of legal legitimacy conceives of law as developed democratically within a 
real-world context of communication by equals. Courts also embrace this same view of 
legitimacy, and employ communicative measures that they presume will be accepted as 
legitimate by those affected by their rulings. Although many lawyers and judges may presume 
the heritage of Weberian or Hartian conceptions of legal legitimacy, they must also at some level 
subscribe to Habermas’s rendering of discursive rational legitimacy as democratic. In Canada, 
this understanding of legal legitimacy stands out most strongly in the Quebec Succession 
Reference. There the court tied the legitimacy of legal and political order to a source other than 
“sovereign will.”  
 The consent of the governed is a value that is basic to our understanding of a free and 
 democratic society. Yet democracy in any real sense of the word cannot exist without the 
 rule of law. It is the law that creates the framework within which the “sovereign will” is 
 to be ascertained and implemented. To be accorded legitimacy, democratic institutions 
 must rest, ultimately, on a legal foundation. That is, they must allow for the participation 
 of, and accountability to, the people, through public institutions created under the 
 Constitution. Equally, however, a system of government cannot survive through 
 adherence to the law alone. A political system must also possess legitimacy, and in our 
 political culture, that requires an interaction between the rule of law and the democratic 
 principle. The system must be capable of reflecting the aspirations of the people. But 
 there is more. Our law’s claim to legitimacy also rests on an appeal to moral values, 
 many of which are imbedded in our constitutional structure. It would be a grave mistake 
 to equate legitimacy with the “sovereign will” or majority rule alone, to the exclusion of 
 other constitutional values.
15
 
 
Here the court can be seen to have given legitimacy a communicative cast, placing it firmly 
within the democratic public sphere – the product of “participation of, and accountability to, the 
people,” animated by “moral values,” and not least, “the interaction between the rule of law and 
                                                 
15
 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, at para. 67. 
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the “democratic principle.” That law, politics and morality all function together to create the 
conditions of legal and political legitimacy, suggests that discourse grounded in communicative 
equality is also at the heart of the court’s rendition of Canada’s constitutional tradition. If so, I 
think it further underscores my argument, that the “extra-legal” communicative practices 
supporting the duty to consult require, and are capable of receiving, the additional support and 
extension of both Canada’s and indigenous nations’ best attempts to embrace an intersocietal 
legal order. 
 
Finally, I should acknowledge that I can see the argument I have made easily leading to a variety 
of critiques, or further developments. With my having employed a key figure in the theory wars, 
readers committed to positions contrary to the one engaged here might want to show the 
limitations inherent in Habermas’s version of discourse theory. As I have said, I am not at all 
opposed to the critical positions on law developed within other prominent perspectives. I merely 
think they provide a more solid analytical rather than a normative framework. Some readers 
might simply object to the idea that law is anything more than the weapon of the powerful. 
Others, perhaps more sympathetic to Habermas’s concerns, might object to my rendition of the 
specific themes I have drawn upon here.  
 
I can also imagine, as I indicated above, that readers better grounded in indigenous legal orders 
than I am could qualify, or dismiss, my characterization of the discourse basis of such orders. 
The diversity present across indigenous North America, in terms of both historical patterns of 
interaction with settler power, and in terms of socio-political organization, kinship structures and 
worldviews, could yield a range of claims about how legal orders have functioned, traditionally; 
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as well as in their interactions with the forces, and courts, of settler society. Such readers might 
also address questions about the range of perspectives within indigenous communities on the 
functioning of the duty to consult: such as its strength as a means for resolving conflicts 
stemming from settler state development or regulative interests, or specific suggestions for 
improving its capacity to provide intersocietally legitimate resolutions to such conflicts. As well, 
scholars and representatives of particular indigenous legal orders might find it useful to address 
the utility or the disutility of my argument for a discourse reading of the duty to consult, in terms 
of its relevance to the normative perspectives on law contained within such particular legal 
orders.  
 
Finally, I can also imagine that readers oriented towards empirical studies of the law might find a 
number of my claims suitable for examining further. How does the duty to consult measure up 
when contrasted with legal instruments available in other common law jurisdictions? What 
factors – ideological, historical, regional, or other – affect the outcomes in specific cases? What 
factors lead First Nations to adopt specific strategies in seeking consultation or in challenging the 
range of rulings brought against their claims? What patterns of communication might impact 
outcomes in particular cases, or ranges of cases? All of these questions would be helpful to 
answer in seeking to understand the workings of the duty to consult. As empirical questions, 
however, I do not think that on their own they would be capable of dismissing the normative 
qualities of a discourse theory approach to the duty to consult.  
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